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Abstract
This thesis draws on Jacques Derrida’s idea of ‘differance’ (difference as both 
distinction and deferral) to argue that, within post-Darwinian humanist culture, the 
category of ‘the human’ can only be defined by differentiating it from ‘the animal’. 
Following Derrida, this project seeks to ‘determin[e] the number, form, sense, or 
structure’ of the ‘plural and repeatedly folded frontier’ between these two categories.
Chapter 1, ‘Becoming Human’, examines the chronological boundaries between the 
human and extinct hominids such as Homo erectus and Neanderthals. It reads 
contemporary scientific accounts of ‘how we became human’ to demonstrate that they 
preserve the conceptual framework of earlier creation myths. However, despite their 
humanism, these accounts inevitably unsettle the boundaries between human and 
animal by revealing the play of traces across them.
Chapter 2, ‘Acting Human’, reads Descartes’ Discourse on the M ethod with Judith 
Butler’s theory of gender performance to argue that the human can only be identified 
by its behaviour. Those who do not behave ‘correctly’, such as people with autism, 
threaten humanism and are consequently punished. Conversely, when animals are seen 
to ‘act human’ (for example, the chimpanzee artist Congo) this is dismissed as 
anthropomorphism. However, these possibilities demonstrate that human behaviour is 
not tied to an internal essence.
Chapter 3, ‘Talking Human’, deconstructs the opposition between human language and 
animal communication which underpins contemporary humanist discourse. The 
human voice is identified with presence, truth and subjectivity, while animals are mute, 
inarticulate objects. However, the human subject is never fully in control of its 
communication, as demonstrated by blushing and involuntary nonverbal ‘leakage’. I 
conclude that ‘language’ and ‘the human’ are constituted only by referring to each 
other.
This thesis critiques the mythology of humanism in order to challenge the unethical 
acts that are committed in the name of the human.
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed
Date  L i / . Q k / . ^ . .
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree 
o f PhD.
Signed .....................................................................
Date ....... a . / . a t / . e f ........................................................................
STATEMENT 2
This thesis is the result o f my own independent work/investigation, except where 
otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit 
references.
Signed
Date  /. l./.Q  ...
STATEMENT 3
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if  accepted, to be available for photocopying and 
for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed
Date
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed ..........................................................................................................
Date ..........................................................................................................
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of PhD.
Signed.............. ...........................................................................................................
Date ...........................................................................................................
STATEMENT 2
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where 
otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit 
references.
Signed ..........................................................................................................
Date ..........................................................................................................
STATEMENT 3
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and 
for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed.............. ..........................................................................................................
Date ..........................................................................................................

The Animal in Differance
Tracing the Boundaries of the Human 
in Post-Darwinian Culture
Jessica Mordsley
A thesis submitted in candidature for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Critical and Cultural Theory 
Cardiff University 
2007
UMI Number: U585056
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U585056
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements............................................................................ i
Introduction. The Human as the Animal in Differance................. 1
Borders, Difference, and Differance........................................................................................ 6
Darwin’s Legacy.....................................................................................................................17
Deconstruction and Limitrophy............................................................................................. 21
Cyborgs, Companions, and the Discourse of Species............................................................24
Posthumanism, Uncertainty, and the Uncanny...................................................................... 28
Animal Studies, Animal Rights, and the Production of the Human.......................................30
Popular Philosophy................................................................................................................ 32
Mythbusting and Semioclasm................................................................................................ 36
Ethics and Humanism............................................................................................................40
Summary of Chapters.............................................................................................................46
Chapter 1. Becoming Human: Evolution, the Trace, and 
Differance in Time.......................................................................... 51
The Origin of Species.............................................................................................................55
Creation Myths....................................................................................................................... 65
Paleoanthropology as a Humanist Discourse........................................................................ 74
The Magic Moment................................................................................................................ 80
Homo Erectus: A True Man?.................................................................................................83
Neanderthals: Simple-Minded Brutes or the First Flower People?....................................... 87
Face to Face: Neanderthal as Mirror......................................................................................90
The Ghost in the Mirror: Neanderthals and the Uncanny..................................................... 95
Border Crossings, Border Control........................................................................................101
The Ascent of Man: Bipedalism and Humanism.................................................................102
Children: Becoming Human and the Biogenetic Law .........................................................106
DNA, the Origin, and the Trace...........................................................................................110
Conclusion: Paleoanthropology Dissolves the Human........................................................117
Chapter 2. Acting Human: Autism, Anthropomorphism, and 
Differance in Behaviour................................................................ 125
Theoretical Approach: Descartes and Butler....................................................................... 128
Animals in Human Form: Feral Children and Autism......................................................... 135
Autism and the Uncanny.......................................................................................................141
Missing Persons: Autism and Exclusion from the Human.................................................. 144
Other Minds: Border Figures and the Limits of the Human................................................ 150
The Violence of Species Norms: Punishment of Autistic People........................................ 153
Autism, Ethics and Power: Re-evaluating the Human......................................................... 158
Human Drag..........................................................................................................................161
A Brief History of Anti-anthropomorphism......................................................................... 168
Seductive Pollution...............................................................................................................173
PG, Pathe and Puns: Acceptable Anthropomorphism..........................................................176
Aping Art: Congo and Dangerous Anthropomorphism.......................................................183
Parody and Risk................................................................................................................... 195
Quotation Marks: Performance vs. Performativity..............................................................197
Conclusion: The Showman and the Marquis...................................................................... 202
Chapter 3. Talking Human: Speech, the Unconscious, and 
Differance in Communication.....................................................206
Theoretical Approach...........................................................................................................210
Language / Communication = Us / Them........................................................................... 213
Sudden Emergence of Language......................................................................................... 216
The Myth of Language: Freedom and Constraint............................................................... 219
From Language to Speech....................................................................................................222
Logos and Phone..................................................................................................................224
Voicelessness, Advocacy, and Articulation.........................................................................227
Aping and Parroting............................................................................................................. 232
‘An Animal Looks at Me’.................................................................................................... 237
Smart Alex: Parroting, Uncertainty and the Uncanny..........................................................240
The Case o f the Perjured Parrot: Death and Doubling.......................................................242
The Great Taboo: Voice and the Transmigration of Souls..................................................245
Replaceable Subjects............................................................................................................ 250
Blushing: Betrayal and Self-control.....................................................................................254
The Limbic System and Leakage.........................................................................................257
Body Language and Proper Speech.....................................................................................262
Aphasia and the Symphony of Smells: Communication and Otherness.............................266
‘Electric Vocabulary’: Terminology and Power................................................................. 272
Conclusion: Endless Deferral...............................................................................................277
Conclusion: Dismantling the Myth of the Human....................281
Notes.............................................................................................. 287
Bibliography...................................................................................313
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been written without funding from the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council. I am extremely grateful for their award.
I would like to thank the staff of the Cardiff University Arts and Social Studies 
Library, in particular the Inter-Library Loans service, for their help.
My supervisor, Dr Neil Badmington, was generous with his time, meticulous in his 
attention to detail, and a great source of inspiration and ideas.
Donna Haraway and Cary Wolfe both very kindly allowed me to read extracts from 
their forthcoming publications.
Jodie Matthews and Mareile Pfannebecker helped me a great deal by reading drafts of 
chapters and providing extremely useful and thorough feedback.
Roger Christofides discussed Derrida, Drogba, and diacritical marks.
Paul Gorton’s rigorous questioning helped to clarify several ideas.
Dr Anne McMonagle, Dr Irene Ragaller, and Dr Robin Sims all gave valuable advice 
and proved that it could be done.
Dr James Evans provided the intellectual and practical support which made it possible 
to complete this project.
My parents were extremely supportive and supplied all sorts of interesting cultural 
artefacts.
Finally, Mark Saint John Ridley kept me going with many years of strength, love, 
sustenance, and lifts home in the rain.
1Introduction
The Human as the Animal in Differance
We could thus take up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is 
constructed, and from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition 
vanish but to see the emergence of a necessity such that one of the terms 
appears as the differance of the other, the other as ‘differed’ within the 
systematic ordering of the same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the 
sensible, as sensible differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life as 
differing-differed matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed- 
differing nature; and all the terms designating what is other than physis -  
techne, nomos, society, freedom, history, spirit, etc. -  as physis differing: physis 
in differance).
Jacques Derrida, ‘Differance’, in ‘Speech and Phenom ena’ and Other Essays on H usserl’s 
Theory o f  Signs, trans. by David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1973), pp. 129-60 (pp. 148-49).
For there is no interest to be found in a discussion of a supposed continuity, 
rupture, or even abyss between those who call themselves men and what so- 
called men, those who name themselves men, call the animal. [...] The 
discussion is worth undertaking once it is a matter of determining the number, 
form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistency of this abyssal limit, these 
edges, this plural and repeatedly folded frontier.
Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, trans. by David W ills, 
Critical Inquiry, 28: 2 (Winter 2002), 369-418 (p. 399).
2In August 2006, Channel 4 broadcast a two-part documentary series entitled What
Makes Us Human?. It was presented by the geneticist and evolutionary biologist
Armand Leroi, who argued that the answer to this question could be found by looking
at the genes. Against a backdrop of forest and blue sky, Leroi claimed:
Ever since Aristotle, philosophers have wondered, what makes us different 
from the beasts? Their answers -  that man is a political animal, a thinking 
animal, a tool-making animal -  can now be discarded. Now when we ask what 
makes us human, we can answer: this gene, and that one, and that one. We can 
begin to write the recipe for making a human being.1
This passage embodies the beliefs and assumptions of contemporary scientific
humanism. First, the belief that science, especially genetics, has now rendered
philosophical inquiry on the subject unnecessary: that there has been, as Marjorie
Garber phrases it, a ‘shift in the disciplinary custody of “human nature”’2 from the
humanities to the biological sciences. Second, the assumption that after centuries of
asking the question ‘what makes us human?’, all previous answers ‘can now be
discarded’, as the current answer ( ‘this gene, and that one, and that one’) is the final
definitive truth. But is this ‘new’ answer really so different from the old ones?
One of the classic statements of ‘what makes us different from the beasts’ is found in 
Rene Descartes’ Discourse on the Method o f Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and 
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences. The Discourse was written in 1637 at a time when 
the importance of ‘the human’ was in the ascendant while the centrality of God was
3correspondingly in decline.4 Descartes played a crucial role in constructing the new
idea of the human; as Neil Badmington argues, Descartes might ‘be seen as one of the
principal architects of humanism, for in the seventeenth century, he arrived at a new
and remarkably influential account of what it means to be human’.5 Descartes’
argument is that humans are physically animals, a conclusion which was hard to avoid
given the new discoveries in anatomy and the first encounters of Western explorers
with apes, but that ‘we’ have an extra quality, namely reason, which distinguishes ‘us’
from other animals. This distinction between humans and other animals has a secular
rather than religious basis. Indeed, Descartes separates humans from animals in a more
absolute way than some religious philosophers, such as St Thomas Aquinas, who
thought that animals may have souls, albeit ‘lesser and temporary’ ones.6 Stephen
Walker notes that: ‘Descartes was not original in being a dualist, but innovative in
abandoning dualism for animals other than man’.7 This dualism is stated in the
following passage from the Discourse:
If any such machines had the organs and outward shape of a monkey or of 
some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that 
they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals; whereas if any 
such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as 
closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should still have two very 
certain means of recognizing that they were not real men. (pp. 139-40)
The first of these two tests is that ‘they could never use words, or put together other
signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to others [...] so as to give an
appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in [their] presence’ (p. 140). The
second test is that ‘even though such machines might do some things as well as we do
them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal
that they were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their
organs’ (p. 140). Therefore, humans do not act ‘only from the disposition of their
4organs’; there is something else that exceeds the body. ‘In just these two ways’, 
Descartes argues, ‘we can also know the difference between man and beast’ (p. 140).
This account of the difference between humans and other animals still dominates 
contemporary views: as Jacques Derrida writes, ‘when it comes to the relation to “the 
Animal”, this Cartesian legacy determines all of modernity. [...] Descartes’s “text” is of 
course not the cause of this large structure, but it “represents” it in a powerful 
systematicity of the symptom’.8 Many people today, both scientists and non-scientists, 
look to genetics to answer the question ‘what makes us human?’, but contrary to 
Armand Marie Leroi’s claims, the old answers have not really been ‘discarded’. The 
persistence of the ‘Cartesian legacy’ can be read, for example, in a 2004 New Scientist 
article entitled ‘Chimp Genome Preview: What Makes Us Human’, in which Robin 
Orwant writes:
Using DNA chips, [the researchers] compared expression patterns for about 
18,000 genes shared by humans, chimps, macaques, and orang-utans [...]. They 
found that in blood and liver tissue, humans and chimps expressed the genes in 
a very similar way. But when they looked at brain tissue, they found that 
chimps’ expression patterns were closer to those of other primates than those of 
humans. The group concluded that a major acceleration in the evolution of 
regulatory factors in humans allowed them to develop unique gene expression 
patterns in the brain.9
This passage rearticulates Descartes’ dualism in the language of genetics. It is
acceptable for the material body ( ‘blood and liver tissue’) to be the same in humans
and chimpanzees, because this does not disrupt the privileged category of the human,
but the mind, whether figured as soul, reason, or ‘unique gene expression patterns in
the brain’, separates ‘us’ from other animals. It is true that these brain expression
patterns have a certain materiality that Descartes’ ‘reason’ does not. The genetic
differences referred to here are empirically verifiable, unlike Descartes’ theorisation of
the soul. However, I suggest that the way in which this research is reported, and in
5particular the emphasis upon the distinction between ‘blood and liver tissue’ and ‘gene 
expression patterns in the brain’, echoes the Cartesian split between body and mind, 
and between animal and human. This reinscription of Cartesian dualism is 
symptomatic of a general tendency within contemporary humanism to take 
longstanding philosophical or religious ideas about ‘what it means to be human’, and 
to reformulate them using scientific terminology.
The third problematic belief expressed in Armand Leroi’s argument permeates the
entire genre to which it belongs, which I have referred to as scientific humanism.
Leroi answers the question ‘what makes us human?’ by saying ‘this gene, and that one,
and that one’, but how do you know which genes ‘make us human’? Early on in the
programme, Leroi makes it clear that he is not referring to all human genes when he
says this, but only to a specific set. Visiting the University of Chicago, he says:
One of the most exciting projects of twenty-first-century science is underway 
here in Chicago. Its goal is the identification of the genes that make us human, 
or more precisely, the genes that distinguish us from the great apes.
It is the shift in the middle of this sentence that fascinates and troubles me: ‘the genes
that make us human, or more precisely, the genes that distinguish us from the great
apes’. Is this simply a more precise way of saying the same thing? Is the concept of
‘what makes us human’ really indistinguishable from ‘what distinguishes us from the
great apes’? The assumption that these two questions are synonymous is prevalent
within contemporary accounts of ‘what it means to be human’. As Cary Wolfe
observes (in a discussion of Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises), ‘the question
What is a man? gets rewritten as if it had always been What is the difference between a
human and an animal?’.10 Furthermore, at the present historical moment this
‘difference’ is most frequently identified as being written in the genes. Thus the
6question, ‘What is a man?’, already transformed into ‘What is the difference between a 
human and an animal?’, is rewritten once more as ‘What is the genetic difference 
between a human and a chimpanzee?’.
Borders, Difference, and Differance
This reinscription of meaning can be read in the 2004 issue of New Scientist mentioned 
above, which featured a series of articles about the forthcoming publication of the
chimpanzee genome sequence under the heading ‘Humankind Past and Future: Chimp
11 1? Genome: Revelations from our Closest Kin’. The sequencing of the human genome
was completed a year earlier, so why should it be the chimpanzee genome which
promises ‘revelations’ about ‘humankind’? While the Human Genome Project was
underway, it seemed to herald an amazing breakthrough; for the first time, it was
claimed, there would be an accurate and complete account of ‘what it means to be
human’. This sense is captured in the US Department of Energy’s 1996 publication,
To Know Ourselves, whose title indicates the kind of knowledge that was promised:
In a material sense, then, all of the subtlety of our species, all of our art and 
science, is ultimately accounted for by a surprisingly small set of discrete 
genetic instructions. [...] We are far more alike than we are different. At the 
same time, there is room for near-infinite variety. It is no overstatement to say 
that to decode our 30,000 genes in some fundamental way would be an epochal 
step toward unraveling the manifold mysteries of life.13
This passage exemplifies the excitement with which the Human Genome Project was
anticipated: an excitement that was shared by the media and by the public and not
confined to US government documents. Somehow there was a sense of
disappointment when it was completed, ahead of schedule, in 2003; it was, as Richard
Horton (editor of The Lancet) writes, ‘a crushing anticlimax’.14
7Why was it such an anticlimax? I suggest that the human genetic sequence alone, with 
nothing to compare it to, is meaningless. This sense of meaninglessness is reflected in 
Horton’s description of the full genome as ‘the 3.2 gigabases of DNA reported in 
Nature':15 that is, 3.2 billion pairs of letters (A, T, C and G). What makes the human 
genome meaningful is difference: as Horton writes, ‘the human genome’s practical 
value is thought to lie not in the sequence itself but rather in the genetic variation that 
exists between individuals’.16 The chimpanzee genome is needed to make the human 
genome meaningful, by identifying the differences between the two: ‘When the 
chimpanzee genome sequence is published, sometime in the next few weeks, what 
everyone will want to know is how it compares with ours, and what genetic differences
17set us apart from our ape cousins’. As this quotation demonstrates, within 
contemporary humanist discourse the category of the human is constructed by 
differentiating it from the animal, and the chimpanzee, in its cultural position as ‘our 
closest living relative’, is the animal which is most frequently used as a point of 
comparison to identify the differences that ‘make us human’. This is why genetics in 
particular is such a powerful cultural discourse and why, as Donna Haraway writes, 
‘genetic difference studies are a high stakes game’.18 It is this active process of 
differentiating which constructs the meaning of the human. The chimpanzee is not 
considered to be interesting in itself, but only because of its difference from the human; 
conversely, without the knowledge of the chimpanzee genome, the human genome is 
meaningless.
A similar process of differentiation is currently taking place with the sequencing of the 
Neanderthal genome. Like chimpanzees, ‘our closest living relatives’, the 
Neanderthals occupy a significant cultural position as the closest extinct relative of
8Homo sapiens. An article in The Times in November 2006 reported that ‘DNA
extracted from a Neanderthal bone has been analysed in detail for the first time and the
genetic code of humanity’s closest cousin will be mapped completely within two
years’. The article continues:
The development will allow scientists to compare the human genome with that 
of our nearest living and extinct relatives -  the chimpanzee and the Neanderthal 
-  to tease out the differences between the three. These variations will in turn 
reveal the genes that make us human.19
Once again, it is ‘the differences’ or ‘variations’ which will ‘reveal the genes that make
us human’; the definition of the category of the human is fundamentally dependent
upon the process of differentiating it from its closest animal relatives. Scientific
humanism suggests that ‘we’ can only learn ‘who we are’ through these differences.
At the same time, the fact that the search continues indicates that neither the human
genome nor the chimpanzee genome was able to provide a final answer to the question
‘what makes us human?’.
The process of identifying the differences between the human and the animal in order
to define ‘what it means to be human’ is not restricted to genetics. In The Ascent o f
Man, Jacob Bronowski argues that in order to find out what ‘man’ is, it is necessary to
ask what makes ‘him ’ different from ‘the animals’:
Every human action goes back in some part to our animal origins; we should be 
cold and lonely creatures if we were cut off from that blood-stream of life. 
Nevertheless, it is right to ask for a distinction: What are the physical gifts that 
man must share with the animals, and what are the gifts that make him 
different?20
It is the ‘distinction’, the difference, that Bronowski wishes to locate in order to 
understand what the human ‘is’. It is only by identifying the differences between 
‘man’ and ‘the animals’ that the human can be defined. Bronowski works through an 
example: a detailed description of an athlete performing a pole vault. He observes that
9‘the starting response of the runner is the same as the flight response of the gazelle. He
seems all animal in action’.21 He then notes the physiological changes that take place,
such as an increase in heartbeat and breathing rate, and continues:
So far, there is nothing to distinguish the athlete from the gazelle -  all that, in 
one way or another, is the normal metabolism of an animal in flight. But there 
is a cardinal difference: the runner was not in flight. The shot that set him off 
was the starter’s pistol, and what he was experiencing, deliberately, was not 
fear but exaltation. [...] The overriding difference [...] is that the athlete is an 
adult whose behaviour is not driven by his immediate environment, as animal 
actions are. [...] It is the invention of the pole, the concentration of the mind at 
the moment before leaping, which give it the stamp of humanity.22
Because the physiological aspects are shared with nonhuman animals, the meaning of
the human ( ‘the stamp of humanity’) is defined as what is not shared: namely,
technology and innovation ( ‘the invention of the pole’), mental powers ( ‘the
concentration of the mind’) and above all, behaviour that is not determined but
‘deliberately’ chosen.23 To define ‘what it means to be human’ is to differ it from the
animal. It is the identification of these differences which constructs the category of the
human. As part of the same process, the physical attributes ‘that man must share with
the animals’ are excluded from ‘what it means to be human’; humanism denies or
downplays their importance.
The human is defined as what differs from the animal, but this difference or opposition
is not single or simple; there are many differences, many borders, to be identified. At
the beginning of Eve Spoke: Human Language and Human Evolution, in which he
argues that the act of speaking differentiates humans from other animals, Philip
Lieberman writes:
Over the past thirty years my colleagues and I have studied monkeys, 
chimpanzees, infants, children, normal adults, dyslexic adults, elderly people, 
and patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease and other types of brain 
damage. We have also examined the skulls of our fossil ancestors, comparing 
them with those of newborn infants and apes. The focus of these studies has
10
been the puzzle surrounding human evolution. Why are we so different from 
other animals, although we are at the same time so similar?24
In this passage, the ‘normal’ human is constructed by differentiating it from these
various border figures. The diverse beings that Lieberman lists have little in common,
except that they are here opposed to ‘normal [human] adults’: the unproblematic ‘we’
of the final sentence. Each of the others is related to the normative ‘we’ in a relation of
both sameness and difference, and the category of the ‘normal’ human is produced by
this play of differences and similarities. What is not shared with these ‘so similar’ but
‘so different’ border figures is what makes ‘us’ human. In her introduction to Human,
All Too Human, Diana Fuss notes that: ‘Sameness, not difference, provokes our
25greatest anxiety (and our greatest fascination) with the “almost human’” . These 
‘almost human’ border figures threaten the security of the ‘normal’ human by exposing 
its unstable boundaries, but they are also needed in order to define it.
A similar list of border figures appears in Leda Cosmides and John Tooby’s foreword 
to Simon Baron-Cohen’s Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism. Describing the
Oft‘evolved, specialized neural’ devices which construct ‘our [...] mental worlds’, they 
write:
Because these devices are present in all human minds, much of what they 
construct is the same for all people, from whatever culture; the representations 
produced by these universal mechanisms thereby constitute the foundation of 
our shared reality and our ability to communicate. [...] Indeed, it is exactly 
because of their universal and automatic character that we have been blind to 
the existence of the machinery that constitutes most of the evolved architecture 
of the human mind [...]. Cognitive scientists were awakened by a series of 
encounters with alien minds, whose starkly contrasting designs and surprising 
incapacities drew attention to previously overlooked natural human 
competences and to the computational problems they routinely solve. They 
encountered artificial mentalities in the computer lab that had obstinate 
difficulties in seeing, speaking, handling objects, understanding, or doing 
almost anything that humans do effortlessly. They encountered thousands of 
animal species each of which could solve a striking diversity of natural 
information-processing problems that other species could not. They
11
encountered the developing minds of infants and children [...] [and] 
neurologically impaired individuals who displayed unanticipated dissociations 
of cognitive deficits and abilities.27
I want to draw attention to two particular aspects of this passage. The first is the
seemingly unselfconscious and uncritical use of the term ‘alien minds’ to describe a
diverse group that includes ‘neurologically impaired individuals’ and ‘infants and
children’, as well as animals and artificial intelligences. Cosmides and Tooby set up a
universal human nature which transcends culture; it includes ‘all people’, ‘all human
minds’. ‘W e’ inhabit ‘our shared reality’ which is constructed by ‘universal
mechanisms’. And yet this apparently all-inclusive, non-discriminatory category
excludes not only ‘infants and children’ but also ‘neurologically impaired individuals’
with ‘cognitive deficits’ who are profoundly excluded from ‘our shared reality’;
indeed, they are explicitly labelled as ‘alien’. This exclusion of certain groups from
the category of the human counteracts the common-sense argument that ‘we all know
who is human now’. The boundaries of the category of the human are by no means
static, obvious, or natural. They are discursively constructed in texts such as this one,
and who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ is always a question of ethics and of power.
Furthermore, I suggest that these exclusions are an essential part of humanism. In 
order to define the human, in order to draw its borders, someone or something must 
always be excluded: as Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston argue, ‘science and its 
poetic sidekick have maintained the “household of man” through exclusions, 
subordinations, exoticizations, pathologizations, [and] criminalizations’.28 The second 
aspect to which I wish to draw attention, the aspect which is central to this thesis, is 
that, as the quotations above demonstrate, the human must be constituted through 
differentiating it from its almost-human others. It is only by encountering the ‘stark
12
contrast’ of these ‘alien minds’ that the idea of the normal, natural human can be 
constructed. As Zakiya Hanafi argues with reference to monsters, these humanlike, but 
not quite human, beings enable us to define ourselves -  ‘I know I am human because I 
am not that'29 -  and this requirement to ‘know’ who is and is not human is central to 
humanism.
Many different strands of thought have been characterised as humanist, but despite the
important theoretical differences, there are certain threads that run through all of them.
As Kate Soper writes:
A profound confidence in our powers to come to know and thereby to control 
our environment and destiny lies at the heart of every humanism; in this sense, 
we must acknowledge a continuity of theme, however warped it may have 
become with the passage of time, between the Renaissance celebration of the 
freedom of humanity from any transcendental hierarchy or cosmic order, the 
Enlightenment faith in reason and its powers, and the ‘social engineering’
30advocated by our contemporary ‘scientific’ humanists.
I am engaging with all of these humanisms in as much as they each posit an absolute
opposition between the human and nonhuman.31 However, because of the historical
span of this thesis, the predominant focus is on contemporary scientific humanism. I
am interested in interrogating the humanism that dominates cultural discourse in
Britain (and elsewhere in ‘the West’) at the present moment. In the past century, the
question of ‘what it means to be human’ has become almost exclusively a scientific
one: as Garber notes, “‘human nature”, once deemed the proper study of mankind, [has
become] the privileged territory of geneticists and biologists’.32 She writes:
The very idea of human nature as a normative, identifiable essence is both a 
political and a psychological wish, with important side effects. [...] The quest 
for it has become a self-fulfilling dream, a lure of full self-knowledge, a ruse of 
research paradigms and protocols from the theological to the anthropological, 
from behaviorism to genomics. In the Enlightenment it was political 
philosophers; in the nineteenth century it was religious believers, psychologists, 
and anthropologists; today it is scientists working at the level of the gene.33
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Secular humanism has rejected the idea of the soul, but still preserves the idea of some 
kind of core human identity, of ‘the psychic unity of mankind’, as the sociobiologist E. 
O. Wilson puts it.34 It is my argument that there is no ‘normative, identifiable 
essence’, no ‘psychic unity’, nothing tangible which unequivocally identifies 
something as human. The human is a signifier within a system of signs which only 
become meaningful through their differences from each other.
Therefore, the only way to define what the human is is to define what it is not. In 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, he argues that linguistic terms 
gain their meaning only through being differentiated from other terms: ‘In language 
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies 
positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only 
differences without positive terms' ?5 The meaning of the human is constructed by 
‘set[ting] up’ the difference between it and its neighbouring terms; it is not a ‘positive 
ter[m]’, but is formed by locating it within a system of signs. The human is frequently 
located between two specific signs:
1. Is man an ape or an angel? My lord, I am on the side of the angels.
2. Man is a rope connecting animal and beyond-man [ubermensch].37
3. The human baby, the human being, is a mosaic of ape and angel.38
4. We may prefer to think of ourselves as fallen angels but in reality we 
are risen apes.39
5. We have, it seems, never ceased to be apes; yet we aspire to be angels.40 
These quotations are taken from a variety of genres and historical moments, from 1864 
to 2004: a time span which corresponds closely to the historical period covered in this 
thesis. Many more examples could be quoted to demonstrate that within post- 
Darwinian humanist discourse, the human is defined primarily by its differential 
relationship to animals on the one hand, and to angels on the other. Drawing on this 
structural relationship, Hanafi writes: ‘The human and the monster vie for space
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between two thresholds of transformation: the upper limits are godhood, the lower 
limits are bestiality’.41 As indicated by the use of terms such as ‘fallen angels’, ‘risen 
apes’, ‘upper limits’ and ‘lower limits’, these signs are hierarchical; humans are placed 
below angels and above animals. The metaphors of ‘up’ and ‘down’ demonstrate that 
the idea of a great chain of being, an overtly hierarchical structure of life-forms, has 
not been eradicated by the scientific discoveries of the last two centuries.42 Instead of 
a hierarchy of divinely created species, the human is now considered to have reached 
the pinnacle of evolution: as John Gray notes, ‘Darwinism has been used to put 
humankind back on its pedestal’.43 While today the ‘lower’ limit of the human is 
generally located within the organic biological world, the ‘upper’ limit is imagined in 
terms of inorganic artificial intelligences, or fictional characters such as 
extraterrestrials and vampires. In this thesis the main focus is on the ‘lower’ limit of 
the human, as I am interested in reading what is currently the dominant discourse 
which claims to explain ‘what it means to be human’ (namely, scientific humanism). 
Therefore this thesis engages predominantly with non-fictional discourse which deals 
with the boundaries between the human and its real, organic others.
The scientists who study these beings are responsible for establishing and policing the 
borders of the human: primatologists define the boundary between human and 
chimpanzee; psychiatrists, the border between the ‘normal’ human and the psychotic or 
damaged other; paleoanthropologists, the chronological division between human and 
pre-human species, and so on. Since the human is constituted by differentiating it from 
the animal, and vice versa, neither of these categories pre-exists the definition of this 
difference. The anthropologist Tim Ingold notes this interdependence of the categories 
of human and animal. Referring to the title of his book, What Is an Animal?, he writes:
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Although our question touches on the properties of both life and the major 
classes of organisms, it is more popularly construed, narrowly and reflexively, 
as a question about ourselves. Every attribute that it is claimed we uniquely 
have, the animal is consequently supposed to lack; thus, the generic concept of 
‘animal’ is negatively constituted by the sum of these deficiencies.44
Similarly, the reverse is also true; the ‘generic concept’ of the human is ‘negatively
constituted’ by relating it to its others. Within contemporary humanist discourse, the
key figures who are used to ‘negatively constitute] ’ the human in this way are
humanlike animals, such as apes and parrots, children, Neanderthals and other extinct
hominids, and people who are identified as ‘damaged’ or ‘abnormal’ in some way.
These almost-human doubles are necessary to mark the limits of the human. In order 
to indicate the boundaries where ‘we’ stop and ‘they’ begin, humanism constructs a 
network of oppositions in which the human is both related to and distinguished from its 
nonhuman others. In his essay ‘Differance’, drawing on Saussure, Jacques Derrida 
writes:
The signified concept is never present in itself, in an adequate presence that 
would refer only to itself. Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed 
in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another and to other concepts, 
by the systematic play of differences.45
It is differance, this ‘systematic play of differences’ between the human and its others,
which I trace in this thesis.46 Differance implies not only ‘difference as distinction’ but
also ‘the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off
until “later” what is presently denied’: in other words, differance both differs and
defers.47 There is in fact a trace of this double meaning in English; the now-distinct
words ‘differ’ and ‘defer’ were originally the same word, and the verb ‘to differ’ can
be used transitively (‘to put apart or separate from each other in qualities; to make
unlike, dissimilar, different, or distinct; to cause to vary; to distinguish, differentiate’),
although this is now ‘unusual’.48 In the course of this thesis, I occasionally employ the
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verb in this way to indicate the active movement of differance, ‘the play \jeu] of 
differences’.49 To differ ‘the human’ from ‘the animal’ is not simply to list the 
differences between these two constructs, but to show that the meaning of the human is 
always deferred: that the human can never be defined without ‘temporalizing’, without 
shifting the question from what the human is to what the animal is not.
The ‘locus and operation’ of differance, as Derrida writes, ‘will therefore be seen
wherever speech appeals to difference’, and this ‘appea[l] to difference’ is a key part of
contemporary humanist discourse about animals.50 For example, Sue Savage-
Rumbaugh writes in the Preface to Kami: The Ape at the Brink o f  the Human Mind•
I knew that the rest of my life would be spent studying apes. So like us they 
are, and yet so distinctly different in some ways. It had not taken long to see 
that human beings could learn a great deal about themselves and the kinds of 
creatures they might once have been, by studying apes. How much of the ape 
was left within us and how much of what we had become resulted from the 
complex society we had managed to build? I was fascinated with this question 
and knew that many of the keys to its answer lay hidden within these animals.51
In this passage, Savage-Rumbaugh makes it clear that her interest in studying apes
comes from a desire to learn about human beings. The human is constructed from this
interplay of sameness and difference: ‘so like us they are, and yet so distinctly
different’. As Derrida writes: ‘The one is only the other deferred, the one differing
from the other. The one is the other in differance, the one is the differance from the
other’.52 This relationship between the one and the other, human and animal, appears
repeatedly in Savage-Rumbaugh’s text, for example when she writes:
Having been granted the opportunity to come to know apes better than I knew 
most people, I had no doubt they had a great deal to tell us about who we 
humans were, where we came from, and where the biological limits or 
constraints upon our species were to be found.53
Despite Savage-Rumbaugh’s important work in Ape Language research, which has
itself challenged those ‘limits or constraints’, she still assumes that there is a rigorous
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opposition between ‘we’ and ‘they’, and that apes are valuable primarily because of 
what ‘they’ can tell ‘us’ about ‘ourselves’. The workings of ‘the economy of 
differance’54 can be read in the claim that ‘they’ can help ‘us’ to locate ‘the biological 
limits’ of ‘our species’. To locate these limits is to draw the boundaries of the human 
and thus to claim knowledge of what the human ‘is’: to ‘stake out the boundaries of 
our humanity by delineating the boundaries of the monstrous’.55
However, this differential structure also troubles the power relationship of humanism, 
as the human is dependent upon the nonhuman for its meaning: ‘as monsters change 
form so do we, by implication’.56 Similarly, Ingold asks: ‘How can we reach a 
comparative understanding of human cultural attitudes towards animals if the very 
conception of what an animal might be, and by implication o f what it means to be 
human, is itself culturally relative?’.57 In the phrase which I have italicised here,
Ingold acknowledges that ‘what it means to be human’ is necessarily dependent on 
‘what an animal might be’. This reveals that the human is never a secure or stable 
category.
Darwin’s Legacy
I have identified the historical period covered in this thesis as ‘post-Darwinian’.58 This 
marks a span of years -  from 1859, the year that The Origin o f Species was first 
published, to 2007, the present day -  but also indicates the radical transformation in the 
cultural understanding of the relationship between humans and other animals that was 
brought about by Charles Darwin’s work. In my opinion, the immense implications of 
Darwin’s theories of evolution by natural selection and the non-existence of species 
have still not been fully absorbed by contemporary culture. Before Darwin, it was
generally believed within Western culture that species were divinely created and 
immutable. This belief was influenced by Judeo-Christian accounts of the separate 
creation of each species, and also by Platonic philosophy.59 Species were seen as 
fixed, unchanging entities: ‘a group of animals all of which were supposed to be 
identical with a type’.60 Creatures were, as the word implies, created ‘according to 
their kinds’ and were fundamentally separate from each other. While Darwin’s work is 
now scientific orthodoxy, this pre-Darwinian belief in an absolute and hierarchical 
opposition between humans and all other animals persists to the present day. Despite 
the decreasing authority of religion, the Judeo-Christian account of creation is one of 
the most influential accounts of who ‘we’ are, and its structure continues to inform the 
way that the relationship between humans and other animals is understood today. This 
issue is discussed in greater detail in the section ‘The Origin of Species’ in Chapter 1 
of this thesis.
Darwin’s work was complemented by Gregor Mendel’s discovery of the laws of 
genetic inheritance in the 1850s and 1860s, and the discovery of the structure of DNA 
by Francis Crick, James Watson, Maurice Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin in the early 
1950s.61 The discovery that all organic life is built in the same way dispels the idea of 
a fundamental biological difference in kind between humans and other animals. This 
is the conclusion that was drawn by Julien Offray de La Mettrie as long ago as 1748, 
when he wrote: ‘Man is not moulded from a costlier clay; nature has used but one 
dough, and has merely varied the leaven’.62 But in fact many people have interpreted 
the idea of DNA as a way of enumerating the exact mathematical difference between 
humans and animals. In the New Scientist article on the chimpanzee genome, ‘What 
Makes Us Human’, it was suggested that a specific gene could be the answer:
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The team is now trying to identify which changes make humans unique. 
Meanwhile, [Matthew] Rockman has already found one candidate gene whose 
regulation may help explain what makes us human. The gene, whose identity 
he is keeping secret pending publication, codes for a neuropeptide and is 
regulated by a ds-regulatory region that affects the gene’s expression in the 
brain. The chimp’s ds-regulator is similar to the corresponding region in other 
primates, but differs markedly from that in humans.63
The regulation of this unidentified gene is presented as the tangible counterpart of a
human essence whose existence is unquestioned. Once again, the ‘locus and
operation’ of differance can be seen here as this text ‘appeals to difference’:64 because
the chimpanzee’s ds-regulator ‘differs markedly’ from the human’s, it ‘may help
explain what makes us human’. Throughout the article it is assumed that humans are
indeed ‘unique’ and that it only remains for science to ‘identify’ precisely where this
difference lies. In the 1920s, the behaviourist John B. Watson asked:
How, then, shall we account for the notion that man is something and has 
something which the brute is not and has not? The feeling that a cataclysmal 
difference exists has been strong through all the centuries, and is as firmly fixed 
in the popular mind today as ever. Among scientific men the conviction that the 
gap is not so wide as was formerly supposed is growing; yet we find 
scientifically-minded men still searching for the ‘missing link’.65
It can be seen in this quotation that the feeling of the ‘cataclysmal difference’ comes
first, not the observation of any specific differences. This feeling becomes something
that must be ‘accounted] for’ by finding something tangible to represent it.
The ds-regulator, identified in the article above as ‘the difference between humans and 
animals’ and therefore ‘what makes us human’, is the most recent in a long line of 
specific physical features which have been identified as the materialisation of human 
essence. For example, in the eighteenth century the anatomist Petrus Camper claimed 
that the difference between humans and animals was that humans do not have an 
intermediary bone between the maxilla (upper jaw bone) and the skull.66 As Herbert 
Wendt comments, ‘the modest os intermaxillare was suddenly promoted into one of
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the chief means of proving that man was not an animal’.67 When Goethe discovered 
that humans do in fact have intermaxillary bones, he wrote in a letter: ‘There it is ... it
/TQ
is like the keystone to mankind, not missing, really there’. More recently, 
paleoanthropologists and anatomists have located the ‘keystone to mankind’ in various 
physical features such as the larynx, the hypoglossal canals (two holes at the base of 
the skull which are connected to the nerves which control the tongue), and the hyoid 
bone, while others, such as geneticists and evolutionary biologists, have claimed that 
particular genes contain the essence of the human. The quest to locate the essence of 
the human in a specific physical object, and thus provide material evidence for the 
‘feeling that a cataclysmal difference exists’,69 shows no sign of ending.
The ‘notion that man is something and has something which the brute is not and has 
not’, the belief that humans are fundamentally not animals, is too deeply embedded in 
Western culture to be easily displaced. Some people have claimed that the full 
implications of evolution and the origin of species have now been taken into account: 
for example, in Purity and Danger Mary Douglas writes: ‘Now that we have 
recognised and assimilated our common descent with apes nothing can happen in the 
field of animal taxonomy to rouse our concern’.70 I do not share Douglas’ confidence 
that the position of the human within ‘animal taxonomy’ cannot cause concern or 
disturbance; on the contrary, I contend that humanist culture has not assimilated the 
full implications of Darwin’s work. This was demonstrated by a recent poll on 
Channel 4 ’s website, on the pages accompanying the What Makes Us Human? 
programme discussed above. The poll asked: ‘Do you think of yourself as an animal?’. 
On 11 April 2007, the results of the vote were 77% Yes, 23% No. The introductory 
text above the poll states:
21
The forces that have made us are the same as those that have fashioned all of 
life on Earth. And yet many of us can’t resist the notion that we are somehow 
more advanced than other animals. [...] Humans are medium-sized mammals 
that belong to a group of animals closely related through evolution, known as 
the primates. All species of lemurs, monkeys, apes and humans are primates. 
We are bound to all other life by the stuff we’re made of.71
It is startling that nearly one-quarter of people, even after reading this evidently one­
sided preamble, do not think of themselves as animals. But it indicates that by no 
means have all of ‘us’ ‘recognised and assimilated our common descent with apes’, 
and that the myth of the human as something profoundly and essentially different from 
all other animals is still pervasive.
Deconstruction and Limitrophy
The main theorist informing my methodological approach is Jacques Derrida. My 
overall approach is Derridean, in that I read humanist texts closely in order to show 
how they themselves deconstruct the opposition between human and animal on which 
they insist. I draw on texts including O f Grammatology, ‘Speech and Phenomena \  
and ‘Differance’ in the course of the thesis. Above all, this project is framed by 
Derrida’s two late essays which specifically deal with the question of the animal: ‘The 
Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, and ‘And Say the Animal 
Responded?’.73
The essay ‘Differance’, which I have already discussed above, suggests a way in which
the dominant belief system of humanism could be challenged. Derrida writes:
We could thus take up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is 
constructed, and from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition 
vanish but to see the emergence of a necessity such that one of the terms 
appears as the differance of the other, the other as ‘differed’ within the 
systematic ordering of the same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the 
sensible, as sensible differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life as
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differing-differed matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed- 
differing nature; and all the terms designating what is other than physis -  
techne, nomos, society, freedom, history, spirit, etc. -  as physis differing: physis 
in differance).14
I respond to Derrida’s suggestion here by taking up the ‘coupled oppositio[n]’ 
human/animal and examining its construction in contemporary humanist discourse,
‘not in order to see opposition vanish’ by erasing the differences between Homo 
sapiens and other living beings, but in order to demonstrate that the human is defined 
as the animal ‘in differance’, as ‘differing from the [animal], as [animal] differed’: in 
short, as ‘differed-differing’ animal.
Although Derrida does not, in this particular essay, list human/animal as one of the
‘coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed’, his interest in this
opposition can be traced through a great many of his texts. Always present to some
degree in his work, it became more overt towards the end of his life. In For What
Tomorrow..., a collection of discussions between Derrida and Elizabeth Roudinesco
first published in 2001, he makes explicit the central importance of ‘animality’ in his
account of differance:
There is difference (with an ‘a’) as soon as there is a living trace, a relation of 
life/death or presence/absence. This became linked for me very early on with 
the immense problematic of animality. There is difference (with an ‘a’) as 
soon as there is something living [du vivant], as soon as there is something of a 
trace [de la trace], across and despite all the limits that the strongest 
philosophical or cultural tradition thought it could recognize between ‘man’ 
and ‘animal’.75
The ‘immense problematic of animality’ is thus central to Derrida’s account of 
differance, and plays a significant part in deconstructing philosophical and cultural 
traditions in general. Furthermore, this ‘problematic’ has a particular urgency at this 
historical moment; as Derrida argues in ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am ’, not only
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do the borders of the human have a history, but this history ‘is now passing through the 
most unusual phase’ (p. 399).
It is not my intention to argue that the opposition between humans and other animals
disappears entirely and is replaced by a homogeneous, undifferentiated category.
There are obvious differences between humans and other animals, and to ignore them
would be critically and pragmatically wrong. In ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am ’,
Derrida lays out his project:
So it will in no way mean questioning, even in the slightest, the limit about 
which we have had a stomachful, the limit between M an with a capital M 
and Animal with a capital A. [...] To suppose that I, or anyone else for that 
matter, could ignore that rupture, indeed that abyss, would mean first of all 
blinding oneself to so much contrary evidence; and, as far as my own 
modest case is concerned, it would mean forgetting all the signs that I have 
sought to give, tirelessly; of my attention to difference, to differences, to 
heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures as against the homogeneous and the 
continuous. I have thus never believed in some homogeneous continuity 
between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal. I am not about to 
begin to do so now. That would be worse than sleepwalking, it would simply 
be too asinine [bete]. (p. 398)
Therefore, I do not attempt to deny or erase the differences between humans and other
animals. However, as Derrida points out, the opposition between ‘The Human’ and
‘The Animal’, is not simple and unitary, but ‘multiple and heterogeneous’ (p. 399). I
therefore want to pay attention to these heterogeneities, not to ignore the differences
between ‘what calls itself man and what he calls the animal’, but to examine how these
differences are used to construct the meaning of the human. In For What Tomorrow...,
Derrida says:
If I am unsatisfied with the notion of a border between two homogeneous 
species, man on one side and the animal on the other, it is not in order to 
claim, stupidly, that there is no limit between ‘animals’ and ‘man’; it is 
because I maintain that there is more than one limit, that there are many 
limits. There is not one opposition between man and non-man; there are, 
between different organizational structures of the living being, many fractures, 
heterogeneities, differential structures, (p. 66)
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My aim, therefore, is to examine the ways in which these multiple, fractured, and 
heterogeneous borders are constituted, in order ‘not to efface the limit, but to multiply 
its figures, to complicate, thicken, delinearize, fold, and divide the line precisely by 
making it increase and multiply’.76 Derrida describes this process of thickening as 
‘limitrophy’, referring to ‘the supposed first or literal sense of trepho [...]: transform 
by thickening, for example, in curdling milk’.77 This thesis participates in this 
process of limitrophy by thickening and folding the line between humans and animals. 
As Derrida puts it:
The discussion is worth undertaking once it is a matter of determining the 
number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistency of this abyssal limit, 
these edges, this plural and repeatedly folded frontier.78
In this thesis, I therefore undertake the discussion by tracing some of the many folds
along this frontier, in order to understand precisely how the boundaries between human
and animal, and therefore the meanings of the categories themselves, are being
constituted and disputed in contemporary culture.
Cyborgs, Companions, and the Discourse of Species
Another important influence on this thesis is Donna Haraway’s work, beginning with
her famous 1985 essay, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s’.79 The ‘Cyborg Manifesto’, as it is commonly known, is one
of the seminal texts of posthumanist theory; Cary Wolfe characterises it as ‘perhaps the
central theoretical statement of this recently established field’.80 The (de)construction
of the opposition between human and animal is a fundamental part of the ‘Cyborg
Manifesto’. Haraway writes:
I want to signal three crucial boundary breakdowns that make the following 
political fictional (political scientific) analysis possible. By the late twentieth
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century in United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and 
animal is thoroughly breached. The last beachheads of uniqueness have been 
polluted if not turned into amusement parks -  language, tool use, social 
behavior, mental events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of 
human and animal. And many people no longer feel the need of such a 
separation; indeed, many branches of feminist culture affirm the pleasure of 
connection of human and other living creatures, (p. 10)
This ‘pleasure’ in connecting with other, nonhuman animals foreshadows Haraway’s
recent work, such as The Companion Species Manifesto and the forthcoming When
Species Meet, which conceptualise the relationships between humans and animals in
81terms of companionship, play, and ‘significant otherness’.
In the ‘Cyborg Manifesto’, the two other ‘crucial boundary breakdowns’ are ‘between 
animal-human (organism) and machine’ and ‘between physical and non-physical’ (pp. 
10-11). However, while these other ‘boundary breakdowns’ have been eagerly taken 
up, especially in the United States of America, the one between humans and animals 
has been somewhat overlooked by posthumanist critical theorists. But Haraway’s text 
makes it clear that this boundary breakdown is absolutely central to the idea of the 
cyborg: ‘The cyborg appears in myth precisely where the boundary between human 
and animal is transgressed. Far from signalling a walling off of people from other 
living beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling’ (p. 10). 
Despite Haraway’s pre-emptive warning here that the cyborg myth does not mean 
turning away from the organic connections between humans and other animals, the 
other ‘boundary breakdowns’ have attracted more attention, perhaps because they seem 
more novel and revolutionary. But it is precisely because the human/animal boundary
is older -  is, as Felipe Fernandez-Armesto writes, ‘the longest-debated frontier of
82human identity’ -  that it is so important to pay attention to it, and its construction and 
deconstruction. As Cary Wolfe writes:
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On the one hand, then, the question of the animal is embedded within the larger 
context of posthumanist theory generally, in which the ethical and theoretical 
problems of nonhuman subjectivities need not be limited to the form of the 
animal alone (as our science fiction writers have dramatized time and again).
On the other hand, the animal possesses a specificity as the object of both 
discursive and institutional practices, one that gives it particular power and 
durability in relation to other discourses of otherness. For the figure of the 
‘animal’ in the West (unlike, say, the robot or the cyborg) is part of a cultural 
and literary history stretching back at least to Plato and the Old Testament, 
reminding us that the animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, 
always lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self- 
constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called ‘the human’ ,83
While it could be argued that the idea of the cyborg, if not its material reality, has a
longer history than Wolfe indicates here,84 it is undoubtedly true that animals, both real
and figurative, have ‘always been especially, frightfully nearby’. In concrete terms,
human civilisation is only made possible through the use of animals. The various
phases in the conventional history of the human, such as nomadic hunting/gathering,
agriculture, ancient civilisation, the agricultural and industrial revolutions, the space
age, and so on, are each founded on a specific relationship to animals. Each of the
human figures in this history -  ‘Man the hunter’, the first farmer, the coloniser, the
space scientist and genetic engineer -  has a shadowy animal counterpart: the hunted
mammoth, domesticated cows and pigs, dogs and chimpanzees sent into space,
genetically altered mice and sheep. Each of these human identities is founded on a
power relation to animals.85
Wolfe is one of the few contemporary thinkers to specifically take up the question of 
the animal in the terms of deconstructive critical theory (rather than animal rights, 
traditional literary criticism, or philosophy). At the beginning of his 2003 book Animal 
Rites: American Culture, the Discourse o f Species, and Posthumanist Theory, Wolfe 
states the terms of the debate very clearly. I quote it at length since it is such an 
important foundational text for this thesis:
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I want to begin by suggesting that much of what we call cultural studies situates 
itself squarely, if only implicitly, on what looks to me more and more like a 
fundamental repression that underlies most ethical and political discourse: 
repressing the question of nonhuman subjectivity, taking it for granted that the 
subject is always already human. This means, to put a finer point on it, that 
debates in the humanities and social sciences between well-intentioned critics 
of racism, (hetero)sexism, classism, and all other -isms that are the stock-in- 
trade of cultural studies almost always remain locked within an unexamined 
framework of speciesism. This framework, like its cognates, involves 
systematic discrimination against an other based solely on a generic 
characteristic -  in this case, species. In the light of developments in cognitive 
science, ethology, and other fields over the past twenty years, however, it 
seems clear that there is no longer any good reason to take it for granted that 
the theoretical, ethical, and political question of the subject is automatically 
coterminous with the species distinction between Homo sapiens and everything 
else. (p. 1)
My theoretical approach is very similar to and influenced by Wolfe’s; like him, I want 
to question ‘the humanist habit of making even the possibility of subjectivity 
coterminous with the species barrier’ (p. 1), and like him, I believe that developments 
from scientific fields such as ethology do and should impact upon posthumanist critical 
theory. Both Wolfe and Haraway seek to remedy the failure of philosophy and critical 
theory to take account of zoological and scientific knowledge, as I do in this thesis. 
Finally, I agree with Wolfe that ‘Derrida’s work on the animal [...] provides the most 
promising framework among the figures discussed for bridging the ethical and 
epistemological dimensions’ of the various issues around the discourse of species (p.
My work differs from Wolfe’s in that his predominant focus is specifically on the 
culture of the United States of America, as indicated by the subtitle of Animal Rites, 
whereas I focus more on British culture. Also, the majority of Animal Rites concerns 
the discourse of species in literary texts and films, whereas my thesis predominantly 
discusses non-fictional, scientific texts.87
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Posthumanism, Uncertainty, and the Uncanny
I cautiously characterise this thesis as posthumanist. Donna Haraway argues that
‘posthumanism is too easily appropriated’ by ‘blissed-out’ transhumanist projects, and
that the terminology of ‘companion species’ and ‘zoontologies’ is less restrictive than
posthumanism, as it ‘insists on its Darwinist meanings, including considering people as
Homo sapiens’, and ‘inquires into the projects that construct us as a species’.88 While I
consider this type of inquiry crucial in challenging humanism and questioning the
boundaries between humans and other animals, the term posthumanism can also be
valuable in indicating a break from humanist thought without necessarily descending
into ‘blissed-out techno-idiocy’: as Haraway acknowledges, ‘lots of people doing
posthumanist thinking, though, don’t do it that way’. I would locate this project within
the strand of posthumanism proposed by Neil Badmington in Alien Chic:
Humanism is there and not quite there. It comes and goes, it flickers, it drifts, 
and it is precisely this wandering that I want to call the possibility of 
posthumanism. [...] The ‘post-’ does not mark an end, a break, or novelty; it 
identifies, rather, a patient reckoning with -  a working-through of -  what 
follows the prefix. [...] Humanism, in fact, is eternally and unwarily becoming 
alien to itself, becoming posthumanism.89
This is the type of posthumanism with which I engage here, rather than the type
exemplified by N. Katherine Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics or Francis Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman
Future: Consequences o f the Biotechnology Revolution. As indicated by the subtitles
of these works, despite the significant differences between them, they both identify
posthumanism primarily with new technological developments such as artificial
intelligence and genetic engineering. The posthumanism of this project is not about
technological development or about announcing a new era, but rather a way of reading
which brings out the contradictions that trouble humanism from within. As
Badmington writes: ‘Posthumanist cultural criticism must, I think, learn to listen out
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for the deconstruction of the binary opposition between the human and the inhuman 
that is forever happening within humanism itse lf.90 In this thesis, I attempt a ‘patient 
reckoning with’ humanism, to engage with it and to locate the points at which it 
‘unwarily’ becomes posthumanism. I agree with Badmington’s view that ‘the task of 
posthumanism is to uncover those uncanny moments at which things start to drift, of 
rereading humanism in a certain way, against itself and the grain’.91 As indicated by 
the use of the term ‘uncanny’ here, an eerie or unnerving feeling can be a valuable 
indicator that this founding premise of humanism -  that it is always possible to know 
who is and is not human -  is under threat.
This notion of uncertainty is central to Freud’s account of the uncanny, and to Ernst 
Jentsch’s 1906 paper ‘The Psychology of the Uncanny’, which Freud draws on 
extensively:
Jentsch writes: ‘[...] One of the most successful devices for easily creating 
uncanny effects is to leave the reader in uncertainty whether a particular figure 
in the story is a human being or an automaton’ [...]. Jentsch believes that a 
particularly favourable condition for awakening uncanny feelings is created 
when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and 
when an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one.92
There are two aspects of this uncertainty: whether something that appears to be merely
automatic and mechanical is in fact conscious (‘whether a lifeless object might not be
in fact animate’) and, conversely, uncertainty over whether something that appears
conscious, such as a human being, is reacting in an automatic, unconscious way
(‘whether an apparently animate being is really alive’).93 Freud mentions waxwork
dolls and automata in relation to the first aspect, and epileptic fits and insanity for the
second; examples discussed in this thesis include representations of Neanderthals,
parrots, echolalia in autism, and blushing. Throughout this thesis, I pay attention to
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instances of the uncanny as important indicators that something or someone is 
troubling the certainty of humanism.
Animal Studies, Animal Rights, and the Production of the Human
In a review of the proceedings of the 2000 Representing Animals conference, Richard 
Kahn argues that researchers in the ‘new liberal arts field, Animal Studies’ can be 
divided into two categories: ‘animal advocates’, and ‘their postmodern, cultural 
studies-oriented opponents’ who ‘partake in Animal Studies as if it were a form of 
literary field and/or transdisciplinary fad’.94 Kahn seems to situate himself within the 
first group, which considers the second to be ‘painfully anthropocentric’, as they 
‘merely pontificatfe] about the intricacies of animal representations [...] [and] forget 
entirely about the animal presences that had helped to give rise to them’. This 
opposition between ‘progressive’ animal advocacy and postmodern critical theory is 
overly simplified. From Kahn’s review itself, it is clear that several of the essays in the 
Representing Animals volume, such as Erica Fudge’s ‘A Left-Handed Blow’, partake 
of cultural criticism while also having a political purpose.95 Furthermore, without 
critical theory to demonstrate that ‘human’ and ‘animal’ are historically and culturally 
constructed categories, ‘those involved in animal politics’ all too often reinscribe the 
hierarchical binary opposition between the two, as is evident from Kahn’s claim that 
they are ‘the representative voices for non-human animals’.96
A more nuanced categorisation is found in The Postmodern Animal, in which Steve 
Baker describes ‘the diverse ways in which postmodern art has dealt with the 
animal’.97 Baker draws on Kate Soper’s What is Nature? in order to describe ‘a 
spectrum [of thought] ranging from the animal-endorsing to the animal-sceptical': the
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former being more closely aligned with ‘conservation’ and ‘animal advocacy’, while 
the latter questions ‘culture’s means of constructing and classifying the animal in order
Q O
to make it meaningful to the human’. In contrast to Kahn, Baker finds ‘common 
ground between animal advocacy and postmodern art’, for example in challenging 
Cartesian dualism and in re-evaluating the hierarchy that places reason above 
sentiment." While the methods of reading employed in this thesis come from 
poststructuralist critical theory, this does not mean that there are no real political 
implications; I discuss this further in the section ‘Ethics and Humanism’, below.
While I believe that critical theory has a vital part to play in rethinking political 
relationships between humans and other animals, I do not situate this thesis within 
Animal Studies as such, since my ethical and theoretical concerns are somewhat 
different. For example, although this thesis examines several of the same cultural 
phenomena considered by Erica Fudge in her 2002 book Animal, such as animal 
language experiments, ape art, and anthropomorphism, my theoretical focus is very 
different from hers. Her primary concern is the way that animals are treated by 
humans, exemplified by issues such as animal rights, vegetarianism, vivisection, and 
the wearing of fur, and indicated by her discussion of philosophers such as Peter 
Singer. This thesis does not engage directly with the type of applied ethical issues 
raised by Singer, such as the ‘equal consideration’ argument and the Great Ape Project 
to establish a ‘bill of rights’ for apes.100 By contrast, my ethical concern is the 
treatment of those beings who fall in the multiple, thickened, foliated borders of the 
human: examples are deaf, autistic and aphasic people, whose uncertain categorisation 
as not-quite-human is discussed in later chapters of this thesis. If, for some of those
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involved in Animal Studies, the question is ‘how should we treat them?’, the question I 
want to ask is ‘how do “we” know who “we” are?’.
In contrast to political ‘animal advocacy’, the aim of this project is to investigate how
the boundaries of the human are constructed, and to show that this constmction always
depends upon exclusion. In formulating this aim, I have been influenced by Diana
Fuss’ introduction to Human, All Too Human, in which she writes:
Our purpose in this volume is not to broaden the category of the human to 
include previously abjected and excluded others, but to engage in a more 
radical interrogation of the process by which the human comes to mean in the 
production of cultural difference, (p. 2)
It seems crucial to me to approach the question of the boundaries between the human
and the animal in this way: to interrogate the production of the category of the human
itself rather than merely questioning where exactly the boundary-lines are drawn. As
Fuss argues:
The human is a linguistic, cultural, and sociopolitical construct of 
comparatively recent date. [...] The human may, in fact, be one of our most 
elastic fictions. As the dividing lines between humans and ‘nonhumans’ have 
been historically redrafted to accommodate new systems of classification and 
new discourses of knowledge, the human has proceeded to mutate many times 
over. (pp. 1-2)
I find Fuss’ account of the human very convincing, and my project questions the way 
that the category of the human continues to ‘mutate’ within culture, and the meanings 
which are attributed to this ‘construct’, rather than attempting to ‘redraf[t]’ the dividing 
lines between humans and animals.
Popular Philosophy
There are a number of contemporary thinkers who have recently published popular 
books on questions relating to the human/animal boundary and how the category of the
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human is constructed. These books demonstrate the current cultural significance of 
this issue; however, their approaches generally differ significantly from mine in this 
thesis, and they do not engage at any length with critical theory.
One of the best-known of these is the 2002 book Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans 
and Other Animals by John Gray. In this aphoristic work, Gray argues that the 
opposition between ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’ is culturally constructed, and that 
humanism still clings to the Christian belief that humans are fundamentally different 
from other animals. This text is particularly notable for Gray’s insistence on the non­
existence of humans as a species. However, having problematised the human/animal 
boundary, Gray repeatedly seems to return to humanism by attempting to locate ‘the’ 
difference between humans and other animals. For example, in a section entitled ‘The 
Poverty of Consciousness’, Gray argues convincingly that consciousness does not 
mark an absolute difference between humans and other animals. But he then reverts to 
insisting that there is an absolute difference, when he writes: ‘Where other animals 
differ from humans is in lacking the sensation of selfhood. In this they are not 
altogether unfortunate’.101 Even though Gray qualifies this statement by suggesting 
that the human position is inferior, he nevertheless repeatedly employs this structure 
whereby he first problematises a conventional distinction between humans and other 
animals, but then identifies a new one. For example, he writes: ‘What is distinctively 
human is not the capacity for language. It is the crystallisation of language in 
writing’.102 Perhaps Gray’s repeated attempts to define ‘what is distinctively human’, 
almost in spite of himself, demonstrate the continuing pull of humanism as a powerful 
and dominant belief system.
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Another significant recent work is Felipe Fernandez-Armesto’s So You Think You’re
Human?, published in 2004. Fernandez-Armesto draws attention to the human as a
historically variable and non-natural category, stating that ‘the present limits of our
concept of humankind are not obvious and not universal’.103 He names ‘six main
sources’ which, in his view, are responsible for the ‘conceptual threat’ to ‘the
coherence of our understanding of what it means to be human’ (p. 1). Several of these
correspond to discourses which I discuss in this thesis: primatology; animal rights;
paleoanthropology; the ‘vague, variable boundaries’ of species; artificial intelligence;
and genetics (pp. 1-5). Like Diana Fuss, he describes the ‘elasticity’ of ‘the concept of
humanity’ (p. 6). However, unlike Fuss, his narrative is one of ever-broadening limits:
The story of the broadening of the concept of humankind -  the story outlined in 
the pages that follow -  is not over yet. [...] How far have we got to go, before 
we have genuinely included the whole human community, and reached a viable 
frontier between humans and others? Perhaps the quest is doomed to be 
interminable as every scientific advance blurs formerly convincing distinctions.
(p. 8)
As can be seen from the use of the words ‘doomed’ and ‘threat’ here, while Femandez-
Armesto draws attention to the blurring of the boundaries of the human, he sees this as
something negative. This becomes even clearer towards the end of the book when he
approvingly cites Francis Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future:
[Fukuyama writes:] ‘We might thus emerge on the other side of a great divide 
between human and posthuman history and not even see that the watershed had 
been breached’. I suspect this is true, for a reason demonstrated by this book: 
we do not know what humankind means; we do not know what it is that makes 
us human; so naturally, we will not be aware of losing it. (p. 155)
Thus, while Fernandez-Armesto is aware that ‘we do not know what humankind
means’, he still believes that there is something, some mysterious ‘it’ which could,
potentially, be lost. At this point my view diverges radically from his.
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The difference between Fernandez-Armesto’s view and that of Derrida, Haraway, 
Wolfe, and others (I locate this thesis in the second category) could be compared to 
Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard’s description of the difference between modernism and 
postmodernism:
The accent can fall on [...] the nostalgia for presence experienced by the human 
subject and the obscure and futile will which animates it in spite of everything. 
Or else the accent can fall on [...] what one might call its ‘inhumanity’ [...] and 
on the extension of being and jubilation which come from inventing new rules 
of the game. [...] These two modes [...] attest to [...] a differend between regret
104and experimentation.
Fernandez-Armesto seems nostalgic for the ideal of the human as something present, 
whole and unified, whereas the opposing view emphasises the ‘extension of being’ that 
is made possible when one attempts to think beyond humanism. He spends most of the 
book convincingly arguing that the human is a fiction, and yet ‘in spite of everything’ 
he still fears that there is something ‘that makes us human’ which ‘w e’ could lose, 
without even being aware of its loss. This desire for wholeness, for ‘community’, is 
expressed in very Lyotardian terms: ‘How far have we got to go, before we have 
genuinely included the whole human community’? In this passage I read what Lyotard 
identifies as a ‘call to order, a desire for unity, identity, security, and popularity’ (p.
14). But this a desire that Lyotard warns against: ‘We have paid dearly for our 
nostalgia for the all and the one, for a reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, for 
a transparent and communicable experience’ (p. 24).105 Like realism, humanism does 
not present reality, but rather ‘protects] consciousness from doubt’ (p. 15) at great 
cost.
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Mythbusting and Semioclasm
In this thesis, I treat the human as a myth. Although I argue that the human is a
cultural and linguistic construction rather than a natural entity, I have chosen to
approach it as a myth rather than as a pure fiction because the definition of the human
has real, tangible effects on living beings. As Catherine Belsey writes:
Greek myths are fictions, we would now say. But we might also recognise that 
they were attempts to make sense of the world. Myths are not just for 
entertainment, but stories of the origins of things. For the culture that 
subscribes to them, they have explanatory power.106
To put it bluntly, a myth can make the difference between life and death. To cite some
well-known examples, in slave societies such as ancient Rome and nineteenth-century
America, slaves were defined as nonhuman objects and thereby deprived of any rights.
Today chimpanzees and bonobos are excluded from the category of the human, and it
is therefore considered acceptable to use them in experiments, even those with fatal
consequences. As I will argue, people with autism, aphasia and mental illnesses are
also excluded from the category of the human in more subtle and dangerous ways. It is
because of these pressing ethical concerns that it is vital to interrogate and expose the
way that the category of the human is produced in our culture through a process of
differing and excluding.
The concept of myth which I employ is primarily influenced by Roland Barthes’ work. 
In Mythologies, Barthes argues that ‘myth is a type of speech’ or ‘mode of 
signification’ which ‘transforms history into nature’ and produces examples of ‘the
1 (Y7falsely obvious’. The ‘essential function of myth’ is ‘the naturalization of the 
concept’ (p. 131). The concept which I denaturalize in this thesis is the human.
Barthes argues that ‘myth has in fact a double function: it points out and it notifies, it 
makes us understand something and it imposes it on us’ (p. 117). Throughout this
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thesis, I attempt to show how humanist myths ‘impose’ norms and rules of behaviour 
and do not merely reflect them or ‘poin[t] [them] out’. In the Preface to the 1970 
edition of Mythologies, Barthes explains the ‘double theoretical framework’ of his 
book, namely ‘ideological critique’ along with ‘semiological analysis’ (p. 9). There is 
a ‘necessary conjunction of these two enterprises: no denunciation without an 
appropriate method of detailed analysis, no semiology which cannot, in the last 
analysis, be acknowledged as semioclasm’ (p. 9). My ‘denunciation’ has a slightly 
different, but related, target: humanism rather than ‘the bourgeois norm’ (p. 9) in 
Barthes’ project. I have combined these two theoretical frameworks of ideological 
critique and semiological analysis by reading the myths of humanist discourse with the 
aim of critiquing humanist ideology.
Barthes suggests that ‘the best weapon against myth is perhaps to mythify it in its turn, 
and to produce an artificial myth’ (p. 135). The beginning of the ‘Cyborg Manifesto’, 
in which Haraway introduces the text as her ‘effort to build an ironic political myth’,108 
also echoes this idea of a myth deliberately produced for political purposes, without 
pretending to be ‘true’. It is intriguing that Felipe Fernandez-Armesto concludes So 
You Think You're Human? also by turning to the terminology of artificial myth. He 
writes:
That humans are uniquely rational, intellectual, spiritual, self-aware, creative, 
conscientious, moral, or godlike seems to be a myth -  an article of faith to 
which we cling in defiance of the evidence. But we need myths to make our 
irresoluble dilemmas bearable. And our claims for our nature are more: not 
mere myths but also aspirations, still waiting to become true. [...] If we were 
uncompromising mythbusters, we would tear up our human rights and start 
again: re-think what we mean by human life and human dignity. For now, if we 
want to go on believing we are human, and justify the special status we accord 
ourselves -  if, indeed, we want to stay human through the changes we face -  
we had better not discard the myth, but start trying to live up to it.
(p. 170)
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While Fernandez-Armesto recognises that the human is a myth, he views it in positive 
terms: as something comforting, something to aspire to. On the contrary, I believe that 
the myth of the human has extremely damaging consequences, because, as I have 
argued, it is always founded on exclusion. Instead of ‘trying to live up to’ the myth, I 
suggest there is indeed a need to ‘re-think what we mean by human life’. In this sense 
I identify myself as one of Fernandez-Armesto’s ‘uncompromising mythbusters’.
In the broadest terms, by ‘the myth of the human’ I mean belief in an absolute, 
monolithic and hierarchical division between ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’. It begins 
with a story of origins, a creation myth, represented by paleoanthropological narratives 
which claim to tell ‘us’ where ‘we’ came from, and therefore who ‘we’ are, by 
identifying the exact moment that ‘we’ became human. Along with this, there is a 
myth of natural human behaviour: a story about how ‘we’ act. Central to this is the 
myth of speech as mastery of the internal self and the external world. These three 
myths are explored respectively in the three chapters of this thesis. Barthes’ project in 
Mythologies, although not explicitly defined as posthumanist, does touch on the 
subject of the human as myth, both in the essay ‘The Great Family of M an’, which 
critiques Edward Steichen’s photography exhibition of the same name, and in ‘Myth 
Today’, in which he writes that ‘the basic idea of a perfectible mobile world, produces 
the inverted image of an unchanging humanity, characterized by an indefinite 
repetition of its identity’ (p. 142). While Barthes questions the unity and identity of 
‘humanity’ or ‘the human community’, he does not discuss the human/animal 
boundary.109 However, as I will argue throughout this thesis, these two concepts are 
inseparable; the illusory unity of the human can only be produced through an equally 
illusory monolithic border with the animal.110
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This myth is not produced in any single area of culture, but across many different types
of texts, such as popular science writing, journalism, fiction, and visual
representations. What unites all of these texts is their participation in the discursive
production of the myth of the human. In ‘Change the Object Itself: Mythology
Today’, Barthes writes:
Contemporary myth is discontinuous. It is no longer expressed in long fixed 
narratives but only in ‘discourse’; at most, it is a phraseology, a corpus of 
phrases (of stereotypes); myth disappears, but leaving -  so much the more 
insidious -  the mythical.111
In order for me to demonstrate how powerful and pervasive this myth is, it is necessary
to show its workings in different types of discourse. The reappearance of certain
‘phrases’ in what might seem to be very diverse areas of cultural discourse shows the
‘insidious’ working of the myths of humanism. The ‘mythical’ is, as Barthes writes,
‘anonymous and slippery, fragmented and garrulous, available both for ideological
criticism and semiological dismantling’.112 This thesis draws together many of these
‘garrulous’ and ‘slippery’ fragments in order to criticise and dismantle the myth of the
human.
I am especially interested in those texts which explicitly attempt to define the human
by differentiating it from the animal, as the production of the myth through the 
‘systematic play of differences’ is most visible here. This thesis does not focus on
texts in which animals are used purely as symbols for an aspect of the human: those in 
which ‘the animal plays the role of the non-specific human’ in order for the human 
reader to ‘project into it’, as John Isaacs puts it.113 Some obvious examples are 
Aesop’s Fables, Franz Kafka’s ‘Metamorphosis’, and George Orwell’s Animal 
Farm.114 Of course, this is something of an oversimplification, as there is potential for
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posthumanist readings of all of these texts, and I do discuss anthropomorphism in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. However, in general I am more interested in trying to 
understand the way that animals are used to produce the meaning of the human through 
the play of differences, in particular in scientific humanist discourses such as 
(paleo)anthropology, psychology, ethology, and animal language and cognition 
research.
Ethics and Humanism
Although I do not engage in detail with philosophical ethics in this thesis, the project
as a whole has an ethical motivation. One of the primary claims of humanists is that
humanism is necessary to prevent people being abused. This was the motivation
behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, and the post-World-
War-Two humanist discourse to which it belongs. This discourse is exemplified by
Jacob Bronowski’s 1973 book The Ascent o f Man, which, like the well-known
television series which it accompanies, tells the history of ‘mankind’. Bronowski
argues that ‘the great temple architecture of every civilisation expresses the
identification of the individual with the human species’ (p. 116). He continues:
The monument speaks for the dead man to the living, and thereby establishes a 
sense of permanence which is a characteristically human view: the concept that 
human life forms a continuity which transcends and flows through the 
individual. The man buried on his horse or revered in his ship at Sutton Hoo 
becomes, in the stone monuments of later ages, a spokesman for their belief 
that there is such an entity as mankind, of which we are each a representative -  
in life and death, (p. 118)
Bronowski claims ‘that there is such an entity as mankind’, of which individuals are
merely representatives. In this view, human life has a single origin, a single character,
a single history, a single identity.
Bronowski’s reasons for supporting this view are clear from a brief sketch of his life.115 
He was bom in Poland to a Jewish family in 1908, came to Britain in the 1920s to 
study mathematics at Cambridge, and then moved into biology, followed by statistical 
analysis. In 1945, he went to Japan as Scientific Deputy to the British Chiefs of Staff 
Mission to study the effect of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
This visit had a profound impact on him; he gave up military research, and began 
instead to study literature, ‘human nature’, culture, and evolution. He became ‘a leader 
in the modem movement of Scientific Humanism’, and his career culminated in The 
Ascent o f Man television series in 1973, the year before his death. Even from this brief 
sketch of Bronowski’s life, it is clear to see the reasons for his humanist beliefs. He 
had lost members of his family in Auschwitz, and had seen the devastation of the 
atomic bombs in Japan. For Bronowski and his humanist contemporaries, a belief in 
the unity of all human life was seen as an essential part of preventing future 
‘inhumane’ treatment. The argument that ‘human life forms a continuity which 
transcends and flows through the individual’ was a response to Nazi ideology which 
justified the mass murder of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, those with learning 
difficulties, and many other groups of people by categorising them as nonhuman. 
Bronowski was a liberal and knowledgeable man who hoped that his humanist beliefs 
would prevent future events like the Holocaust or the bombing of Hiroshima.
Given this history, why should anyone wish to challenge this scientific, ethical 
humanism? First, humanism has not succeeded in preventing human rights abuses. It 
is now over sixty years since the end of World War Two, and while there has not been 
another mass murder on the scale of the Nazi Holocaust, human rights abuses and 
genocides have continued, for example in Rwanda in the 1990s and in Darfur at the
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present time. It could be objected that this does not necessarily invalidate the humanist 
project in principle. However, I believe that there is a more fundamental reason for 
this failure, which must be examined in order to rethink ethics beyond humanism.
Humanists claim that the concept of the human transcends race, gender, nationality,
and all of the other divisive categories which make people aware of how they differ
from each other, instead of what ‘we’ all share. This view is exemplified by the
following passage from Richard Norman’s 2004 book On Humanism :
Whatever progress there has been towards greater equality and the combating 
of injustice has been made possible by the clearer perception of what human 
beings share in common. The protest of oppressed groups has been that ‘we are 
human beings like you’, and progress comes when that truth is recognised.116
This ‘like you’ is a call for homogeneity, for the kind of dangerous unity that Lyotard
warns against. Why is it necessary that others should be ‘like us’ in order to treat them
with respect? The problematic nature of this type of ethics becomes clearer when
Norman identifies ‘language’ and ‘our capacity for emotional identification with one
another’ as the two most important aspects of shared human existence. He admits:
That is not to say that all human beings feel this (there are psychopaths and 
other human beings whose mental functions are severely impaired), and it is not 
to say that anyone feels this way all the time. Nevertheless it is a characteristic 
feature of human beings that we are inclined to relate to one another in this way 
[...]. In short, we matter to one another. It is this feature of human nature which 
the philosopher David Hume referred to as ‘sympathy’, as ‘humanity’ or 
‘fellow-feeling’, and which he rightly identified as the precondition for shared 
moral values, (p. 93)
Leaving aside the questionable assertion that this ‘fellow-feeling’ really is
characteristic of most human beings, it is the casual exclusion of ‘psychopaths and
other human beings whose mental functions are severely impaired’ which
demonstrates the danger of humanism’s claim to be more ethical than its alternatives.
By categorising a person as ‘psychopath[ic]’ and placing him or her outside the
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category of the human, s/he is no longer entitled to ethical consideration, since this 
‘fellow-feeling’ is ‘the precondition for shared moral values’. Furthermore, two of the 
most common indications of autism in children are that they do not speak, and they do 
not have the ‘capacity for emotional identification’ with others. However, it would be 
inaccurate to describe them as ‘severely impaired’. If they lack this ‘fellow-feeling’, 
this ‘humanity’, does that mean that they should be excluded from the ‘shared moral 
values’? This is indeed what does happen; as I argue in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
autistic people are excluded from medical and psychological definitions of the human, 
and are treated unethically as a consequence. The ‘autistic liberation movement’ has 
been founded in response to this mistreatment, but in the language it uses, this 
movement still retains the ‘we are like you’ structure, with the human as the central 
point of reference. As Cary Wolfe argues, ‘Animal Studies and Disability Studies [...] 
pose fundamental challenges [...] to a model of subjectivity and experience drawn from 
the liberal justice tradition and its central concept of “rights’” . Instead, Wolfe 
suggests, there is a need for ‘a more ambitious and more profound ethical project: a 
new and more inclusive form of ethical pluralism that it is our charge, now, to 
frame’.117
Norman is keen to insist that ‘the growth of the language of human rights as an 
internationally shared moral vocabulary is something to be welcomed’ (p. 106). He 
writes: ‘One of the impressive features of utilitarianism is its universalism. It enjoins a 
concern for all human beings’ (p. 107). What this humanist argument does not take 
into account is, first, that it is not simple or obvious to define ‘all human beings’: that, 
as Diana Fuss writes, ‘the human is not, and has never been, an all inclusive
11 s
category’. Second, it immediately raises the question of why ethical concern, which
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Norman summarises as ‘promoting the well-being of others’, ‘respecting the autonomy
of others’, and ‘accepting that their lives are their own’ (p. 106) should stop dead when
it reaches a border of the human. Why are nonhuman beings not worthy of concern?
Norman does, in his own words, ‘need to respond briefly to that charge’, but his
argument -  that utilitarians ‘should aim to promote the well-being and prevent the
suffering of any being capable of experiencing pain or pleasure’ (p. 112) -  still
concludes by reinscribing the binary opposition between humans and other animals:
In these ways, humanists can and should want to preserve the natural 
environment, as well as showing concern for the welfare of non-human animals 
-  but that concern has a dimension which is properly different from our concern 
for other humans, (p. 114)
As long as that structure of absolute opposition is maintained, rather than a structure of
multiple and irreducible heterogeneity, it is always possible to justify unethical acts by
recategorising beings as non-human.
In other words, I take issue with the ideas of ‘all human beings’ and ‘all human
beings’. Once you have these twin ideas -  that it is possible to distinguish with
certainty who is human and what is not, and that a special type of ethical concern
should extend only to those within the privileged category -  the way is open for
unethical treatment for all those who are placed outside it. As Wolfe argues, ‘the
discourse of species has been used historically as a chief strategy for marking and
exploiting other human subjects as well’.119 In Animal Rites, Wolfe writes:
As long as this humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization remains 
intact, and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to 
systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their 
species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use 
by some humans against other humans as well. (p. 8)
By claiming that ‘there is such an entity as mankind’ of which we are all
representatives, it can then be argued that some individuals are inadequate, deviant or
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inappropriate representatives of this single ‘entity’. Genocide can be (and has been) 
justified by recategorising the victims as ‘inhuman’, as ‘animals’. There are many 
obvious examples that could be cited in this respect: women, black people, Jews, the 
working class, and those with learning difficulties or mental illnesses, among others, 
have been represented as mindless bodies and described as animals or beasts. As Fuss 
phrases it: ‘That the human has a history comes as no surprise to those subjects so
1 ^rj
routinely and so violently excluded from its ideological terrain’.
With respect to women, Wolfe describes this as ‘the strictly homologous positions of
the feminine and the animal in the cultural regime of “camophallogocentrism”’.121 The
word ‘homologous’ is important here since the various binary oppositions that
continue to dominate Western culture are not interchangeable with each other. Each
opposition operates in a specific and unique way, such that being female is not ‘the
same’ experience as being black, nor does it carry the same meanings. However, the
oppositions reinforce each other, since the same figure stands at the top of each
hierarchy. As Harriet Ritvo writes:
The binary opposition between humans and animals has been historically 
parallel to a series of other oppositions, confined within the human species: for 
example, man/woman, upper-class/lower-class, European/non-European, 
adult/child. In each case, the occupants of the second category have routinely 
been disparaged by the more powerful occupants of the first. Such 
disparagement has often been expressed in terms of the hierarchy of nature [...]. 
Sometimes, as is always a possibility with figuration, analogy has slipped into 
identity. That is, groups who are; compared to animals may also be treated like 
them. 2
It is not arbitrary or coincidental that the word ‘Man’ means both ‘humankind’ and 
‘male humans’: as Donna Haraway writes, the human is a ‘euphemistically named 
surrogate’ for ‘that odd, ethnocentric, phallogocentric, putatively universal being called
? 123Man’. In general, the able-bodied, able-minded, middle-class, white, heterosexual,
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European male has been identified with the human, and everyone who deviates from 
this mould has been constructed as closer to the animal: this is the ‘scheme of the 
dominant’ which is also ‘the dominant schema of subjectivity itself, as Derrida 
argues.124
This project does not deal specifically with questions of gender or race. This is 
because both of these issues have vast and complex histories to which I cannot do 
justice by relegating them to a small section of this thesis.125 However, it is important 
to bear in mind that the construction of the human/animal opposition is inextricably 
bound up with other oppositions, such as man/woman, white/black, able­
bodied/disabled, neurologically typical/autistic, heterosexual/queer, and the power 
relations at stake in all of these. The question of who is designated as human and who 
is not is always a matter of ethical and political (and not ‘merely’ linguistic) concern.
In my view, it is crucial to demonstrate that the human/animal boundary is multiple, 
heterogeneous, and has a history: to expose the way that the category of the human is 
constructed through a process of differing and exclusion, in order to challenge its 
power and the acts committed in its name.
Summary of Chapters
As outlined above, each chapter of this thesis investigates a different aspect of the 
myth of the human: respectively, the creation myth of ‘how we became human’, the 
myth of natural human behaviour, and the myth of speech as mastery of the internal 
self and the external world. The boundary between the human and the animal is not 
single but is ‘multiple and foliated’; the figure of the human is always emerging, being 
differed and defined along these many folds. Each chapter traces a different fold or
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‘foliation’ in the boundary between the human and the animal: ‘becoming human’, 
‘acting human’, and ‘talking human’. Although I do not employ inverted commas in 
subsequent usage of these phrases, I am of course using them, as I am using the terms 
‘human’ and ‘animal’ in general, ‘under erasure [sous rature]’. Deconstruction, as 
Derrida argues in ‘The Ends of Man’, ‘must weave and intertwine [...] two motifs’: it 
must analyse a discourse from the inside ‘by repeating what is implicit in the founding 
concepts and in original problematics, by using against the edifice the instruments or
the stones available in the house’ and must also ‘change ground [...], by stepping
101abruptly outside and by affirming absolute rupture and difference’. It is necessary to 
employ the language of humanism, to use terms such as ‘becoming human’, in order to 
achieve this ‘change of ground’. I am not implying a belief in these ideas as actual 
events; that is, I do not believe that one really becomes human, because this whole 
project questions what that phrase would mean. Rather, I am referring to a discursive 
process, a ‘phraseology’ of mythical speech within culture.
Chapter 1. Becoming Human: Evolution, the Trace, and Differance in Time
In this chapter I examine the chronological boundary of the human, in order to 
interrogate the way in which the human is produced as different in time from its 
nonhuman animal ancestors. I argue that cultural representations of becoming human 
unsettle the fixed categories of human and animal. Even though fictional accounts of 
becoming human, such as The Epic o f Gilgamesh and the book of Genesis, have 
largely been replaced by stories told by paleoanthropologists and evolutionary 
biologists, these scientific narratives still preserve the terminology and conceptual 
framework of the earlier creation myths. Paleoanthropology, the study of human 
evolution, is a human science and a humanist discourse; it assumes the existence of the
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human as a single entity, monolithically opposed to the animal, which came into 
existence in a single ‘magic moment’. It therefore tries to fix the objects of its study as 
either human or animal. But this binary opposition between human and animal is 
troubled by the possibility of crossing the border that separates them. The very 
possibility of transition, which takes place on both a species and an individual level, 
challenges the absolute opposition between human and animal. It is impossible to 
locate an absolute origin of the human because of the play of traces and differance that 
problematises the separation of human and animal, present and past, living and dead. I 
conclude that narratives of becoming human inevitably dissolve the human that they 
seek to explain. The very possibility of ‘moving the goalposts’, of changing the 
definition of what it means to be human, shows that the human is a culturally 
constructed category.
Chapter 2. Acting Human: Autism , Anthropomorphism, and Differance in 
Behaviour
In this chapter I focus on the behavioural boundary of the human, in order to argue that 
the illusion of human essence is produced through a culturally regulated performance 
of species norms. I draw on Judith Butler’s notion of gender as performative, which 
has been widely taken up by theorists of gender, sexuality and race, but has not been 
explored as a posthumanist theory. According to humanism, acting human is a natural 
expression of an internal identity. Therefore, humanism is threatened when the 
behaviour does not match the supposed essence, and tries to suppress the threatening 
being by representing him/her/it as anomalous, false, or unintelligible. Those who do 
not act human in the correct way, such as feral children and autistic people, are 
constructed as nonhuman and punished for their failure. The ‘autistic liberation
movement’ responds by trying to extend the category of the human. However, this 
strategy retains the centrality of the term ‘human’ as a privileged category. An 
alternative strategy is to challenge the power of the human as the site of knowledge and 
power. The second behavioural threat to humanism is posed by animals who act 
human. Humanism attempts to suppress this by describing the phenomenon as 
anthropomorphism; in other words, suggesting that the performance is false or 
fictional. However, the ferocity of anti-anthropomorphism reveals that there is 
something very important at stake, and that the performance does indeed threaten the 
secure category of the human. Although these performances may be presented as false 
or fictional, the fact that an animal can act human undermines the idea that human 
behaviour is a natural manifestation of an internal essence, and instead makes visible 
the performativity of all instances of acting human.
Chapter 3. Talking Human: Speech, the Unconscious, and Differance in 
Communication
In this chapter I analyse the linguistic/communicatory boundary of the human, in order 
to deconstruct the opposition between human language and animal communication 
which underpins contemporary humanist discourse. This chapter incorporates a wide 
range of texts, reading biological, psychological and (paleo)anthropological 
explanations alongside philosophy and critical theory, in order to deconstruct the 
humanist myth of language. Humanists claim that spoken language, in its specific 
physical form, is ‘what makes us human’. The human voice is identified with presence, 
truth, subjectivity, while animals are mute, inarticulate objects. However, the 
existence of ‘talking’ birds, especially parrots, threatens this structure of oppositions. 
Humanism attempts to contain this threat by representing parrots’ ‘speech’ as ‘not
really talking’. Parroting is represented as a mechanical imitation of true human 
speech, but the representations of parrots which I analyse show that human speech 
itself does not guarantee truth or presence. I then interrogate the idea that humans 
‘have’ language. Human speech inevitably exceeds conscious control and intention; 
even the voice itself is not a pure expression of internal thoughts, but signifies in 
extraverbal ways. It is necessary to recognise both the shared aspects of human and 
nonhuman communication while also respecting the radical otherness of animals’ 
experience. I conclude that if the human is defined by ‘having language’ and language 
is ‘what humans have’, then the signifiers ‘language’ and ‘the human’ are constituted 
only by referring to each other. There is no ultimate signified, no human essence.
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Chapter 1 
Becoming Human 
Evolution, the Trace, and Differance in Time
One of the great scientific detective stories may finally have been solved: when 
did our ancestors cease being brute animals and first become truly human?
‘The Day W e Learned To Think’, Horizon. First broadcast 20 February 2003 on BBC Two.
In a series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man 
as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point where the 
term ‘man’ ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little importance.
Charles Darwin, ‘The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to S ex ’ (1871), in From So 
Simple a Beginning: The Four Great Books o f  Charles Darwin, ed. by Edward O. Wilson 
(London and New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 767-1248 (p. 910).
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When does ‘the animal’ end and ‘man’ begin? Did ‘our’ ancestors become human 
when they started to create art and wear clothes forty thousand years ago, or a hundred 
thousand years ago, when the first Homo sapiens evolved? Or perhaps the border 
between animal and human lies further back, a million years ago, marked by the 
evolution of Homo erectus: characterised by Richard Leakey as ‘distinctly human’,1 
even though Noel Boaz and Russell Ciochon see it as ‘still in essence a tropical 
animal’.2 Perhaps the first humans were ‘our’ Australopithecus afarensis ancestors 
who lived four million years ago, described by Ian Tattersall as ‘more humanlike than 
apelike’,3 but by John Lynch and Louise Barrett as ‘small and chimp-like, with nothing 
obviously human about their behaviour’.4 Looking back in time, how can humans, 
‘those living creatures who have given themselves the word that enables them to speak 
of the animal with a single voice’,5 know where to draw a line between ‘themselves’ 
and the animal other?
What these conflicting definitions of the human suggest is that the chronological limit 
between human and animal is not single and indivisible, but is a ‘plural and repeatedly 
folded frontier’ .6 In this chapter I focus specifically on the chronological boundary of 
the human, in order to interrogate the way in which the human is produced as different 
in time from its nonhuman animal ancestors. I argue that cultural representations of 
becoming human, of crossing the boundary from animal to human, unsettle the fixed
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categories of human and animal. As outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, my aim 
is ‘not to efface the limit, but to multiply its figures, to complicate, thicken,
'y
delinearize, fold, and divide the line precisely by making it increase and multiply’.
The drawing o f this limit is necessary in order to construct the category of the
human. As Derrida writes in O f Grammatology:
Man calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play 
of supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality, primitivism, childhood, 
madness, divinity. [...] The history of man calling himself man is the 
articulation of all these limits among themselves.8
In this chapter, I read narratives of human evolution in order to argue that they draw a
chronological limit between human and animal, which excludes ‘nature’, ‘animality’,
and ‘primitivism’ in order to define the human: to enable ‘man [to] cal[l] himself man’.
The theory of evolution has profound implications for humanism as it fundamentally 
challenges the concept of species and of absolute boundaries between species. Human 
evolution is a topic which is frequently discussed within popular culture, the news 
media, and scientific research, but has received relatively little attention within critical 
and cultural theory. Posthumanist theorists have been more interested in announcing 
the end of the human (as is suggested by the very word posthumanism) than in looking 
back at its origins; the potential successors of the human have attracted more interest 
than its extinct predecessors. However, the creation myth of the human, the story of 
how ‘we’ became human, is central to the mythology of humanism. It is my argument 
that this story is centred on a process of becoming differed from the animal. The basic 
components of this story, such as hunting animals, learning language, and wearing 
clothes, have persisted for millennia. Even though fictional narratives of becoming 
human, such as The Epic o f Gilgamesh and the Biblical account in the book of Genesis,
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have largely been replaced by scientific stories, these scientific narratives of evolution 
still preserve the terminology and conceptual framework of the earlier creation myths.
Paleoanthropology, the study of human evolution, is a human science and a humanist 
discourse: it assumes the existence of the human as a single entity, monolithically 
opposed to the animal. Because paleoanthropology postulates a human essence, it 
cannot tolerate an ambiguously or partially human figure; therefore, 
paleoanthropological texts attempt to fix various extinct hominid species as either 
human or animal. In this chapter, I read a number of texts that represent Homo erectus 
-  a key transitional figure between animal and human -  in opposing ways, in order to 
show how they try to fix its meaning as either human or animal, and thereby preserve 
the human/animal binary opposition. I then turn to representations of Neanderthals and 
show that they trouble this binary opposition because they cannot be fixed as either 
human or animal. I argue that Neanderthals signify within culture as a mirror or 
uncanny double of the human subject, and that the possibility of ‘them’ passing as ‘us’ 
challenges the idea of a human essence.
The binary opposition between human and animal is troubled by the possibility of 
crossing the border that separates them. The very possibility of transition challenges 
the absolute separation between human and animal. This transition, this becoming 
human, takes place not only on the level of the species -  human evolution over 
millions of years -  but also on the level of the individual -  each child must learn to 
become human. In cultural discourse, phylogenesis, becoming human as a species, is 
identified with ontogenesis, the development of each individual child. This conflation
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stems from the nineteenth-century ‘biogenetic law’ (the argument that ‘ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny’) which is still a highly influential analogy.9
I conclude that narratives of becoming human inevitably dissolve the human that they 
seek to explain. The very possibility of ‘moving the goalposts’, of changing the 
definition of what it means to be human and where the limit between the animal and 
the human lies, suggests that the human is a culturally constructed category. The 
search for a point of absolute origin is problematised by the play of traces ‘across and 
despite all the limits that the strongest philosophical or cultural tradition thought it 
could recognize between “man” and “animal” ’.10 Narratives of human evolution 
cannot help but deconstruct the absolute opposition between humans and other 
animals. The human does not constitute a radical break from the pre-human animal, 
but ‘retains the mark’ of that animal as part of itself, and the pre-human animal is only 
understood as ‘hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element’, the 
human.11
The Origin of Species
Before the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin o f  Species in 1859, it was
generally believed within Western culture that species were divinely created,
immutable entities. According to the Old Testament, God created all of the species of
animals, and then created man as a kind of proxy to rule over them:
God made the wild animals according to their kinds, the livestock according to 
their kinds, and all the creatures that move along the ground according to their 
kinds. And God saw that it was good. Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our 
image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of 
the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that 
move along the ground’.12
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Species were seen as fixed, unchanging entities; creatures were, as the word implies, 
created ‘according to their kinds’ and were fundamentally distinct from each other. As 
well as the Judeo-Christian Bible, there was the influence of Platonic philosophy, in 
which each living animal was merely an imperfect copy of the species ideal, which 
resided in some supernatural realm: ‘pre-Darwinian biologists felt [...] that earthly 
horses were merely imperfect replicas of some ideal horse, and earthly lions were 
rough and ready copies of the original, heavenly lion’.13 These belief systems suggest 
that there is an absolute separation between humans and all other animals, and a core 
identity which is shared by all humans.
Even when the possibility of some kind of change or evolution in humans was
considered, there was no suggestion that one species might actually become another.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau opens his 1754 ‘Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations
of Inequality among Men’ with the following passage:
However important as it may be, in order to judge soundly regarding Man’s 
natural state, to consider him from his origin, and to examine him, so to speak, 
in the first Embryo of the species, I shall not follow his organization throughout 
its successive developments: I shall not pause to search in the animal System 
what he may have been at the beginning, if he was eventually to become what 
he now is; I shall not examine whether, as Aristotle thinks, his elongated nails 
were at first hooked claws; whether he was as hairy as a bear and whether, 
walking on all fours, his gaze directed to the Earth, and confined to the horizon 
of a few paces, determined both the character and the limits of his ideas. [...] 
Comparative Anatomy has as yet made too little progress, the observations of 
Naturalists are as yet too uncertain to permit establishing the basis of a solid 
argument on such foundations; so that, without resorting to the supernatural 
information we have on this point, and without taking into account the changes 
that must have occurred in man’s internal and the external conformation, as he 
gradually put his limbs to new uses, and took up new foods, I shall assume him 
always conformed as I see him today, walking on two feet, using his hands as 
we do ours, directing his gaze over the whole of Nature, and with his eyes 
surveying the vast expanse of Heaven.14
Even though Rousseau alludes to the possibility of some kind of ‘successive
developments’ of ‘man’, these were still within the category of ‘vague and almost
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imaginary conjectures’. Furthermore, even though Rousseau considers that ‘changes 
[...] must have occurred in man’s internal and [...] external conformation’, he imagines 
these changes to be the result of ‘put[ting] his limbs to new uses’ and eating ‘new 
kinds of foods’: that is, changes within the human species. The possibility that the 
human might have emerged from a completely other, inhuman, animal species -  that 
there might not have been such a thing as ‘M an’ -  does not even form part of any 
‘imaginary conjectures’. Rousseau proceeds on the then-plausible basis that ‘man’ has 
‘always conformed as I see him today’. His description of this state -  ‘walking on two 
feet, using his hands as we do ours, directing his gaze over the whole of Nature’ -  
emphasises the superiority of the human in comparison to the rest of the world: ‘Man’ 
is depicted as a bipedal, dextrous godlike animal who can survey ‘the vast expanse of 
Heaven’.
From this perspective, Darwin’s theory of the origin of species by means of natural
selection constituted an immense shock. Its impact was famously described by
Sigmund Freud in ‘Fixation To Traumas -  The Unconscious’:
In the course of centuries the naive self-love of men has had to submit to two 
major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they learnt that our 
earth was not the center of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic 
system of scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with 
the name of Copernicus, though something similar had already been asserted by 
Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when biological research destroyed 
man’s supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the 
animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revaluation has been 
accomplished in our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, 
though not without the most violent contemporary opposition.15
It is now nearly one hundred and fifty years since The Origin o f Species was published,
but humanism still does not seem to have accepted its full implications.
Freud’s argument that Darwin’s work was a ‘blow’ to ‘the naive self-love of men’, and
that it incurred ‘the most violent contemporary opposition’, is disputed by Chris
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Fleming and Jane Goodall in their paper ‘Dangerous Darwinism’, published in the 
journal Public Understanding o f Science. They criticise the ‘rhetorical narrative’ 
instigated by Freud, which claims that Darwin’s theory ‘came as a horrible shock to the 
Victorians and that it is still a profound psychological threat, and therefore widely 
resisted’.16 They argue that ‘the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates] that 
Darwin’s work was neither generally shocking nor regarded as particularly dangerous 
in his own time’ (p. 266). It is their contention that this ‘culture-shock myth’, as they 
call it, is still used by pro-Darwinian scientists such as Richard Dawkins and Stephen 
Jay Gould to deny ‘that there was a genuine rational debate about the new theories, 
built around cogent arguments on several sides’ (p. 266).
While I am sympathetic to the goal of increasing public understanding of science and 
to the demand that scientists should take ‘some responsibility for what may be highly 
complex configurations of evidence when they make statements about cultural issues’ 
(p. 261), I do not accept their argument that Darwin’s theory did not and does not 
provoke resistance as a result of its impact on the place of humans in the world. 
Fleming and Goodall argue that the ‘culture-shock narrative, and the paradigm-shift 
drama to which it belongs’ ultimately serve to ‘promote not understanding but 
dramaturgy, not science but myth’ (pp. 269-70). It is true that others before Darwin 
had speculated about evolution (including his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin), but The 
Origin o f Species did mark a major shift in cultural understanding. As Colin Tudge 
writes:
Darwin was not the first person to think of evolution: of course not. But he it 
was who established that evolution is a fact -  the natural way of things. He 
succeeded in this partly by providing the first plausible mechanism of evolution 
-  ‘by means of natural selection’; and this made the idea generally credible. He 
also established the idea of evolution through the sheer mass of evidence that 
he brought to bear, and the inexorable logic of his arguments.17
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Therefore, while Darwin’s work can be understood as part of a wider historical
narrative, it is not unreasonable to also identify it as a significant turning point.
Fleming and Goodall’s primary criticism of those who promote the ‘culture-shock
myth’ is that they do not provide an ‘evidential basis’ for their claims, but merely
repeat the myth (p. 261). I would argue that there is still a great deal of resistance to
the full implications of evolutionary theory, even within the scientific community, and
that the ‘evidential basis’ for this resistance can be read in many cultural texts. For
example, in a 2004 New Scientist article on the sequencing of the chimpanzee genome,
Robin Orwant writes:
The results of the human genome project suggest the figure [the number of 
human genes] is closer to 30,000 -  only five times as many as your average 
bacterium and roughly the same as mice. To add insult to injury, most of our 
genes are virtually identical to those of chimps.18
The language of violence here -  the idea that humans have actually been somehow
‘injur[edf by these discoveries -  closely echoes Freud’s characterisation of the
Copemican and Darwinian revolutions as ‘blows’. Similarly, a 1997 article in
Scientific American entitled ‘Rambling Road to Humanity’ located a recent
paleoanthropological discovery in an anti-humanist narrative very similar to Freud’s:
Science has, over the centuries, humbled humans, gradually forcing us to 
abandon the illusion that our species represents the ultimate end of creation. 
Copernicus and Galileo displaced Earth from the center of the universe; Darwin 
dashed the conceit that humans originated in a special way, distinct from all 
other species. Now a group of researchers [...] throw cold water even on the 
notion of steady ‘improvement’ within the human line.19
The article discusses recent discoveries that the brain size of Homo sapiens has
diminished over the last seventy-five thousand years, and that Neanderthals had a
significantly larger average brain capacity, before concluding: ‘So this is what it has
come to. The favored son of the Garden of Eden has been demoted to the incredible
shrinking human’. Texts like these show that discoveries about human evolution still
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have the power to ‘humbl[e] humans’ and that they are frequently interpreted in a 
negative way.
Perhaps more significantly, what articles like these demonstrate is that scientific
discoveries cannot be disentangled from the cultural myths that surround them.
Fleming and Goodall criticise the ‘culture-shock narrative’ for promoting ‘not science
but myth’, but this formulation assumes that it is possible to separate scientific
discoveries from the way that they are narrated. In order to be disseminated, scientific
research must be nairativized and thus transformed into myth. This is particularly true
of scientific fields such as evolutionary biology and human genetics which are so
closely tied to cultural and philosophical beliefs about who ‘we’ are. While it is the
theory of evolution which is generally regarded as the central part of The Origin o f
Species, Darwin’s argument that there is no such thing as a species is more deeply
challenging to humanist discourse. Darwin writes:
I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and dispassionate 
judgment of which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists entertain, 
and which I formerly entertained -  namely, that each species has been 
independently created -  is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not 
immutable; but that those belonging to what are called the same genera are 
lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct species, in the same 
manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species are the descendants of 
that species.20
A species is not a divinely created entity, but simply a convenient label for grouping
individual organisms. Darwin writes that ‘no one definition [of species] has yet
satisfied all naturalists’, apart from ‘the unknown element of a distinct act of 
21creation’: an observation which still holds true today. Furthermore, a species is not
created at a single moment, but emerges from within another species: as Darwin puts
it, ‘varieties are species in the process of formation, or are, as I have called them,
• • • • 22incipient species’. This changes the notion of species from ‘a group of animals all of
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which were supposed to be identical with a type’ to ‘a live population occupying space 
during time in nature’.23 This idea has profound implications for humanism, as it 
means there is no simple and absolute boundary between human and nonhuman.
Furthermore, if the human species has evolved from nonhuman animals, then prior to a 
certain date, humans did not exist. It must, therefore, have a chronological boundary; 
if one goes far enough back in time, one must encounter a limit. As Ian Tattersall 
observes:
Darwin had to concede, of course, that species had some type of reality in space 
-  though he was keenly aware of the practical difficulties frequently 
encountered in defining them. The idea of natural selection, however, cleverly 
enabled Darwin to attack the notion of immutability by denying species reality 
in time.24
Evolutionary theory thus adds a historical dimension to the concept of the human. The 
human is no longer a universal, eternal being, but has a beginning and an end: as 
Darwin argues, ‘every production of nature [...] has had a history’.25 The modem 
project of taxonomy, begun by Linnaeus, aimed to place each living being in the 
correct position in the overall scheme of life. However, the dream of a perfect 
classification becomes an impossibility when one adds the dimension of time, which 
dissolves the boundaries between species, meaning that ‘every generalisation about 
biology is a slice in time’.27 Similarly, Richard Dawkins writes: ‘If we consider all 
animals that have ever lived instead of just modem animals, such words as “human” 
and “bird” become just as blurred and unclear at the edges as words like “tall” and
55 28“fat”’. The fact that species change over time means that the category of the human 
is ‘blurred and unclear at the edges’.
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This implication is clear in The Descent o f Man, in which Darwin argues that there is
no way of pinning a definite date of origin on the human species:
Whether primeval man, when he possessed very few arts of the rudest kind, and 
when his power of language was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to 
be called man, must depend on the definition which we employ. In a series of 
forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as he now 
exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point when the term ‘man’ 
ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little importance. So again it is 
almost a matter of indifference whether the so-called races of man are thus 
designated, or are ranked as species or sub-species; but the latter term appears
• 29the most appropriate.
As Darwin writes, being human is not a question of identifying any real essence, but
merely a question of ‘deservfing] to be called man’. It is a linguistic construction, and
therefore ‘dependfs] on the definition which we employ’. This work was first
published in 1871, but its implications -  most significantly, the non-existence of the
human species -  have still not really been accepted or understood. Ideas based on
evolution are still frequently used to reinscribe, rather than challenge, pre-Darwinian
notions of human superiority. As Stephen R. L. Clark writes: ‘Liberal humanists need
to believe in the myth of a common human nature, but have abandoned belief in the
human soul, and so equate that imagined natural kind with the human species. They
should think again’.30 Similarly, John Gray points out:
Species do not exist. This applies equally to humans. Yet it is forgotten 
whenever people talk about ‘the progress of mankind’. They have put their faith 
in an abstraction that no one would think of taking seriously if it were not 
formed from cast-off Christian hopes.31
The fact that people still frequently make reference to the idea of a single human
entity, such as ‘mankind’, ‘humanity’, or ‘the human race’, demonstrates that the full
implications of Darwin’s work, in particular his insistence on the non-existence of
species, have still not been fully incorporated into cultural understandings of what it
means to be human.
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The persistence of these pre-Darwinian ideas is demonstrated by their appearance in 
the most unlikely texts. In the 2006 edition of Darwin’s four major works (.From So 
Simple a Beginning: The Four Great Books o f Charles Darwin), its editor E. O.
Wilson writes:
By 4 million years before the present, the earliest direct human ancestor 
(Australopithecus afarensis, known best from the female fossil ‘Lucy’) had 
acquired an erect posture and bipedal locomotion but still possessed a 
chimpanzee-sized brain. The first ‘truly human’ species (Homo habilis) arose 
by 2.2 million years ago and possessed a brain capacity one-third larger. It gave 
rise within half a million years to Homo erectus, who possessed a brain nearly 
as large as that of modem Homo sapiens.32
Wilson uses the phrase ‘truly human’, even though the text which he is introducing
(The Descent o f Man) makes it very clear that various developments attributed to ‘the
human’, such as large brain size, bipedalism, and tool making, emerged over millions
of years, so that there is no such thing as the first ‘true’ human. However, the fact that
he places it in inverted commas suggests a certain hesitation on his part; this humanism
is not entirely secure.33 Darwin is insistent that there is no such thing as a ‘true’
species, and that this realisation should follow from his work: as a consequence of
understanding evolution, he writes, ‘we shall at least be freed from the vain search for
the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term species’.34 It may be the case
that naturalists no longer engage in ‘endless disputes about whether or not some fifty
o r
species of British brambles are true species’ but when it comes to the human, even 
scientific experts in evolutionary theory, such as Wilson, seem unwilling or unable to 
give up on that ‘vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence’.
This search for the essence of the human is now the main goal of paleoanthropology: 
the scientific study of human evolution, generally conducted through the search for and 
analysis of fossil remains. As can be seen from the word itself -  from the Greek palai,
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long ago, and anthropos, man -  the discipline investigates the question of human
origins specifically, as distinct from paleontology, which studies the fossil remains and
evolutionary history of all organisms. However, as well as being a research science,
paleoanthropology is also a human science. It seems reasonable to categorise it in this
way, since there is no agreed-upon definition of which disciplines count as ‘human
sciences’, except that they focus on the human as their object of study. For example,
Oxford University’s Human Sciences course ‘studies humans as biological, social and
cultural species [...] from the contrasting perspectives of the biological and social
sciences’.36 Another Human Sciences department, at Loughborough University,
describes its subject area as ‘Psychology, Ergonomics, Human Biology’.37
Paleoanthropology fits well into this cross-disciplinary area of study because it
straddles the line between ‘biological’ and ‘social’ sciences. The archaeologist Ralph
Solecki explicitly describes the study of prehistory as a ‘humanistic’ discipline:
Prehistory partakes of allied interdisciplinary fields such as palaeozoology, 
palaeobotany, geology, climatology -  among some of the more obviously 
useful sciences. But the subject matter of prehistory is man, and one must never 
lose sight of this fact. Hence prehistorians, if they wish to present their data in 
humanistic terms, should be knowledgeable in the other fields of anthropology 
(physical anthropology, linguistics and cultural anthropology).38
Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary describes the discipline as ‘a branch of
39anthropology’. This interdisciplinarity, which combines the authority of ‘the more 
obviously useful sciences’ with the cultural importance of anthropology, means that 
paleoanthropology plays a very significant role in constructing contemporary 
understandings of the human.
Paleoanthropological texts do not simply recount scientific research, but also 
(re)produce cultural myths: as Matt Cartmill notes, ‘the stories that we tell about 
human origins, even if they are true stories, are myths’.40 The stories are built around
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fossilised bones and stone tools which are materially real, but, as I will argue, these
physical objects are woven into imaginary stories and fantasies. Sometimes this
process of myth-making is explicit. For example, Wilson writes:
The evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have. It can be 
adjusted until it comes as close to truth as the human mind is constructed to 
judge the truth. And if that is the case, the mythopoeic requirements of the 
mind must somehow be met by scientific materialism so as to reinvest our 
superb energies.41
However, not all of those who produce this myth acknowledge that they are responding
to ‘mythopoeic’ and not simply factual desires, even though these two modes cannot
be fully separated. As Cristopher Nash argues:
The narrative mode of discourse is omnipresent in human affairs. W e’re 
obliged to consider the ungainly fact that in our culture, where we least expect 
it and even most vociferously disclaim it, there may actually be storytelling 
going on, and that the implications may indeed be ‘considerable’.42
Narratives of human evolution are, precisely, narratives, and paleoanthropologists are
storytellers. The story they tell has serious political and ethical consequences because
it is the story of how ‘we’ came to be, and by implication who ‘we’ are. As Barbara
Katz Rothman writes, ‘evolutionary history [is] the story of how we came to be, the
collective origins tale we can tell’ 43 I will now briefly look at some pre-scientific
versions of this ‘collective origins tale’ in order to demonstrate how they still influence
paleoanthropological storytelling today.
Creation Myths
Stories of becoming human and of becoming differed from the animal are among the 
very earliest known texts. The Epic o f Gilgamesh, the oldest surviving story in 
existence, tells the story of a ‘wild man’ who goes through a process of becoming 
human which is very similar to the dominant narrative of becoming human today.
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Gilgamesh, first written down in Mesopotamia in the third millennium B.C.E., is in its
current form a combination of several different, related versions of a tale based around
a real historical figure: Gilgamesh, king of Uruk. The fictionalised Gilgamesh is a
tyrant whose uncontrollable lust and violence is ruining the lives of his subjects. So
they pray to Aruru, the goddess of creation, to create an ‘equal’ to Gilgamesh who can
fight with him and leave the citizens in peace: a man who will be ‘his own reflection,
his second se lf .44 In answer to their prayers, Aruru makes a man from clay. This is
the wild man Enkidu, who is described as a mixture of god, human and animal:
There was virtue in him of the god of war, of Ninurta himself. His body was 
rough, he had long hair like a woman’s; it waved like the hair of Nisaba, the 
goddess of com. His body was covered with matted hair like Samuqan’s, the 
god of cattle. He was innocent of mankind; he knew nothing of the cultivated 
land. (p. 63)
Enkidu seems to be a figure of true ‘divinanimality’, to use Derrida’s term.45 
Gilgamesh too embodies the divine, the human, and the animal; he is described as two- 
thirds god, one-third man, and ‘terrifying like a great wild bull’ (p. 61). Enkidu is a 
kind of Homo ferns: a man untouched by human culture,46 who lives in peaceful 
harmony with animals: ‘Enkidu ate grass in the hills with the gazelle and lurked with 
wild beasts at the water-holes; he had joy of the water with the herds of wild game’ (p. 
63).
But this idyllic scene is disrupted by the practice of hunting. Because Enkidu 
continually thwarts the hunters’ attempts to trap animals, the men set a trap for him in 
return. This trap is ‘a harlot, a wanton from the temple of love’ who goes naked to 
Enkidu in order to lure him into having sex with her (p. 63). The woman is used as a 
bridge between the world of animals and the world of men. Rather than being
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primarily erotic, her nakedness emphasises her status as intermediate between human 
and animal:
The trapper spoke to her: ‘There he is. Now, woman, make your breasts bare, 
have no shame, do not delay but welcome his love. [...] For when he murmurs 
love to you the wild beasts that shared his life in the hills will reject him.’ She 
was not ashamed to take him, she made herself naked and welcomed his 
eagerness, (p. 64)
The emphasis on the woman’s lack of shame about her nakedness suggests that she is
more animal than human. In the Bible, it is Adam and Eve’s awareness of and shame
about their nakedness which makes them fully human. The relationship between
nakedness and shame also plays a key part in ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am (More
to Follow)’, which Derrida begins by posing the question of why he feels ashamed if a
cat sees him naked. He writes:
It is as if I were ashamed, therefore, naked in front of this cat, but also ashamed 
for being ashamed. [...] Ashamed of being as naked as an animal [bete\. It is 
generally thought, although none of the philosophers I am about to examine 
actually mention it, that the property unique to animals and what in the final 
analysis distinguishes them from man, is their being naked without knowing 
it.47
(I discuss the concepts of blushing and shame, and how they relate to the border 
between human and animal, in more depth in Chapter 3.) In Gilgamesh, the harlot’s 
lack of shame about her nakedness suggests that she is not fully human, and this 
enables her to make contact with Enkidu where other people cannot.
But sexual contact with the harlot has the same effect for Enkidu as eating the apple
does for Adam and Eve: it banishes him from his Edenic paradise. After six days and
seven nights lying with the woman, Enkidu tries to return to the beasts he has always
lived with, but they reject him:
Then, when the gazelle saw him, they bolted away; when the wild creatures 
saw him they fled. Enkidu would have followed, but his body was bound as 
though with a cord, his knees gave way when he started to run, his swiftness
68
was gone. And now the wild creatures had all fled away; Enkidu was grown 
weak, for wisdom was in him, and the thoughts of a man were in his heart.
(p. 65)
Enkidu has unwittingly and unwillingly crossed the border from animal to human, and
is forever cut off from the animals. The hunt has been successful. Unable to return to
the animals, Enkidu goes with the harlot to Uruk, where Gilgamesh is king, and she
helps him to complete the process of becoming human:
She divided her clothing in two and with the one half she clothed him and with 
the other herself; and holding his hand she led him like a child to the 
sheepfolds, into the shepherds’ tents. [...] But Enkidu could only suck the milk 
of wild animals. He fumbled and gaped, at a loss what to do or how he should 
eat the bread and drink the strong wine. Then the woman said, ‘Enkidu, eat 
bread, it is the staff of life; drink the wine, it is the custom of the land.’ So he 
ate till he was full and drank strong wine, seven goblets. He became merry, his 
heart exulted and his face shone. He rubbed down the matted hair of his body 
and anointed himself with oil. Enkidu had become a man; but when he had put 
on man’s clothing he appeared like a bridegroom. He took arms to hunt the lion 
so that the shepherds could rest at night, (pp. 67-68)
The key parts of this process of becoming human involve becoming differed from the
animal. Once Enkidu has made the transition from human to animal (when he has
‘grown weak’ and ‘the thoughts of a man were in his heart’), he must learn to wear
clothes, eat human food and drink wine, and groom himself, in order to live with other
humans. Finally, he takes ‘arms to hunt the lion’; he has changed sides, so that instead
of protecting the animals from the human hunters, he now participates in hunting them.
Although this story is over five thousand years old, these behaviours still correspond 
closely to those which are now seen as marking the differences between human and 
animal. For example, on the BBC’s website you can play a game called ‘Caveman 
Challenge’, the aim of which is to ‘move along the evolutionary scale from ape to
? 48man’. The game consists of completing successive stages in the process of becoming 
human; these include walking upright, eating meat, making tools, controlling fire,
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hunting animals, using language, and using your imagination. This cultural 
representation of becoming human is remarkably similar to that in Gilgamesh, despite 
the five thousand years that separate them, and this demonstrates that ancient 
mythological accounts of becoming human still inform scientific narratives today.
Gilgamesh is a very ancient depiction of becoming human, of establishing a distance
between humans and other animals, and yet the text repeatedly describes humans by
likening them to animals. Gilgamesh is ‘like a wild bull’ (p. 65), the goddess Ninsun
‘is as strong as a wild ox in the byre’ (p. 69), and when Enkidu dies, Gilgamesh begins
‘to rage like a lion, like a lioness robbed of her whelps’ (p. 95). There is a fascinating
tension in the text between the explicit storyline of Enkidu becoming separated from
the animals, and the underlying sense of affinity between humans and animals, shown
by the recurrent animal metaphors. John Berger observes a similar sense of proximity
in the metaphors used in The Iliad: 'The Iliad is one of the earliest texts available to us,
and in it the use of metaphor still reveals the proximity of man and animal, the
proximity from which metaphor itself arose’.49 Berger suggests that the relation of
humans to animals is one of both sameness and difference. He writes:
Animals are bom, are sentient and are mortal. In these things they resemble 
man. In their superficial anatomy -  less in their deep anatomy -  in their habits, 
in their time, in their physical capacities, they differ from man. They are both 
like and unlike, (p. 2)
It is this interplay of sameness and difference -  like a lion, but not a lion -  which,
according to Berger, means that ‘the essential relation between man and animal was
metaphoric. Within that relation what the two terms -  man and animal -  shared in
common revealed what differentiated them’ (p. 5). Each attempt to differentiate the
human from the animal brings with it an awareness of the similarities as well, and the
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‘proximity of man and animal’ is shown in the significance of animals in the earliest 
texts and works of art.
As noted above, many of the earliest known texts, such as The Epic o f Gilgamesh, The 
Iliad, and the Bible, are full of animal metaphors. Similarly, the prehistoric cave 
paintings of Lascaux, Altamira, and others all depict animals. As Jacob Bronowski 
writes:
We find in caves like Altamira [...] the record of what dominated the mind of 
man the hunter. There we see what made his world and preoccupied him. The 
cave paintings, which are about twenty thousand years old, fix for ever the 
universal base of his culture then, the hunter’s knowledge of the animal that he 
lived by and stalked.50
As Bronowski says, these paintings suggest that ‘the animal’ preoccupied ‘man the
hunter’, as do the frequent animal metaphors in stories. Hunting appears explicitly in
many of these images: in some cases there are small stick-figure humans attacking the
animals with spears, while others depict animals already killed by hunters. The
relationship between humans and animals is crystallised in the painted pictures of
hunting. Just as the human subject produces the animal as object of the artistic gaze, it
also produces the animal as object of the hunt.
In both fictional and scientific creation myths, hunting animals is represented as a 
central part of the process of becoming human. In the mid-twentieth century, the most 
widely accepted explanation of human evolution was known as ‘Man the Hunter’.
This theory suggests that hunting was the driving force behind the evolution of many 
human characteristics, such as bipedalism, (relative) hairlessness, co-operation, and 
even language. For example, Desmond Morris writes: ‘This change [from fruit picking 
to hunting] was to forge our human personality, making us more cooperative, more
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communicative, more dextrous and more intelligent’.51 This theory places the
differentiation from the animal other at the very inception of the human; in order to
become human, the animal must be defined ‘as a thing’, as Georges Bataille has
written.52 Bataille argues that this process of defining the animal as an object is central
to the process of defining oneself as human:
The definition of the animal as a thing has become a basic human given. The 
animal has lost its status as man’s fellow creature, and man, perceiving the 
animality in himself, regards it as a defect. [...] But to kill the animal and alter it 
as one pleases is not merely to change into a thing that which doubtless was not 
a thing from the start; it is to define the animal as a thing beforehand.53
Of course, animals also hunt and kill each other, but Bataille argues that this is a
different process, since ‘the animal that another animal eats is not yet given as an
object’.54 I do not agree with Bataille’s absolute distinction between ‘animality’ and
‘humanity’, nor with his argument that the animal ‘like the plant, has no autonomy in
relation to the rest of the world’.55 However, his theory does suggest that it is
necessary to produce the animal as an object that can be killed and eaten in order to
bring the human subject into existence.
While the animal must be produced as object in order to construct the human as 
subject, this relationship is unstable. At a moment’s notice, the power relations can be 
subverted, and ‘Man the Hunter’ can suddenly become the hunted animal, as in the 
case of Enkidu’s entrapment in Gilgamesh. Derrida notes this structure at work in the 
story of Cain and Abel: ‘Having fallen into the trap and killed Abel, Cain covers 
himself with shame and flees, wandering, hunted, tracked in turn like an animal’.56 If 
hunting animals is part of becoming human, then these reversals of power in hunting 
stories indicate that the category of the human is never fully secure. A man can slip
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from the category of the human and become ‘tracked in turn like an animal’, defined 
‘as a thing’ which can be killed and eaten.
As can be seen from the importance of hunting in both mythical and scientific
narratives of becoming human, the new scientific versions often preserve elements of
the ancient stories. When Western culture rejected the literal truth of the Bible, it lost
its dominant creation myth, and had to replace it with a scientific one; however, this
can be seen as a reinscription of the same story with a new vocabulary. This process of
reinscription is often explicit; for example, when Jacob Bronowski recounts the history
of humans in The Ascent o f Man, he asks in his first chapter: ‘Where should one
begin?’ and answers: ‘With the Creation -  with the creation of man himself’
(p. 24). Note the hesitation in the middle of his answer, marked by the dash and the
repetition. One must begin with the Creation, but the second time around, the capital
letter has disappeared; this indicates the disappearance of God, and the inception of a
new type of creation myth. Bronowski visibly struggles with the disjunction between
the Biblical account and the scientific version:
The ancient stories used to put the creation of man into a golden age and a 
beautiful, legendary landscape. If I were telling the story of Genesis now, I 
should be standing in the Garden of Eden. But this is manifestly not the Garden 
of Eden. And yet I am at the navel of the world, at the birthplace of man, here 
in the East African Rift Valley, near the equator, (p. 25)
This account is undoubtedly more accurate than the Biblical story. But it is still
phrased as a creation myth, with references to the ‘birthplace of man’ and ‘the navel of
the world’. Texts which tell the scientific humanist creation myth continually use the
language of the (apparently superseded) religious one. For example, Richard Dawkins’
book, despite being subtitled ‘A Darwinian View of Life’, is entitled River out o f
57Eden. Desmond Morris describes how climate change drove ‘ancestral apes’ out of
‘their forest of Eden’: ‘in an almost Biblical sense, they had to face expulsion from the 
Garden’.58 Adam and Eve are given new prefixes, such as ‘Y-chromosomal Adam’ 
and ‘mitochondrial Eve’: ideas in which, as Rod Caird writes, ‘the fundamental 
conceptual clash between evolution and the Biblical story of Creation seems to have 
found a sort of common ground’.59 I am not questioning the scientific research which 
underlies these texts; however, the continued resort to these Biblical names 
demonstrates that contemporary scientific storytellers are still framing their myths in 
the language of creation.
Another example of the persistence of the idea of creation in scientific texts is the 
frequent use of the word ‘creature’, which derives from the past participle of Latin 
creare, to create. The word is used especially often to describe beings which exist 
somewhere on the ambiguous frontier between human and animal. For example, the 
paleoanthropologist Sonia Cole writes: ‘Over half a million years ago, astonishing 
creatures lived in South Africa [...] which are so difficult to classify on anatomical 
grounds that it is still doubtful whether they must be regarded as man-like apes or ape­
like men’.60 Similarly, in Walking with Cavemen John Lynch and Louise Barrett 
frequently use the word ‘creature’ to refer to beings who trouble the opposition 
between human and animal. For example, they write that, while ‘we tend to think of 
our ancestry as a continuous line of progression from one extinct “human” to the next’, 
in the past ‘there were many other “human” creatures that shared the world’.61 The use 
of inverted commas around ‘human’ here indicates a lack of certainty about the status 
of these ‘creatures’. The word is generally used without conscious awareness or 
acknowledgement of its etymology, but its continued use demonstrates that religious 
concepts of human origins still unconsciously inform scientific humanism. As I will
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demonstrate, however, it is not possible to simply transfer ‘the Creation’ into a new 
scientific version -  ‘the creation of man him self -  because with a full understanding 
of evolution and the origin of species comes the realisation that there is no such thing 
as ‘man him self.
Paleoanthropology as a Humanist Discourse
The human, or ‘Man’, is the primary object of paleoanthropological inquiry. In its 
very name, the discipline relies on the notion that there is something called ‘man’
(ianthropos): as if, in Lyotard’s words, ‘at least man were a certain value, which had no 
need to be interrogated’. Paleoanthropology is not only a human science, but is also 
a humanist discourse. Paleoanthropological investigation begins with the idea that 
there is an intangible quality called ‘humanness’ which distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’. 
In his prologue to Origins Reconsidered: In Search o f What Makes Us Human, co­
authored with Roger Lewin, the leading paleoanthropologist Richard Leakey outlines 
what he sees as the purpose of his research. He writes:
Surprisingly, there is no agreed-upon definition of the quality of humanness. It 
hardly seemed necessary, partly because it appeared so obvious: humanness is 
what we feel about ourselves. Those who tried to define humanness found 
themselves molding Jell-O: it kept slipping through the fingers. But if this 
sense of humanity came into being in the course of evolutionary history, then it 
must have component parts, and they in turn must be identifiable. [...] It is the 
business of paleoanthropologists to reconstruct that history, not to obscure it.63
This is a strongly humanist project, which asserts that there is such a thing as
‘humanness’, which ‘we’ all feeV . Although Leakey objects to those who ‘make
humanness a unique and scientifically inexplicable mark of humanity’, arguing that
this position ‘smacks of a kind of creationist obfuscation’ (p. xxi), nevertheless
elsewhere in the book he refers to ‘that intangible, indefinable, and yet intensely felt
sense in us that we identify as true humanity’ (p. 82). I am not at all sure that I do have
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this ‘intensely felt sense’ of ‘humanness’ or that I would be able to identify the feeling 
of ‘true humanity’, but the narratives of paleoanthropology do not simply describe this 
state; they create it. The ‘we’, the all-inclusive pronoun that unites all human beings, 
is constructed by the stories of paleoanthropology. As Nash writes in his foreword to 
Narrative in Culture: The Uses o f  Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy, and 
Literature:
The authors speaking here describe narrative by-and-large as a technique for 
getting coherence. (I use this rough predicate -  ‘getting’ -  to leave open, as I 
think they are disposed to do, the issue as to whether the process alluded to is 
the discovery or the production of coherence.)64
Within paleoanthropology, the aim is to bring ‘coherence’ to the idea of ‘true
humanity’: to create a single human identity. Most contemporary paleoanthropologists
would argue that they are discovering, rather than producing, this coherence. In
general, their view is that there is such a thing as ‘true humanity’, and that the
difficulty of defining it (its slippery ‘Jell-O’-like nature, as Leakey puts it) can be
overcome by scientific investigation.
This view is representative of contemporary scientific humanism. It starts from the
idea that ‘we’ all somehow ‘feel human’, that this feeling marks an absolute opposition
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and then aims to provide a scientific justification for it. For
example, a similar viewpoint is expressed by Ian Tattersall in The Monkey in the
Mirror: Essays on the Science o f What Makes Us Human:
There are six billion human beings (for the moment); and no matter how 
bizarrely some of us behave or view the world, we usually have no great 
difficulty in interpreting each other’s motives, or at least in explaining them 
away. But what about other species, even close relatives? Here we have to 
confess ourselves nonplussed, for it turns out that we are simply incapable of 
imagining states of consciousness other than our own.65
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There is contemporary scientific humanism in a nutshell: the belief that we have an 
instinctive understanding of each other that is shared with all humans and no 
nonhumans. ‘We’ are essentially all the same, regardless of our individual psychology, 
culture, and beliefs; conversely, the states of consciousness of other animals are utterly 
unimaginable. It is on this basis of humanist belief, founded on an absolute opposition, 
that the ‘business’ of paleoanthropology proceeds.
Many paleoanthropologists claim that all humans share a single identity; Leakey, for 
example, refers to the ‘search for the identity of all mankind’ (p. 16). The biological 
anthropologist Matt Cartmill suggests that the emphasis in post-war paleoanthropology 
on the identity of all humans, and the complementary emphasis on the absolute 
dividing line between humans and all other animals, results from the rejection of pre­
war ‘racist doctrine’.66 He writes:
In this new context, in which all anthropological argument began by affirming 
the unity of the family of man, the line separating humanity from the beasts 
became sharper and more symbolically important for anthropologists; and 
human uniqueness was widely stressed as a presupposition of anthropological 
discourse, (p. 177)
As Cartmill argues here, post-war paleoanthropology places great importance on ‘the 
line separating humanity from the beasts’. I would add a theoretical slant to this 
analysis by arguing that in order to produce ‘the unity of the family of man’, in order to 
define the human as a single unified concept, it was necessary to differ it from the 
animal (which also had to be constructed as a single, unitary category). The meaning 
of ‘the’ human, of ‘man’ in the singular, could only be produced by defining it against 
‘the’ animal, also in the singular, with a sharp and singular boundary-line dividing the 
two. Thus in place of Darwin’s image of a multitude of individual organisms, each a 
unique variation, all connected to each other in a complex web of resemblance and
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genealogy, the post-war scientific humanists created a monolithic opposition between
the human and the animal. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it is this
monolithic opposition with which Derrida takes issue in ‘The Animal that Therefore I
Am (More to Follow)’:
This abyssal rupture doesn’t describe two edges, a unilinear and indivisible 
line having two edges, Man and Animal in general. [...] Beyond the edge of the 
so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a single opposing side, rather 
than ‘the Animal’ or ‘Animal Life’, there is already a heterogeneous 
multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since to say ‘the living’ is 
already to say too much or not enough) a multiplicity of organizations of 
relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of 
organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by 
means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death.
(p. 399)
It is this ‘heterogeneous multiplicity’ which was denied in the post-war 
paleoanthropology which sought to affirm ‘the unity of the family of man’, as Cartmill 
phrases it. The discipline has still not shaken off its preoccupation with human 
uniqueness and with ‘a unilinear and indivisible line’ between ‘Man and Animal in 
general’.
There is a pressing ethical need to question the humanist claims of paleoanthropology. 
Narratives of human evolution can be used to justify inequalities by providing 
apparently eternal, natural and unquestionable facts about being human. Leakey 
argues that ‘the pursuit of human origins [...] addresses questions that arise from our 
need to understand the nature of humanity and our place in the world’ (p. xvi). This 
assumption that understanding ‘our’ origins can address the question of ‘our place in 
the world’ means that claims about how and when ‘we’ became human are frequently 
prescriptive rather than descriptive; as John Berger writes: ‘All theories of ultimate 
origin are only ways of better defining what followed’ (p. 6). That is, by attempting to 
define the origin of the human, paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists must
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define what is proper to the human, and effectively prescribe what is normal human 
behaviour. In these narratives, ‘we are’, in Roland Barthes’ words, ‘directed to this 
ambiguous myth of the human “community”’.67 In his critique of Edward Steichen’s 
Family o f Man exhibition, Barthes argues that the ‘unity’ which is ‘magically 
produced’ by emphasising ‘universal human nature’ conceals real historical conditions 
and injustices, and ‘suppress[es] the determining weight of History’.68 Similarly, 
paleoanthropological storytelling produces a ‘unity’ which ignores history by 
projecting present-day Western cultural norms back in time, and presenting them as 
natural and essential human attributes.
For example, paleoanthropological texts tend to essentialise contemporary 
stereotypical gender roles by claiming that they have a prehistoric origin.
Summarising the paleoanthropological discourse of the mid-twentieth century, John 
Reader comments: ‘Early man went out hunting for food, it was said, while early 
woman stayed at home and cared for the children, a style of living strikingly similar to 
that of suburban man in the post-war decades’.69 Donna Haraway has also written 
about the use of paleoanthropology to naturalise ‘the species-defining sharing way of 
life, rooted in hunting and the heterosexual nuclear family’, which for her is 
exemplified by Jay Mattemes’ famous 1970s painting Fossil Footprint Makers o f
70Laetoli. The painting is based on a trail of fossilised Australopithecus afarensis 
footprints which were discovered by Mary Leakey at Laetoli in Tanzania in 1978. It 
depicts three hominids -  a male, and a female carrying a baby -  walking across the 
African savannah with the volcano erupting in the background.71 Haraway points out 
that there are many other ways to interpret the two sets of footprints and many other 
potential ways of imagining the scene:
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The germ of human sociality was the couple and their offspring, not a mixed 
foraging group, a group of related females with their kids, two males with one 
carrying a kid, or any of the other many possibilities for those first small steps 
for mankind left in the dust at Laetoli. (p. 261)
Haraway describes this as ‘the numbing and hegemonic sameness of the universal way
of life [...] in the new physical anthropology’ (p. 261). She also notes that the feminist
re workings of the myth, which emphasised for example ‘Woman the Gatherer’ rather
than ‘Man the Hunter’, did not fundamentally challenge the notion that imaginary
reconstructions of prehistoric life could be used to make claims about how humans
should ‘naturally’ behave.
It is evident that this notion, this ‘numbing and hegemonic sameness’, still has 
currency today. For example, the BBC’s website offers a ‘Sex ID’ test, first published 
online in 2002, which gives you ‘a brain sex profile and findfs] out if you think like a 
man or a woman’.72 This test involves a number of tasks, such as identifying the 
differences between two pictures, measuring the length of your fingers, and judging the 
angle of a line. After completing the test, an article explains the rationale behind these 
tasks:
In prehistoric times, a man’s vision may have been more narrowly focussed and 
he would have to have been good at judging space and distance in order to be a 
good hunter. These skills could be related to the ability to focus on the laws 
governing a system. Women, on the other hand, spent more time foraging for 
food and watching over their children. These jobs would require wide vision 
and the ability to differentiate nuances of tone -  skills that would help them 
sense another person’s emotions. It may sound crude and there’s no scientific 
proof, but it’s plausible.73
By referring to ‘prehistoric times’, this article suggests that there is an eternal and
biological basis for differences in gender roles, even while admitting that ‘there’s no
scientific proof’. It is not only gender roles which are made to ‘look eternal’74 in this
way, but many other aspects of contemporary Western society, such as sexuality and
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economic relations. The scientific humanism of paleoanthropology seeks to ground 
cultural norms in biological nature. This is why it is politically important to pay close 
attention to this humanism, and particularly to the moments where it deconstructs 
itself: in Derrida’s terms, to ‘oppose [humanism] to itse lf.75
The Magic Moment
Since many paleoanthropologists believe that there is a single human identity, they 
must define the limits of this identity. Therefore, a major part of the project of 
paleoanthropology is to identify the origin of the human: the moment at which ‘we’ 
became human. Bronowski asks: ‘At what point can we say that the precursors of man 
become man himself?’.76 This same question can be found, in various forms, in almost 
every text about human evolution. For example, Jared Diamond asks: ‘What happened 
at that magic moment in evolution around 40,000 years ago, when we suddenly 
became human?’.77 This emphasis on a ‘magic moment’ or ‘a great leap forward’78 is 
common to virtually all paleoanthropological texts from the 1960s onwards: as Nancy 
Makepeace Tanner writes, ‘there is a strong desire to see [...] a remarkable break rather
7 Q
than a slow and very unremarkable change separating us from all other animals’. 
Cartmill points out that this emphasis detracts from paleoanthropology’s scientific 
credentials: ‘a genuinely singular occurrence cannot be explained with reference to the 
laws of nature. A science centered around the animal-human boundary must, 
therefore, be a science that lacks theoretical connections’ (p. 177). However, as he 
maintains, ‘although accepting a qualitative discontinuity between people and animals 
has diminished the theoretical content of paleoanthropological discourse, it has 
augmented its moral and cultural significance’ (p. 178). If, as I argue, the human is
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defined by being differed from the animal, the paleoanthropologists’ job of identifying 
that difference -  what it consists of, and when it took place -  is a crucial cultural role.
This concept of a ‘magic moment’ is taken to its logical extreme in the 2003 BBC
Horizon documentary entitled ‘The Day We Learned to Think’.80 The programme
claims that there was a single day in human evolution that marked the simultaneous
inception of language, thought, art, and dominance over nature: in short, of the human.
It poses the question:
When, in the course of our evolution from apes to modem humans, did we 
acquire the ability to talk, to give meaning to the world around us, to think? 
When did we really stop being animals and become truly human?
This is a classic example of a text which represents the human and animal as two
totally separate, opposed terms. The human does not emerge from the animal; rather
the moment of becoming human is represented as a complete, clean break: ‘we really
stop[ped] being animals’. This programme represents humans as superior to all other
animals: a dominant, creative, powerful species. Having asserted that animals cannot
think, the programme then argues that thought and language are inseparable, and that
art is also inextricably linked to both:
For archaeologists this realisation that art, language and thought were all the 
same thing was a huge breakthrough. Suddenly what they had to look for was 
clear. Discover the earliest forms of human art and you would have found the 
day we learned to think.
Although the idea of identifying a single day as ‘the day we became human’ sounds
ridiculous, it is a logical consequence of the belief that there is an absolute binary
opposition between the human and the animal. If the two categories are completely
separate, if there is such a thing as a human essence, which is absent one moment and
present the next, there must have been an instantaneous switch from one to the other.
82
Despite the superficial acceptance among paleoanthropologists that the human has
evolved gradually, there remains an underlying belief in a moment of ‘flip’ between
human and animal: what Derrida calls a ‘leap’, ‘the instantaneous crossing of a line of
discontinuity’.81 Therefore, every hominid species must be categorised as either
human or animal. Even though paleoanthropologists recognise that the fossils of
human ancestors have a combination of both ‘humanlike’ and ‘apelike’ features, they
must always end by categorising the species as either one or the other. For example, in
this description of Lucy, the famous Australopithecus afarensis skeleton named after
the Beatles song ‘Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds’, Rod Caird lists two sets of
conflicting characteristics:
Lucy has the human-like characteristics of upright stance, arched feet, and 
relatively long thumbs. But she also has the ape-like features of small size, 
short legs and long arms, a small brain, somewhat hunched shoulders, and 
moderately curved fingers.82
The doubt over whether this particular individual should be categorised as human or
animal is indicated by the linguistic uncertainty over which pronoun to use: ‘she’ or
‘it’? This uncertainty is evident in the following passage, in which Ian Tattersall
discusses the same fossil skeleton:
What kind of creature was itl As is probably inevitable, even though we know 
it walked upright, and thanks to Lucy we know a lot about its skeleton, there’s 
still controversy about how it lived and moved. The anatomist Owen Lovejoy, 
who carried out the original analysis of Lucy’s skeleton, thinks of her as a 
virtually perfectly adapted biped.83
From one sentence to the next, Tattersall moves from ‘it’ to ‘her’. It is as if by
granting this particular individual a name, ‘she’ also acquires some sort of human
status and therefore must be treated as a person, not an object; A. afarensis may be an
‘it’, but Lucy is a ‘she’. However, this undecidability cannot be tolerated, so after
some further discussion, Tattersall concludes that ‘the total effect, however, is more
humanlike than apelike’.84
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Homo Erectus: A True Man?
In order to demonstrate that humanism cannot tolerate this undecidability, I will now 
look in more detail at the case of one particular species, Homo erectus, and the way 
that it is represented in texts as either human or animal. From the time that it was first 
discovered by Eugene Dubois in the 1890s, Homo erectus’ categorisation has swung 
back and forth between animal and human; it has been subject to a ‘spectrum of 
interpretations’.85 Dubois believed that the fossils discovered by his team represented 
the ‘Missing Link’: a ‘speechless primeval man’ intermediate between ape and human, 
whose existence was first postulated by Ernst Haeckel in 1879. Dubois initially 
named it Anthropopithecus erectus (upright man-like ape) and then decided that
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Pithecanthropus erectus (upright ape-like man) was more accurate. The ambiguity 
of the fossil is indicated by these awkward Latin binomials, which combine elements 
of the human (anthropos) and ape (pithe).88 F. Clark Howell writes:
Ahead of its time, it faced a society and a scientific world both unready for it.
It was by far the oldest and most primitive human fossil known. As a result, its
ape-like qualities were emphasized more than its manlike ones.89
By the time Howell was writing in 1965, the orthodox paleoanthropological view had 
shifted, partly because of further discoveries of Homo erectus remains in the first half 
of the twentieth century, such as the ‘Peking Man’ fossils found in a cave in 
Choukoutien (or Zhoukoudian) in China. The dominant view in the 1960s is perfectly 
expressed by a chapter title in Howell’s book: ‘Homo Erectus: A True Man at Last’ (p. 
77). Although Howell admits in the chapter that the overall understanding of Homo 
erectus is ‘hopelessly vague’ (p. 84) and that many of the assumptions he makes ‘may 
seem wildly speculative’ (p. 83), he nevertheless categorises H. erectus as definitely 
human, the first ‘true man’. He writes that ‘we may assume that most of his kind used
84
fire’ (p. 80) and describes ‘him’ as ‘a superb walker’ whose leg bones ‘cannot be 
distinguished from those of a modem man’ (p. 82). At the end of the chapter, he 
concludes that ‘Homo erectus might be labelled as a kind of migratory worker within a 
fairly diverse habitat, a fellow who returned to certain sites with some regularity’ (p. 
84). This fixes Homo erectus as human: ‘a fellow’, one of ‘us’.
Writing in the early 1990s, Richard Leakey also categorises Homo erectus as human, 
but for him, it is a quasi-mystical sense of ‘humanness’ which is the deciding factor.
He writes:
Homo erectus stands at a pivotal point in human evolutionary history; in a very 
real way it is the harbinger of humanity. Everything earlier than Homo erectus 
was more apelike (except the short-lived, somewhat enigmatic Homo habilis). 
Everything after Homo erectus was distinctly humanlike, (p. 46)
The word ‘harbinger’, which occurs frequently in discussions of human evolution,
derives from the Old High German heriberga, a lodging or shelter for an army, and
later came to mean a person who runs ahead to arrange that shelter: a forerunner.90
Therefore, it has a double meaning; it is the first human, but also comes before or
foreshadows the human. This places Homo erectus in an ambiguous position; is it
inside or outside the category of the human? Like Howell, Leakey lists the various
attributes of Homo erectus which would seem to classify it as human, and also those
which would classify it as an ape. He concludes:
It is true, I know, that the probable immediate ancestor of Homo erectus, a 
species called Homo habilis, is in many ways simply a smaller-brained version. 
[...] But in a sense difficult to explain, Homo erectus seems to have ‘arrived’, to 
be at the threshold of something extremely important in our history, (p. 55)
Leakey cannot justify his decision in rational terms; it is ‘difficult to explain’ why he
feels that Homo erectus, but not Homo habilis, is ‘distinctly human’ (p. 55). Once
again, a humanist narrative cannot allow the question of humanness to remain open, as
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this would blur the boundaries of the human. Despite Homo erectus’ mixture of 
apelike and humanlike characteristics, it must be placed on one or the other side of the 
line that divides human from animal.
In recent years, paleoanthropologists have begun to argue, once again, that Homo
erectus was more animal than human. In a 2004 New Scientist article, entitled ‘The
Brute of Dragon Bone Hill’, Boaz and Ciochon describe their research into the Peking
Man fossils. The gist of their research is that Peking Man was not, in fact, ‘the first
hominid to possess many traits we consider to be human’, but should be categorised as
a nonhuman animal. They write:
Our re-analysis shatters the myth of a heroic early nimrod pitted against wild 
beasts and the elements, occasionally cannibalistic, managing to establish a 
cave home with primitive tools. Instead, it depicts a hungry scavenger skulking 
off to the cave, fire and sharp stones in hand, to steal away the half-chewed 
haunches of big carnivore kills, some of which by chance happen to be remains 
of its fellow hominids.91
Despite the fact that Peking Man was able to emigrate from Africa to Asia, they argue
that
H. erectus was still in essence a tropical animal, shunning the cold and with a 
tenuous grasp on fire that probably terrified them almost as much as the other 
animals with whom they competed for food. (p. 32)
In this description, Peking Man is demoted from ‘his’ human status and transformed
into one ‘tropical animal’ among others. The use of the phrase ‘in essence’ indicates
that Boaz and Ciochon are reading these behaviours as indications of an internal core
essence that is either human or animal, as opposed to the behaviour itself constituting
the human. I discuss this concept of performativity, or acting human, in more detail in
Chapter 2. They argue that Homo erectus was an animal because of ‘his’ ‘strangely
static’ cultural life:
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We believe this indicates these hominids were incapable of speaking as we do, 
a conclusion supported by the small size of the H. erectus brain [...]. It is only 
with the evolution of complex language that our ancestors would have been 
capable of the sorts of behaviours we think of as uniquely human, (p. 35)
The overall aim of their research is to establish that ‘Peking Man was far less like us
than has previously been suggested’ (p. 35). This ‘us’ again refers to all humans, and
so their aim is to resituate H. erectus on the other side of the boundary line dividing
animals from humans. This also entails defining the line itself; the boundary between
human and animal is not fixed, but is constructed in these debates.
As discussed above, the question of whether Homo erectus was ‘really human’ or not 
cannot have a real answer. There were never two nonhuman parents who miraculously 
gave birth to a human child. Rather, as time went on, our ancestors evolved to be more 
like ‘us’. In his conclusion to The Origin o f Species, Darwin suggests that once the 
theory of evolution is understood, the notion of ‘true’ species will become obsolete.
He writes:
Systematists will be able to pursue their labours as at present; but they will not 
be incessantly haunted by the shadowy doubt whether this or that form be in 
essence a species. This I feel sure, and I speak after experience, will be no 
slight relief.92
However, it seems that paleoanthropologists are still ‘incessantly haunted by [...] 
shadowy doubt[s]’. Representations of H. erectus seesaw between two totally 
incompatible images, one human and one animal, even if most of that difference comes 
from the choice of words ( ‘a heroic early nimrod pitted against wild beasts and the 
elements’ opposed to ‘a hungry scavenger skulking off to the cave’) and not from any 
fundamental factual difference. It is the vocabulary used which differs these two 
representations, not the behaviour being described. But because humanism needs the
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borders of the human to be secure, Homo erectus must be placed on one side or the 
other: human or animal.
Neanderthals: Simple-Minded Brutes or the First Flower People?
Like Homo erectus, the representation of Homo neanderthalensis has swung back and 
forth between human and animal. When Neanderthal remains were first discovered in 
1856, no other extinct humans were known, and Darwin had not yet published The 
Origin o f Species.93 Many scientists refused to accept that the fossil represented a 
different species of human, and instead argued that it was the skull of a deformed 
Homo sapiens 94 After many more remains were discovered, it was finally accepted 
that the Neanderthals had been a separate species.
At first, Neanderthals were represented as stupid, primitive, cannibalistic animals. In 
the early twentieth century the Neanderthal was ‘cast in the role of a brutish figure, 
slow, dull and rather bereft of sentiment’ .95 Paintings and sculptures from this period 
depict them as stooped, bestial and nearly naked; a famous example is the series of 
murals created by Charles R. Knight for the American Museum of Natural History.96 
A typical description of Neanderthals from this time is found in H. G. Wells’ The 
Outline o f History. He refers to ‘an extreme hairiness, an ugliness, or a repulsive 
strangeness in his appearance over and above his low forehead, his beetle brows, his 
ape neck, and his inferior stature’.97 This description suggests that the Neanderthals 
were as much animal as human: as well as being hairy and ugly, their animalistic 
characteristics are reinforced by the terms ‘beetle’ and ‘ape’. This bestial image 
persisted throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The word Neanderthal took 
on the meaning of ‘primitive, uncivilized, loutish; [...] politically or socially
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reactionary’.98 To call someone a Neanderthal was, as the Oxford English Dictionary 
states, ‘derogatory’.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the image shifted as the Neanderthals began to be represented 
as a gentle, loving species who were more ‘in tune with nature’ than Homo sapiens. 
For example, Jay Mattemes’ paintings from the late 1960s depict the Neanderthals 
living an idyllic existence reminiscent of hippie culture, with bare-breasted women 
listening to men playing musical instruments.99 This view was strengthened by Ralph 
Solecki’s 1971 book Shanidar: The First Flower People, an account of his 
archaeological dig in Shanidar cave in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Solecki’s team 
found skeletal remains which indicated that injured and chronically ill Neanderthals 
had been cared for by other members of the group. They also found traces of pollen in 
a Neanderthal grave, which suggested they had been buried with flowers. Solecki 
writes:
It is the purpose of this book to show that Neanderthal Man is closer to us than 
we have been heretofore willing to believe. The fact that flowers were found in 
a Neanderthal grave, I believe, will have a profound effect in breaking down 
the last objections to the inclusion of Neanderthal Man in our family tree. No 
more can we study him impartially as a kind of laboratory animal bereft of 
feeling and sentiment. He is part and parcel of our past, the beginnings, 
actually, of our own human tradition, even though his body did not as yet quite 
compare with ours.100
Thus Solecki explicitly argues for resituating the Neanderthals on ‘our’ side of the line
dividing humans from other animals; they should be considered part of ‘our human
tradition’, rather than seen ‘as a kind of laboratory animal’. It is not just a matter of
changing taxonomy, but of accepting what had previously been seen as the animal
other as ‘part and parcel of our past’, as part of ‘us’.
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In recent years, some scientists, such as Ian Tattersall, have tried to correct what they 
view as a pendulum swinging too far. Tattersall argues that instead of trying to argue 
that the Neanderthals were ‘the same as us’, they should be understood as a radically 
different species. He writes: ‘The people of the Upper Paleolithic were us, and can be 
understood as such; the Neanderthals were not, and cannot’.101 However, in most 
cultural representations of Neanderthals, the binary opposition between human and 
animal remains regardless of which side of the boundary Neanderthals are placed on. 
For example, a recent BBC television documentary, entitled ‘Neanderthal’, began by 
asking: ‘Was Neanderthal the simple-minded brute of legend? Or a rival to our own 
species?’.102 This question of whether Neanderthals should be viewed as ‘us’ or 
‘them’, a ‘rival’ or merely a ‘simple-minded brute’, dominates the way that they are 
represented in the media. For example, several recent articles on BBC News have 
reported on scientific research on Neanderthals, such as ‘Neanderthals “Not Close 
Family’” ,103, ‘Neanderthals “Had Hands like Ours’” ,104 and ‘Late Neanderthals “More 
like Us’” .105 These headlines demonstrate the desire to fix Neanderthals as human or 
animal, ‘us’ or ‘them’. But they also reveal that, in each case, the perceived 
significance of the discovery is how it affects the relationship between Neanderthals 
and Homo sapiens, and consequently, what it implies about ‘us’. I suggest that this is 
because the Neanderthal is a border figure which is used to define the human through 
differance: this ‘systematic play of differences’ which constitutes the category of the 
human.106
The history of cultural representations of Neanderthals, which I have briefly outlined
107above, can be understood further by examining Roland Barthes’ description of how
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myths represent ‘the Other’ by either reducing ‘him’ to ‘sameness’ or by presenting
‘him’ as a ‘pure object’. Barthes writes:
If [the petit-bourgeois] comes face to face with [the Other], he blinds himself, 
ignores and denies him, or else transforms him into himself. In the petit- 
bourgeois universe, all the experiences of confrontation are reverberating, any 
otherness is reduced to sameness. The spectacle or the tribunal, which are both 
places where the Other threatens to appear in full view, become mirrors. This is 
because the Other is a scandal which threatens his essence. [...] Sometimes -  
rarely -  the Other is revealed as irreducible [...]. There is here a figure for 
emergencies: exoticism. The Other becomes a pure object, a spectacle, a clown. 
[...] He no longer threatens the security of the home.10
The Neanderthal ‘threatens the security of the home’, of humanism, because ‘he’ does
not fit comfortably into either category, human or animal. ‘He’ threatens the security
of the opposition between human and animal by destabilising the boundary. The first
strategy of humanism, when Neanderthal remains were initially discovered, was to
‘ignor[e] and den[y] him’, or ‘transform] him’ into a version of the human by
claiming that he was simply a deformed Homo sapiens. When the evidence that
Neanderthals could not be ‘reduced to sameness’ in this way became overwhelming,
the Neanderthal was then represented as ‘a pure object’, an exotic animal.
Face to Face: Neanderthal as Mirror
While the possibility of ‘com[ing] face to face’ with a Neanderthal is threatening to 
humanism, it is clear that it is also desired, since there are so many fictional 
representations of this meeting. An encounter with another hominid species would 
provide confirmation of ‘our’ existence. As Barthes writes, it is impossible to truly see 
yourself from the outside: ‘You are the only one who can never see yourself except as 
an image; you never see your eyes unless they are dulled by the gaze they rest upon the 
mirror or the lens’.109 Imaginary narratives of encounters between Homo sapiens and 
other hominids provide ‘us’ with the illusion of seeing ‘ourselves’, as a species, from
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the outside. These illusory encounters are most commonly imagined to take place 
between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals, probably because this has some basis in 
reality. The two groups co-existed in Europe and the Middle East for several thousand 
years, and there is strong evidence that they encountered one another; for example, 
they traded tools and/or tool-making techniques.110 Furthermore, while most other 
hominid species are seen as inferior predecessors of modem humans, the Neanderthals 
were in many ways very much like ‘us’; evidence suggests that they wore clothes, 
made tools, hunted, used fire, possibly buried their dead, and may even have had a 
spoken language.111 Within both fiction and the narratives of paleoanthropology, 
Neanderthals occupy a special position as a kind of twin, or uncanny double, of the 
human.
The fantasy of seeing ‘ourselves’ from the outside is played out in fictional tales of 
encounters between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. One classic example is William 
Golding’s The Inheritors, a 1955 novel which (with the exception of the final chapter)
119is told from the point of view of one of the last surviving Neanderthals. Golding 
wrote it in response to the description of Neanderthals in H. G. W ells’ The Outline o f 
History, quoted above, which he uses as an epigraph. In Golding’s novel, the 
protagonist Lok is a member of a small Neanderthal tribe who find their territory 
invaded by a terrifying group of ‘new people’: the ‘inheritors’ of the title. These are 
presumably Homo sapiens, although they are never named as such. The ‘new people’ 
are portrayed as violent, murderous, drunken and monstrous. They kill almost all of 
the Neanderthal group, kidnap the child and the baby, leaving only Lok and one 
woman, Fa. Lok’s first glimpse of a Homo sapiens is as follows:
The bushes twitched again. Lok steadied by the tree and gazed. A head and a
chest faced him, half-hidden. There were white bone things behind the leaves
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and hair. The man had white bone things above his eyes and under the mouth 
so that his face was longer than a face should be. (p. 106)
This grotesque image of bones in the wrong places and a misshapen face is reinforced
when Lok and Fa encounter the Homo sapiens group for the second time, when they go
to try to rescue the kidnapped children. Watching from the bushes outside the camp,
they observe ‘the new people’:
The new people sat on the ground between Lok and the light and no two heads 
were the same shape. They were pulled out sideways into horns, or spired like a 
pine tree or were round and huge. [...] The stag appeared. He moved springily 
on his two hind legs and his forelegs were stretched out sideways. His antlered 
head was among the leaves of the trees, he was looking up, past the new 
people, past Fa and Lok, and it swayed from side to side. The stag began to turn 
and they saw that his tail was dead and flapped against the pale, hairless legs. 
He had hands, (p. 128)
These monstrous, misshapen creatures blur the boundaries between human and animal.
The human hands on the antlered stag appear uncanny, because they create uncertainty
about whether this being is or is not human: the uncertainty which is central to Freud’s
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account of the uncanny. In other passages, the Homo sapiens ( ‘the new people’) are 
described as ‘wasp-like’, with ‘grey, furry skin’, with skin ‘the colour of big fungi’ and 
with leg and arm joints ‘like the nodes in a twig’ (p. 138). These descriptions differ the 
human from itself by likening it to inhuman, even abject animals and plants. Whereas 
for Wells and his contemporaries, the Neanderthals were characterised by ‘an ugliness, 
or a repulsive strangeness in [their] appearance’, here it is ‘us’, the Homo sapiens who 
are ugly, repulsive and strange.
At the end of the book, the point of view shifts away from the protagonist, Lok, just 
before he lies down to die. For the first time, there is a description of Lok from the 
outside: Golding calls him ‘the red creature’ (p. 216) or simply ‘the creature’ (p. 218): 
a word which, as I have argued above, is frequently used to describe beings whose
humanness is uncertain. In the final chapter, both the perspective and the style of 
writing change completely. It is written from the point of view of one of the ‘new 
people’ as they sail away from the scene of their conflict with the now-dead 
Neanderthals, carrying the Neanderthal baby (which they refer to as ‘the devil’) with 
them. The book concludes: ‘He peered forward past the sail to see what lay at the 
other end of the lake, but it was so long, and there was such a flashing from the water 
that he could not see if the line of darkness had an ending’ (p. 233). This sense of 
isolation and darkness permeates The Inheritors. It suggests that a kind of alienation 
resulted from the extinction of the Neanderthals, leaving Homo sapiens, as the only 
humans, fundamentally alone in the world: what John Berger calls ‘the loneliness of 
man as a species’.114
A very different and more conventionally humanist view of the relationship between 
Homo sapiens and Neanderthals is found in Jean M. Auel’s The Clan o f the Cave 
Bear.115 This novel tells the story of Ayla, a young Homo sapiens girl who is the sole 
survivor when her tribe is killed by an earthquake. She is then taken in by a 
Neanderthal group (the Cave Bear Clan of the title). At first, Ayla and the 
Neanderthals see each other as animal-like; Ayla thinks that the Neanderthal face is 
‘like a muzzle’ (p. 45) and that their words sound ‘like a growl or grunt of some 
animal’ (p. 46). Conversely, the clan’s first impression of Ayla is ‘what appeared to be 
an animal without fur’ (p. 20). But as time goes on, Ayla becomes very close to her 
adoptive family. She learns to communicate as they do, through hand gestures, and to 
obey the laws of the clan. However, there is a limit to how far Ayla can fit into the 
clan. As she grows older, she repeatedly breaks its strict rules: for example, she
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secretly hunts and kills animals, even though women are forbidden to do so, and
refuses to submit to sexual advances:
It shocked him to see the girl pitting her will against a male. No woman of the 
Clan would consider it. They were content with their place, their position was 
not a veneer of culture, it was their natural state, (p. 202)
Auel is a contemporary North American female writer, whose emphasis on the power
of the ‘medicine woman’, and so on, fits into a particular strand of feminism. As with
paleoanthropological narratives, this book also constructs a normative form of human
society: it implies that female empowerment is essentially and naturally human, and
makes contemporary ideas about human behaviour ‘look eternal’.116 From this
position, Auel condemns the Neanderthals as inherently and unchangeably sexist. This
viewpoint has no real basis in archaeological discoveries, although the book as a whole
uses many facts gleaned from archaeology and paleoanthropology to add
verisimilitude.117
As the story proceeds, Ayla’s presence has an increasingly disruptive effect on the
Neanderthal clan, because she refuses or is unable to obey their laws and customs. The
story can be read as an argument that culture can only have a limited effect: Ayla has
been brought up in a Neanderthal community, but it is her Homo sapiens biology that
dictates her character. In support of this view, Auel depicts the two species as literal
physical mirror images of each other:
[Ayla] was one of the Others; a newer, younger breed, more vital, more 
dynamic, not controlled by hidebound traditions from a brain that was nearly all 
memory. Her brain followed different paths, her full, high forehead that housed 
forward thinking [sic] frontal lobes, gave her an understanding from a different 
view. She could accept the new, shape it to her will, forge it into ideas 
undreamed by the Clan, and, in nature’s way, her kind was destined to supplant 
the ancient, dying race. At a deep, unconscious level, Broud sensed the 
opposing destinies of the two. Ayla was more than a threat to his masculinity, 
she was a threat to his existence. His hatred of her was the hatred of the old for
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the new, of the traditional for the innovative, of the dying for the living, (p.
196)
As can be seen in this passage, Auel represents the relationship between Neanderthals
and modem humans as a series of hierarchical binary oppositions: body / mind, past /
future, tradition / innovation, concrete / abstract, and so on. The Neanderthals are
stuck in an evolutionary dead end, while Homo sapiens are inherently more ‘vital’ and
‘dynamic’ and are therefore destined to survive. A similar argument was put forward
in the BBC documentary ‘Neanderthal’, discussed above, which argued that the
Neanderthals had greater bodily strength which was well suited to the Ice Age climate,
but that they were unable to innovate and adapt when the climate changed.
It seems that the very features that made Neanderthal perfectly adapted to the 
rigours of the ice age had also locked him in to an evolutionary dead end. 
Modem humans may not have been adapted to the cold, but they were tailor 
made for the open plains.118
As in The Clan o f  the Cave Bear, this represents the Neanderthals as closer to animal
than human; they are ‘locked’ in, tied to their bodies and to a particular environment,
whereas ‘we’ are able to use our mental agility to adjust to varying conditions.
In general, in these texts the Neanderthal is used as a way of defining the human 
through differance. By mirroring Homo sapiens, these representations of Neanderthals 
define what it is to be human by providing a glimpse of a similar, but crucially 
different, alternative.
The Ghost in the Mirror: Neanderthals and the Uncanny
This interplay of sameness and difference, this not-quite-mirroring, is typical of 
contemporary cultural representations of Neanderthals. The fascination stems from the 
fact that they were, as Jean M. Auel writes, ‘so different, yet so provocatively similar’:
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Sprung from the same ancient seed, the progeny of their common ancestor took 
alternate routes, both leading to a richly developed, if dissimilar, intelligence. 
Both sapient, for a time, both dominant, the gulf that separated them was not 
great. But the subtle difference created a vastly different destiny, (p. 100)
It is this combination of similarity and dissimilarity which makes the Neanderthals and
other extinct hominids simultaneously intriguing and frightening: as Diana Fuss
argues, ‘sameness, not difference, provokes our greatest anxiety (and our greatest
fascination) with the “almost human” ’.119 This sense of same-yet-different occurs in
virtually every text that mentions Neanderthals. For example, the BBC Horizon
programme describes Neanderthals as ‘a species o f human in many ways so similar to
us, and yet also very different’.120 Similarly, Douglas Palmer writes: ‘Just 30,000
years ago there were people living in Europe who looked like us, who behaved and
191walked like us, and yet were not us’. This is an odd and unsettling idea; if they were 
so much ‘like us’, how can ‘w e’ be sure that they were ‘not us’? And, since the 
definition of the human is dependent upon differing it from its animal others, how can 
‘we’ be sure who ‘w e’ are?
The unsettling potential of this same-yet-different idea can be seen in The Last 
Neanderthal, when Ian Tattersall writes: ‘Familiar yet unfamiliar: these behaviors 
perfectly matched the equivocally human morphology of the Neanderthals’. The 
notion of something being ‘equivocally human’ is disturbing to humanism. The 
concept of the ‘uncanny valley’, invented in 1970 by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro 
Mori, is useful here. Mori argues that when we encounter a ‘humanlike’ machine, the 
more closely it resembles a human, the more positively we respond to it. However, if 
it resembles a human too closely, we find it disturbing or even disgusting. Mori gives 
the example of realistic prosthetic hands:
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This kind of prosthetic hand is too real and when we notice it is prosthetic, we 
have a sense of strangeness. So if we shake the hand, we are surprised by the 
lack of soft tissue and cold temperature. In this case, there is no longer a sense 
of familiarity. It is uncanny. In mathematical terms, strangeness can be 
represented by negative familiarity, so the prosthetic hand is at the bottom of 
the valley. So in this case, the appearance is quite human like, but the 
familiarity is negative. This is the uncanny valley.122
This ‘sense of strangeness’ occurs frequently in paleoanthropological discourse, for
example in Boaz and Ciochon’s description of Peking Man {Homo erectus) as ‘our
almost human ancestor’.123 This same ambiguity, of something that is nearly but not
quite ‘the same’ as us, also appears in Richard Leakey’s fantasy of hominid life a
million years ago: ‘So much activity, so very familiar, and yet uncannily different’.124
The notion of human uniqueness is profoundly disturbed by the existence of something
that is almost human; how can something ‘almost’ have a human essence? As I have
argued, humanism needs to fix the borders of the human by differing the human from
its nonhuman others. Something that is ‘equivocally human’ questions the fixity of
those borders and destabilises the meaning of the human.
In order to use the Neanderthal as a mirror to define the human, it is necessary that the
differences between Neanderthals and Homo sapiens should be evident. If those
differences comes into question, if it is no longer possible to tell the difference between
the human subject and the nonhuman other, then the definition of the human is
troubled. This need to tell the difference is evident in the issue of ‘passing’.
Paleoanthropological texts frequently pose the question of whether a Neanderthal
could ‘pass’ as a human being. Some, such as Jared Diamond, argue that a
Neanderthal would be visibly inhuman:
Neanderthals’ head anatomy was so distinctive that, even if a Neanderthal 
dressed in a business suit or a designer dress were to walk down the streets of 
New York or London today, everybody else (all the homines sapientes) on the
125street would be staring in shock.
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This scenario reassures the humanist subject that s/he will never be in doubt; the 
inhuman is ‘so distinctive’ that it could never be mistaken for the human. But others 
disagree. F. Clark Howell, for instance, writes: ‘Put [a Neanderthal] in a suit of clothes 
and send him down to the supermarket for some groceries and he might pass 
completely unnoticed’.126 This ability to pass ‘unnoticed’ threatens our ability to tell 
human from inhuman, us from them, and thus threatens humanism itself. If we cannot 
tell the difference, what does that imply about human essence? As I argue in more 
detail in Chapter 2, since there is no tangible human essence, it is only possible to 
judge whether someone is human from the outside, by looking at how s/he behaves. If 
someone or something behaves in an ‘equivocally human’ manner, this is experienced 
as uncanny and threatens the structure of humanism, which requires an absolute 
division between human and inhuman.
This ability to tell the difference has recently been even more profoundly troubled by a 
theory which suggests that the Neanderthals disappeared not because they were killed 
by Homo sapiens, but because the two groups interbred. The Neanderthals as a group 
became extinct within ten thousand years of Homo sapiens arriving in Europe, but 
opinion is divided on the reason for this. If ‘we’ killed them, either directly, or 
indirectly by consuming the same resources, then ‘they’ remain separated from ‘us’. 
However, if their distinctness was lost through interbreeding, then at some point ‘they’ 
became ‘us’. This theory has gained more currency in recent years, since the discovery 
of a controversial skeleton in the Lapedo Valley in Portugal in 1998. This skeleton, 
known officially as Lagar Velho 1 and informally as the Lapedo Child, appears to have 
both Homo sapiens and Neanderthal characteristics. It has provoked an immense 
amount of debate about the possibility of Neanderthals and Homo sapiens
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interbreeding.127 A 2007 New Scientist article, entitled ‘The Neanderthal Within’,
discusses the possibility that ‘interbreeding not only happened, but that it played an
important role in our evolution’. The article continues: ‘Like it or not, we may have to
accept that our species is, to some extent, a hybrid. There’s a little bit of Neanderthal 
128in all of us’. The idea was also explored in an Australian radio show entitled ‘Are
1 99We Neanderthals?’. This radical question has deeply unsettling implications; it
suggests that ‘we’ may not be able to tell the difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’, that
the Neanderthal, once represented as grotesque, bestial and utterly other, may in fact be
inside ‘us’. As Palmer writes:
Although the consensus is that the Neanderthals did die out, for some there is 
still that nagging, lingering doubt and the possibility that behind the face in the 
mirror is the ghostly vestige of a Neanderthal in everyone of Eurasian origin.130
This possibility is deeply troubling to humanism, which relies on being able to tell the
difference between human and nonhuman. Instead of using the Neanderthal as a
mirror to reflect ‘ourselves’ from the outside, this ‘nagging, lingering doubt’ casts
uncertainty over where the self ends and the other begins: uncanniness results when
‘the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt as to which his
self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his own’, as Freud writes.131 This doubt
suggests not only that the boundaries between the human and nonhuman could be
transgressed, but that ‘w e’ might not even know that this transgression has taken place.
As I have argued, the debate over whether Neanderthals should be categorised as 
human or animal is not due to inherent interest in Neanderthals per se, but because the 
figure of the Neanderthal is needed to define ‘what it means to be human’. Consider 
for example Ian Tattersall’s claim that ‘there is certainly no better way in which we 
Homo sapiens can judge our own uniqueness in the living world than by measuring
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ourselves against the Neanderthals and their achievements’.132 The way that the
definition of the human depends upon differing it from the Neanderthal is evident in
this passage from Palmer’s Neanderthal:
Not far beneath the surface of all the historic problems of recognizing the 
Neanderthals for what they are lurks another fundamental difficulty. If Homo 
neanderthalensis is, as William King claimed, a separate species of human, 
then what are the Neanderthals to us? And beyond that question lies our human 
difficulty with knowing what exactly we are. (p. 25)
Here, it is possible to read the way that meaning is produced by difference: how ‘the
elements of signification function not by virtue of the compact force of their cores but
by the network of oppositions that distinguish them and relate them to one another’.133
The first ‘difficulty’ is ‘recognizing the Neanderthals for what they are’. This then
leads to the question of ‘what are the Neanderthals to usT: that is, how does one
element of signification (the Neanderthal) relate to another (Homo sapiens)? How do
they ‘relate [...] to one another’? Finally, the ultimate ‘difficulty’, as Palmer phrases it,
is ‘knowing what exactly we are’. There is no ‘core’ which can be identified, which
will show ‘what exactly we are’; instead, it is necessary to use a related ‘element of
signification’ to see how it differs from the human. If meaning can only be produced
through difference, the Neanderthals occupy a highly significant structural position as
the beings that are most like ‘us’ without actually being ‘us’. Identifying the
differences between Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens is necessary to produce
the meaning of the human: ‘The Neanderthals were different from us, but how
different?’.134 These representations of Neanderthals and Homo sapiens, with their
obsessive desire to demarcate the differences between the two, show that the concept
of the human is ‘never present in itself, in an adequate presence that would refer only
to itself but is ‘necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or system, within which
it refers to another and to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences’.135 If
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those differences are in question, as in the case of Neanderthals, then the category of 
the human itself is also brought into question.
Border Crossings, Border Control
These representations of Neanderthals reveal great anxiety about whether or not ‘they’
could have become ‘us’. Could they have crossed the border from nearly-human to
fully-human? Humanism is profoundly disturbed by the notion that something
nonhuman could become human, because this troubles the security of the human
category. However, in order to define ‘ourselves’ as human today, it is necessary that
this border crossing must have taken place at some time in the past. It is the job of
paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists to decide when this took place: to
decide who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. Jeffrey H. Schwartz has observed this tendency to
treat the category of the human as a kind of ‘fraternity’:
The debate over whether a fossil is or is not a true member of Homo sapiens 
tends to sound more like a debate on the admission of an underclassmate to a 
fraternity than it does a rigorous discourse on the specimen’s phylogenetic 
affinities.136
This formulation also highlights that there is power in deciding who is admitted to this 
exclusive club. For example, Raymond Dart, who discovered the fossil skull known as 
the Taung child, saw it as ‘a representative of a creature that was knocking on the door
1 'X7of humanity, but hadn’t quite crossed the threshold of humanity’. Similarly, 
Tattersall argues that ‘the 3.6-million-year-old bipeds of Laetoli had crossed a major 
adaptive threshold, and by crossing it they had gained admission to the human 
family’.138 The term threshold, as well as indicating a doorway, border, or entrance, 
also means ‘the limit below which a stimulus is not perceptible; the magnitude or 
intensity of a stimulus which has to be exceeded for it to produce a certain
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response’, which indicates a point on a continuum, rather than a qualitative change. 
This metaphor signals the disturbing weakness of categorisation and classification. 
Neighbouring categories must come up against each other, and the places where they 
meet call into question the idea of essence. ‘The door of humanity’ may be a barrier 
that prevents entry, but it is also a weak point in a wall: a place where absolute division 
is subverted by the possibility of crossing the border.
In these texts, ‘humanity’ or ‘the human family’ is represented as the desirable inside, 
and the almost-human animal other is still outside, hoping to be allowed in. 
Paleoanthropologists act as the security guards who guard the door, size up potential 
entrants, and decide who can and cannot enter. This policing of the borders of the 
human may seem relatively trivial when discussing the categorisation of a fossilised 
skull of a long-extinct species, but it has very real effects when it takes place with 
living beings: when, for example, those making the decision are psychiatrists or 
legislators and those being excluded are people who are autistic or deaf. I examine 
these contemporary situations, and the effect of being excluded from the category of 
the human, at greater length in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. Here, I want to note that 
decisions about who is and is not included within the category of the human always 
entail the exercise of power.
The Ascent of Man: Bipedalism and Humanism
The process of becoming human is most frequently represented as an ascent or rise. 
This has a physical basis in that bipedalism is one of the most obvious physical 
differences between humans and other primates. Human ancestors began to walk on 
two legs about four million years ago, and this development is central to
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paleoanthropological definitions of what it means to be human. Richard Leakey, for
example, argues: ‘The origin of a bipedal form of locomotion was so fundamental a
change, so replete with profound evolutionary potential, that we should recognize the
roots of our humanity where they really are’.140 While there is some scientific basis for
this emphasis on bipedalism, the connection between walking on two legs, freedom
and ‘true humanity’ can be traced back to long before the relevant archaeological
discoveries were made. For example, as long ago as 1754 Rousseau speculated about
early ‘Man’: ‘Walking on all fours, his gaze directed to the Earth, and confined to the
horizon of a few paces, [would have] determined both the character and the limits of
his ideas’.141 This idea that walking on all fours is constraining, while bipedalism is
liberating, is still current. For example, the 2002 BBC book Walking with Cavemen
describes an Australopithecus afarensis female as follows:
By standing on her own two feet, she represents the key to our future. Her 
hands, no longer needed for locomotion, will free those that follow her to 
discover other uses. Shaping tools with them, they will gradually gain control 
over their environment and, eventually, they will create art and herald the 
beginning of a truly human culture. Her bipedal stance will also release the 
hominid line from the constraints that keep afarensis’s brains small and ape- 
like.142
This passage exemplifies the representation of bipedalism within humanist discourse.
‘Standing on two feet’ is represented as a move from bondage to freedom: it ‘release[s]
[...] constraints’ and the hands become ‘free’ to make tools, create art, and produce a
‘truly human culture’. This vocabulary is common to almost all narratives of human
evolution. For example, Wilson writes:
The earliest men or man-apes started to walk erect when they came to spend 
most or all of their time on the ground. Their hands were freed, the manufacture 
and handling of artifacts were made easier, and intelligence grew as the tool- 
using habit improved.143
Within humanist narratives, then, becoming bipedal is represented as a shift from
constraint to freedom, from submission to dominance, and from fixity to choice. In
Chapter 3 ,1 argue that humanism represents spoken language in a similar way, as a 
release from constraints. The human is distinguished from the animal because the 
animal is seen as the product of automatic, determined, reactions, while the human is 
the subject in control of its own responses. Similarly, the hand is represented within 
both philosophical and scientific texts as a key difference between human and 
animal.144 In addition to the freeing of the hands, bipedalism has also been linked with 
all of the other major differences which are claimed to differentiate humans from other 
apes. For example, it has been claimed that it led to the development of a larger brain 
due to the need for additional ‘sensorimotor control’, and to the ‘evolution of complex 
vocalization’ as a result of the change in position of the larynx.145 Walking on two 
feet, rather than four, is thus associated with all of the other central differences said to 
‘make us human’: large brain, articulate speech, and use of the hands.146
The physical fact of walking upright is inseparable from the metaphorical values 
associated with it. For example, the section on bipedalism in Walking with Cavemen is 
entitled ‘Walking Tall’ (p. 36); this implies pride and self-confidence, in addition to 
being descriptive. The two meanings -  ‘erect on the feet or end; in or into a vertical 
position; perpendicular to the ground or other surface’ and ‘of persons: adhering to or 
following correct moral principles; of unbending integrity or rectitude; morally just, 
honest, or honourable’147 -  blur into each other, so that humans’ bipedalism is 
represented as a marker of moral superiority. As William King Gregory writes, ‘the 
erect posture which has enabled man to look down on the world of quadrupeds may 
well be one of the bases of man’s colossal and impregnable superiority complex’.148 
This echoes a more general use of ‘up’ as a metaphor for ‘good’ and ‘down’ for ‘bad’, 
which is deeply ingrained in the English language. In Metaphors We Live By, George
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Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim that these ‘orientational metaphors [...] arise from the
fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our
physical environment’.149 They suggest that the metaphorical use of ‘up’ to mean
‘happy’ may have a physical basis, since ‘drooping posture typically goes along with
sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state’ (p. 15). They
also offer the following explanation for the association of ‘up’ with ‘rational’ and
‘down’ with ‘emotional’:
In our culture people view themselves as being in control over animals, plants, 
and their physical environment, and it is their unique ability to reason that 
places human beings above other animals and gives them this control. 
CONTROL IS UP thus provides a basis for MAN IS UP and therefore for 
RATIONAL IS UP. (p. 17)
Here, Lakoff and Johnson relate the metaphorical use of ‘up’ to the idea of humans
being ‘in control over’ and ‘above other animals’. While they do not specifically
mention bipedalism, the fact that humans are bipedal while other apes are (generally)
not could be usefully added to their list of physical bases for these metaphors. The
metaphorical use of ‘up’ to mean ‘superior’, ‘rational’, or ‘in control’ tends to creep
into the language used to describe the physical differences between humans and other
apes, as in this example from Bronowski’s Ascent o f  Man: ‘[The Taung child] was a
child that held its head up. That is one man-like feature; for in the monkeys and apes
the head hangs forward from the spine, and does not sit upright on top of it’ (p. 29).
The wording of this passage suggests that there is something admirable about the
Taung child that ‘held its head up’, in contrast to the ‘head hang[ing] forward from the
spine’ in monkeys and apes.
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Children: Becoming Human and the Biogenetic Law
As is suggested by the title The Ascent o f Man, Bronowski depicts the human species 
as hierarchically above the rest o f the living world. In the first chapter, this ‘ascent’ is 
shown quite literally in a series o f monochrome photographs which depict a naked 
toddler raising itself from a prone position on its stomach, to standing upright with its 
arms thrown out wide (pp. 30-33). This triumphant series of photographs resembles 
Rudolf Zallinger’s famous illustration of human evolution as a ‘march of progress’. 
Originally appearing in Time-Life’s Early Man book, the image has been reproduced 
and parodied so often that it has become iconic.150 It depicts fifteen figures, starting 
with the stooped, hairy ‘proto-ape’ Pliopithecus on the left, tentatively standing up and 
walking forwards, to the upright, naked, fully human figure on the right, his (and they 
are all male) humanness indicated by the spear grasped in his hand.151 The 
resemblance between these two pictorial representations of becoming human is 
symptomatic of a general tendency to conflate the development of the individual with 
the evolution of the species. Like the human species as a whole, each individual child 
must go through the process of becoming human, and these two processes are 
represented in very similar ways, such as the visual representations of gradual ascents, 
described above. For example, Bronowski writes that ‘by fourteen months [...] the
1 S9child has entered the human commitment to walk upright’, and Anne Karpf claims 
that ‘the newborn baby’s use of its voice is the rite of passage through which it is 
conferred membership of the human species’.153 These metaphors echo those used in 
texts about human evolution: for example, Tattersall argues that Homo ergaster is ‘a 
convincing contender for early membership in our genus’.154 The shared vocabulary of 
these genres demonstrates that the biogenetic law still informs discourses of becoming 
human.
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The biogenetic law -  the hypothesis that ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’ -  was 
initially put forward in the 1820s by Karl Ernst von Baer, and more famously in a 
modified form by Ernst Haeckel in 1866. It suggests that as embryos of any species 
grow, their development repeats the evolutionary development of the species as a 
whole.155 Although the biogenetic law is no longer accepted in its strict, literal form, it 
is still a highly influential analogy. In his 1977 book Ontogeny and Phylogeny,
Stephen Jay Gould writes: ‘The microcosm: ontogeny. The macrocosm: cosmic 
history, human history, organic development. This comparison may be the most 
durable analogy in the history of biology’.156 Gould demonstrates the massively 
pervasive influence of the biogenetic law on many fields, claiming for example that 
‘twentieth-century psychoanalytic [...] theories cannot be properly assessed or even 
understood without recognising their links to the biogenetic law’.157 The same is true 
of paleoanthropology. Contemporary texts about human evolution are still heavily 
influenced by the biogenetic law; as Kathleen Gibson notes, ‘ontogenetic perspectives 
have become the rule, rather than the exception, among serious scholars of cognitive 
and linguistic evolution’.158 For example, Leakey states that ‘human infants effectively 
recapitulate a segment of our evolutionary history’.159
The conflation of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes of becoming human is 
indicated by phrases such as ‘the childhood of humanity’ and ‘the cradle of 
civilisation’ to refer to the early stages of human evolution. For example, the complex 
of ancient caves containing fossilised human remains in Gauteng, South Africa is 
known as the ‘Cradle of Humankind’;160 similarly, Bronowski describes the Great Rift 
Valley as ‘the navel of the world’ and ‘the birthplace of man’.161 Just as ‘our’
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ancestors had to become human at a certain time in the past, so each individual child 
has to go through this same process in miniature: learning to speak, to walk, to dress 
itself, and so on. This process is represented as equivalent to the humanization of the 
species. For example, Tim Ingold argues that ‘“becoming human”, then, is tantamount 
to the process of enculturation which virtually all children of our species undergo in 
their passage to maturity’.162 There seems something paradoxical in the idea that 
children are ‘of our species’, and yet have to undergo a process which is ‘tantamount’ 
to ‘becoming human’. This paradox is discussed by Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard in The 
Inhuman, in which he asks: ‘What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of 
their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a “second” nature which, thanks to 
language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness and 
reason?’. This question problematises the security of the category of the human 
since, as Cary Wolfe writes, ‘it posits a permanently incipient multiplicity and self­
difference at the very core of subjectivity as such’.164 Not only in evolutionary terms, 
but in each individual lifetime, ‘our’ humanness is always already inhabited by the 
inhuman.
But for Lyotard, it is the ‘initial misery’ of childhood, the ‘native lack’, which
somehow makes the child ‘eminently’ human. He continues:
Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the objects of its 
interest, not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to common reason, 
the child is eminently the human because its distress heralds and promises 
things possible. Its initial delay in humanity, which makes it the hostage of the 
adult community, is also what manifests to this community the lack of 
humanity it is suffering from, and which calls on it to become more human, (p. 
4)
It seems strange to describe the child as ‘shorn of speech’: ‘shorn’ suggests something 
that was present, and has been taken away, whereas the child has never spoken.
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Similarly, is it reasonable to suggest that the ‘distress’ and ‘suffering’ of a crying infant
be attributed to its ‘lack of humanity’? Lyotard’s formulation is paradoxical because,
although he argues that it is necessary for children to become human, he still seems to
view them as essentially human. He defines the child in terms of its relation to its
potential future ‘humanity’. In this way, the child, like the pre-human animal ancestor,
is always defined in its relation to the human that it will one day become. This
relationship can be understood in terms of the Derridean idea of differance, which
makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is said 
to be ‘present’, appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other 
than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be 
hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element.165
In Lyotard’s text, the ‘present’ child is ‘hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a
future element’, namely the adult human. It only makes sense to read the child as
‘shorn of speech’ and ‘suffering’ from ‘a lack of humanity’ if it is understood in terms
of this ‘relation to a future element’.166 At the same time, its animal-like
characteristics and its apparent recapitulation of long-ago stages of human evolution
also indicate that it ‘retains the mark of a past element’.
This ‘movement of signification’, these traces, trouble the idea of an absolute
opposition between human and animal. Indeed, the notion of becoming human
suggests that the boundary between human and nonhuman must be permeable, as it can
be transgressed. For Darwin, the way that children develop proves that, on a
phylogenetic level, human ‘faculties’ could have evolved gradually. He writes:
I shall make some few remarks on the probable steps and means by which the 
several mental and moral faculties of man have been gradually evolved. That 
this at least is possible ought not to be denied, when we daily see their 
development in every infant.
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That is, the fact that children gradually develop their ‘mental and moral faculties’ 
proves that it is possible to become human. The possibility of crossing the boundary 
calls the division itself into question. Similarly, in his history of paleoanthropology, 
John Reader writes:
[Sir Arthur] Keith now attempted to define the point at which the man-like ape 
could be said to have become man. In A New Theory o f Human Evolution he 
proposed brain size as the measure, suggesting that just as the eruption of the 
first permanent molar provides a convenient mark for determining the end of 
infancy and the beginning of childhood in the individual, so the acquisition of a 
certain brain size could mark the species’ evolutionary transition from apehood 
to manhood.168
Like Darwin, Keith uses an ‘ontogenetic perspective’; he looks at ‘childhood in the 
individual’ to try to understand the development of the human species. Although he is 
trying to define the limits of the human, his argument makes it clear that there is no 
single boundary. There is no crucial difference between the individual at ‘the end of 
infancy’ and the same individual at ‘the beginning of childhood’; the eruption of the 
tooth is ‘a convenient mark’ rather than a dramatic change. This calls into question the 
idea of an absolute difference between ‘apehood’ and ‘manhood’. What I want to 
emphasise here is that if ‘we’ are not bom human, but become human, the category 
itself is not secure, since the boundary between animal and human can be crossed.
Thus the very notion of becoming human destabilises the stability of the category of 
the human.
DNA, the Origin, and the Trace
The process of becoming human does not mark a complete break between two separate 
categories, but is, precisely, a process. As I have suggested above, this process 
involves a play of traces across the boundary that separates human from animal; both 
past and future elements inflect the present. For Derrida, the trace and differance are
I l l
deeply connected with the human/animal opposition. For example, in Of
Grammatology, he writes that ‘the trace [...] must be thought before the opposition of
nature and culture, animality and humanity’ (p. 70). More explicitly, in For What
Tomorrow... he states that: ‘There is difference (with an “a”) as soon as there is a
living trace, a relation of life/death or presence/absence. This became linked for me
very early on with the immense problematic of animality’.169 The texts about human
evolution which have been discussed in this chapter reveal the play of the ‘living trace’
across the limits that separate human from animal, presence from absence, life from
death. Darwin’s Descent o f Man, which could be considered the founding text of this
genre, uses the terms ‘trace’ and ‘traces’ repeatedly; for example, he writes that ‘man
bears in his bodily structure clear traces of his descent from some lower form’ (p.
797).170 These traces mean that there can be no point of absolute rupture between past
and present, animal and human: no single day on which ‘we really stop[ped] being
animals and bec[a]me truly human’.171 As John Gray writes:
The lesson of evolutionary psychology and cognitive science is that we are 
descendants of a long lineage, only a fraction of which is human. We are far 
more than the traces that other humans have left in us. Our brains and spinal
172cords are encrypted with traces of far older worlds.
These ‘traces of far older worlds’ mean that the animal other is fundamentally part of 
the human; within the very core of the human, in the brain and central nervous system, 
are traces of the nonhuman, long-dead but still living within ‘us’. Many other texts use 
the word ‘traces’ in this context, including The Ascent o f Man, in which Bronowski 
notes that ‘each one of us traces his make-up back through the evolutionary process 
right to the beginnings of life’ (p. 309), the programme ‘Are We Neanderthals?’ which
173refers to ‘traces’ of nonhuman viruses in human DNA, and the Companion Species 
Manifesto, in which Donna Haraway refers to the need to understand ‘companion 
species in both storied deep time, which is chemically etched in the DNA of every cell,
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and in recent doings, which leave more odoriferous traces’.174 These ‘chemically 
etched [...] traces’ mean that no absolute, single limit can be drawn between human 
and animal, life and death.
In the radio programme ‘Are We Neanderthals?’, discussed above, the biology 
professor Alan Templeton comments that ‘DNA molecules can travel through time. So 
in fact DNA is kind of a living fossil’.175 Each living being thus contains ‘a living 
fossil’ within itself: traces of billions of years of previous beings.176 Indeed, as Michel 
Foucault has observed, all fossils lie in an ‘uncertain frontier region’ between life and 
death:
Just as the zoophyte stands on the ambiguous frontier between animals and 
plants, so the fossils, as well as the metals, reside in that uncertain frontier 
region where one does not know whether one ought to speak of life or not.177
The troubling ambiguity of fossils, which calls into question the boundaries between
life and death, present and past, also questions the opposition between human and
animal. Howell quotes a psychiatrist saying ‘one of the best relics we have of early
man is modem man’.178 The notion that ‘we’ are living fossils, modem relics, dismpts
the relationship between subject and object, since the subject doing the investigation is
simultaneously a ‘relic’ of the object that s/he is investigating. In this interplay of
subject and object, the human is both alive and dead, both present and absent. This
reversal of living and dead, active and passive, also appears in this passage from
Leakey’s Origins Reconsidered, in which the trace of the long-dead Homo erectus
seems to magically manifest itself:
When I hold a Homo erectus cranium in my hand and look at it full face, I get a 
strong feeling of being in the presence of something distinctly human. It is the 
first point in human history at which a real humanness impresses itself so 
forcefully, (p. 55)
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In this almost mystical passage, the relationship between the scientist and the object of 
study is once again reversed, as the ‘humanness’ of the fossil apparently takes on an 
active, even forceful, role. The trace of the other (the living Homo erectus), retained 
within the same (the dead cranium), appears to be reactivated, as the absent past is 
transformed into presence, both here and now. Some trace of life, of being, is active 
within the fossil skull. In the paleoanthropologist’s imagination, death becomes life, 
and the inhuman ‘cranium’ once again becomes the living human being.
The human does not suddenly spring into existence, but begins within the nonhuman 
animal: as Bronowski writes, the human has ‘its beginnings in the animal’.179 There is 
no pure moment of origin, but an infinitely complex process of differentiation. Darwin 
describes this process of differing as ‘the principle of divergence’ by which ‘varieties 
[within a species] become augmented into the greater difference between species’.180 
This is a radical contrast to the Biblical tale of separate creations, which still informs 
the paleoanthropological search for ‘that magic moment [...] when we suddenly 
became human’. The human emerges from the animal, and this emergence is never an 
absolute break; rather, it retains the trace of the nonhuman other within. In The 
Descent o f Man, Darwin discusses what he calls ‘the principle of reversion, by which 
long-lost dormant structures are called back into existence’ (p. 848). He describes 
cases in which the human body develops abnormally, but in ways which resemble the 
normal development of other, ‘lower’ animals (p. 847). These cases, Darwin argues, 
‘reveal the descent of man from some lower form in an unmistakeable manner’ (p.
851). In Derridean terms, this suggests that the animal other is always already within 
the human subject; traces of the other can threaten to reappear within ‘us’. The human 
literally ‘retains the mark of a past element’.
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That each element is also ‘hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element’ 
can be seen in narratives of human evolution which describe pre-human ancestors as, 
precisely, pre-human. Just as Lyotard describes the child as ‘suffering from’ a ‘lack of 
humanity’, these hominids are represented as moving towards the goal of humanness, 
as if they somehow already have the trace of their future human descendants within. 
For example, Lynch and Barrett write that Australopithecus afarensis ‘represents one 
of the first steps on our journey towards humanity’.181 Even when they add the 
disclaimer that afarensis ‘is not an inferior kind of human, not a superior type of ape, 
but a highly successful species in its own right’, in the next sentence they say 
‘ afarensis's small steps are already paving the way for the giant leaps of mankind’ (pp. 
52-53). An afarensis female is significant ‘not so much because of what she and her 
species are now, but because of what they make possible’: because ‘standing upright 
has been the first step on the way to all of us’ (p. 64). In this text, afarensis is 
represented as already being ‘hollowed out by the mark of [their] relation’ to the 
present, to ‘all of us’, ‘our future’. These pre-humans cannot be understood without 
reference to the ‘future element’ of Homo sapiens. They are always conceived in their 
relation to the human to come: a relation of both similarity and difference.
This combination of similarity and difference can have a disturbing effect, as in this 
description of Homo ergaster from Walking with Cavemen: ‘Yet at the top of this very 
human body there rests a distinctly un-human head [...]: the face of an animal, but an 
animal with a new intelligence’ (p. 121). This combination of ‘very human’ and 
‘distinctly un-human’ is an uncanny image because it creates uncertainty over whether
1 89ergaster is or is not human, is or is not conscious. It fundamentally troubles the
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distinction, so crucial to humanism, between human and animal; this is one of ‘those 
uncanny moments at which things start to drift’.183 Even though this encounter is 
described in the language of humanism, with references to ‘ourselves’ and ‘our 
humanity’, this humanism is ‘unwarily becoming alien to itself, becoming 
posthumanism’.184 Perhaps the most uncanny realisation is that the human that is now 
present is ‘hollowed out by the mark of its relation’ to its own future absence.
Derrida describes the trace as the place ‘where the relationship with the other is
marked’,185 where one term of an opposition inscribes itself within the other. This
inscription, this play of traces, can be read in another description of Homo ergaster in
Walking with Cavemen:
Ergaster was tall, smooth-skinned, proportioned in a way that we would 
instantly recognize as human, but, if we were able to look closer, we would see 
the head and face of something very different indeed. With a low forehead and 
heavy brow-ridge, his face would be that of a wild animal, although one with a 
glimmer of humanity within, (pp. 12-13)
Echoing this notion of ‘a glimmer of humanity within’, Leakey writes: ‘In the enlarged
brain, the newly emerging tool-making ability, and the beginnings of a hunting-and-
1 86gathering subsistence, we recognize hints of ourselves, our humanity’. The
‘glimmers’ and ‘hints’ of the human in these descriptions suggest the play of traces
across the limits of human/animal, present/past, living/dead. This play means that the
human is never simply present or absent, and this makes it impossible to sustain an
absolute opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The impossibility of sustaining this
opposition can be read in Lynch and Barrett’s description of ‘Lucy’, the
Australopithecus afarensis fossil skeleton discussed above:
Lucy walked upright, and that is the clue that tells us she is our ancestor. It is 
perhaps all we would recognize, but it is not all that binds us to her. In the 
wrinkle of an ear, the purse of a lip, the furrow of a brow and in a myriad other 
tiny hidden ways, there are parts of Lucy alive in us all. (p. 14)
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These ‘tiny hidden’ connections, these parts of the animal other that are still ‘alive in 
us all’, demonstrate the movement of differance, of the ‘living trace’ which plays 
‘across and despite all the limits that the strongest philosophical or cultural tradition 
thought it could recognize between “man” and “animal”’.187 Lucy and Peking Man 
may be dead and fossilised, but ‘we’ are bound to ‘them’: ‘they’ are still living within 
‘us’.
This ‘living trace’ means that it is impossible to identify the ‘magic moment [...] when
we suddenly became human’. The impossibility is encapsulated in this passage from
F. Clark Howell’s Early M an :
Once the idea of man’s evolutionary development is accepted, his origins can 
theoretically be traced back to the origin of life itself -  a matter of some 2,000 
million years. For practical purposes, however, the point at which to study the 
beginnings of man is when he began to have the first faint traces of 
‘mannishness’. How far into the past to dig for such traces -  what, even, to 
keep an eye out for -  is something of a problem, (p. 31)
Howell takes it for granted that ‘man’ is an object which can be defined and studied,
and that ‘mannishness’ is something identifiable. However, his text also indicates that
locating the limits of the human ‘is something of a problem’. He repeatedly uses the
word ‘trace’: man’s origins can ‘be traced back’, the ‘first faint traces’ of mannishness,
the uncertainty over what would even constitute ‘such traces’. It is the play of these
traces which makes it impossible to locate a pure origin of the human. In O f
Grammatology, Derrida writes:
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin -  within the discourse that we 
sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not 
even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, 
the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin, (p. 61)
There is no such thing as ‘the origin of the human’, since every organism necessarily
contains the trace of its parents, right back to the first life on earth. As Foucault writes,
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‘it is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on
what may serve for him as origin’; there can be no such thing as a pure origin of the
human as a biological species, since all life ‘has its roots in the first organic 
1 88formations’. This echoes Darwin’s observation that: ‘From the first dawn of life, all 
organic beings are found to resemble each other in descending degrees’.189 An 
investigation of human origins leads inexorably back to ‘the first organic formations’ 
and ‘the first dawn of life’, which pre-dates anything that could conceivably be called 
human by billions of years. There is no pure origin to be found here either, as the line 
between pre-organic and organic chemical formations is not a clean break.190
The movement of the trace, of the hidden ‘them’ that problematises the very concept of
‘us’, is not confined to hominids or primates or even animals, but can be traced back
far beyond any beings that resemble us:
For most of the planet’s history, creatures have been faceless. Tracing the 
journey from them to us is, like most evolutionary stories, full of staggering 
timescales and unpronounceable names of long-extinct creatures. But they are 
all ‘part of us’ today, for their features were the forerunners of our features.191
Even the terrifying, faceless, nameless, long-dead animal other is ‘part of us’. The
search for ‘our’ origin can never succeed, because the nonhuman animal can never be
excluded from the play of traces that constitutes the human.
Conclusion: Paleoanthropology Dissolves the Human
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that paleoanthropology as a humanist 
discourse aims to identify a single boundary between human and animal, in order to 
preserve the binary opposition. I have shown how paleoanthropological discourse 
attempts to fix the meaning of the human. However, it is my contention that this is
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impossible. Paleoanthropology’s humanism cannot be sustained, and it is doomed to 
dissolve the object of its study. In a prosaic way, the discoveries of paleoanthropology 
undermine the humanism that originally motivated them by showing that the human is 
simply one animal species among many. In comparison to a Biblical creation myth 
that presents humans as separate from and superior to all other life on earth, any 
scientific investigation of ‘our’ place in nature is going to be a demotion.
However, the humanist mission of paleoanthropology also undermines itself in a more 
profound way. There is no shared definition of ‘human’ among paleoanthropologists. 
Initially, it might seem that the division of fossils into Homo (for example H. ergaster, 
H. erectus, H. sapiens) and Australopithecus (for example A. afarensis, A. africanus) 
marks a clear dividing line between human and pre-human ape. However, this 
dividing line is no less arbitrary and disputed than that between human and animal; as 
Herbert Wendt has observed, ‘we can no longer say where the “ape-man”, 
Australopithecus, ends and “genuine man”, Homo, begins’.192 Sometimes the inability 
to decide whether a fossil is ‘human’ or not is so profound that paleoanthropologists 
resort to inventing new terms, such as Paranthropus (near-man or resembling man), 
Plesianthropus (near-man), Anthropopithecus (man-like ape), and Pithecanthropus 
(ape-like man). Although these particular terms have now been rejected, they 
represent an inability to categorise species as definitively human or nonhuman.
Furthermore, there is no simple correspondence between Homo and ‘human’. As Ian 
Tattersall writes, ‘the adjective ‘human’ is extremely ill-defined, having entered the 
language long before anyone realized that we are connected by ancestry to the rest of 
the living world’.193 Once again, it is the dimension of time which causes the adjective
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‘human’ to be ‘ill-defined’. For example, Tattersall uses it to refer to all species which
have existed since the human evolutionary line split from the chimpanzee line:
As used here [in The Last Neanderthal], ‘human’ does not refer to beings 
possessing precisely those capacities that make modem Homo sapiens unique 
in nature; rather, it is more loosely employed to refer to all primates that share a 
common ancestry uniquely with us, from Australopithecus on. This 
interpretation makes ‘human’ equivalent to the traditional term ‘hominid’.194
The definition ‘primates that share a common ancestry uniquely with us’ is an arbitrary
limit which is defined by the fact that all other species which shared that ancestry, such
as Neanderthals, are now extinct. In this definition, the human begins approximately
five million years ago. However, in other narratives of human evolution, ‘human’ is
used to mean only ‘anatomically modem humans’ (Homo sapiens). For example, in
Ape Man, Rod Caird writes:
The word ‘hominid’ [...] is used to describe all those creatures, preceding and 
including humans, which have lived on the evolutionary lines between the split 
with the chimpanzees and modem humans. It is a very valuable term because 
its use avoids having to attach the label ‘human’ to creatures which may very 
well be our ancestors but lack some of the characteristics generally accepted as 
specifically human. In this book ‘human’ is interchangeable with Homo sapiens 
-  anatomically modem people, recognizable as such. (p. 33)
For Caird, then, the shift between human and pre-human animal happened perhaps
200.000 years ago. Steven Mithen employs yet another idiosyncratic usage: ‘It is 
useful to refer to Homo ergaster, Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis as Early 
Humans rather than early hominids because this acknowledges their evolutionary 
status’.195 Mithen thus draws his own boundary line somewhere between Tattersall’s 
and Caird’s. Finally, Jared Diamond restricts the word to ‘behaviourally modem 
humans’. He excludes the anatomically modem Cro-Magnon Homo sapiens of
100.000 years ago; because they ‘had no preserved art’ and ‘couldn’t even catch fish’, 
he writes, they ‘still rank as less than fully human’.196 In four different texts, then,
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there are four different meanings of the word ‘human’, and four different limits
between human and animal. To quote Derrida:
If I am unsatisfied with the notion of a border between two homogeneous 
species, man on one side and the animal on the other, it is not in order to 
claim, stupidly, that there is no limit between ‘animals’ and ‘man’; it is 
because I maintain that there is more than one limit, that there are many 
limits. There is not one opposition between man and non-man; there are, 
between different organizational structures of the living being, many fractures, 
heterogeneities, differential structures.197
The plurality of the oppositions between ‘man and non-man’ is evident from the
diverse meanings of the word ‘human’ in these texts. Each of the writers discussed
here locates a different fracture in the movement from nonhuman to human. But
because of the persistent belief that there is a monolithic opposition, they each try to
claim that one particular limit is the origin of the human, the single limit between ‘man
and non-man’.
As these examples demonstrate, scientists who study evolution are aware of the 
slipperiness of the signifier ‘human’, since each finds it necessary to explain his own 
definition. Tattersall ascribes this instability to the fact that the term predates the 
discovery of evolution, and identifies it as ‘merely’ a problem with language.
However, this linguistic uncertainty indicates a deeper way in which the meaning of 
the human itself is ‘extremely ill-defined’. To demonstrate this, consider the concept 
of the ‘cerebral Rubicon’, a term which was coined by the anatomist Sir Arthur Keith 
in the 1940s. In his book A New Theory o f Human Evolution, he ‘proposed a cranial 
volume of 750 cubic centimetres as the “cerebral Rubicon” to be crossed before the 
ancestors of mankind may be called truly human’.198 Since he was specifically 
concerned with human evolution, he had to try to ‘define the point at which the man­
like ape could be said to have become man’.199 But as with Darwin’s observation that
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‘whether primeval man, when he possessed very few arts of the rudest kind [...] would 
have deserved to be called man, must depend on the definition which we employ’, it is 
clear that this is a linguistic debate.200 The question is at which point could ‘our’ 
ancestors ‘be said to have become man’: when ‘the ancestors of mankind may be 
called truly human’. This demonstrates that the process of defining is constitutive, not 
descriptive. It constructs the border between ‘man-like ape’ and ‘man’, and therefore 
the category of the human. It does not simply locate it.
Keith’s cerebral Rubicon of 750 cubic centimetres was problematised in the 1960s
when Louis Leakey discovered a new fossil species known as Homo habilis. The story
is told in the BBC’s Walking with Cavemen book. I quote it at length as it
demonstrates the way that the category of the human is brought into question by
paleoanthropological debate:
Ever since it was first discovered and described, Homo habilis has been a 
controversial species. Louis Leakey, who discovered the fossils at Olduvai 
Gorge in Tanzania in 1961, was convinced that it was Homo because they were 
found with stone tools and, as far as he was concerned, only a human could 
make such items. However, there was something of a problem with this, as the 
estimated brain capacity of the fossil was 640 cubic centimetres whereas, at the 
time the fossils were found, a figure of 750 cubic centimetres was considered to 
be the ‘cerebral rubicon’ -  the brain size that had to be reached before a species 
could be considered human. In order to get round this, Leakey and his 
colleagues, John Napier and Phillip Tobias, redefined the cerebral rubicon and 
decided that a brain size of 600 cubic centimetres should mark the boundary of 
human brain size, thus allowing their fossil a comfortable entry into the human 
world. Obviously, some scientists felt that this was moving the goalposts to suit 
Leakey’s notions about what made a human, (p. 116)
This paleoanthropological debate exposes the way that the boundaries between the
human and the pre-human are constructed. When a fossil is discovered, it must be
named and classified as either human or nonhuman. It is generally assumed in these
discussions that there is such a thing as ‘true humanity’, and that what is at stake is
correctly identifying it. However, these decisions themselves produce the limits of the
human; that the human is not a pre-existing entity, and that humanness is not 
‘unmistakable’ or ‘obvious’, is indicated by the very possibility of ‘moving the 
goalposts’, of ‘redefinfing] the cerebral rubicon’. In the example above, for Leakey it 
was inconceivable that a nonhuman could make stone tools; for other 
paleoanthropologists, a human could not have such a small brain capacity. Therefore 
Leakey decided to change the ‘boundary of human brain size’, whereas others would 
have preferred to change the behavioural boundary of the human and say that 
nonhuman animals can make tools. From one point of view, tool-making is an 
essential part of what it is to be human; from another, brain size above 750 cubic 
centimetres is the absolute marker of humanness. What emerges is that what human 
means for Leakey is different from what it means for another scientist.
The project of paleoanthropology is presented as ‘the search for human origins’ and
‘the pursuit of human origins’: terms which suggest a search for something that
definitely exists.201 In these debates, the category of the human is very visibly under
construction, but those who are doing the constructing do not explicitly question the
reality of ‘humanness’: an essential quality that unites all of ‘us’ and excludes all of
‘them’. Rather, the debate is presented as merely a disagreement over the exact
moment that this humanness begins. ‘When did we become human?’ is a question that
assumes that becoming human has indeed taken place, so it takes the current existence
of the human for granted. But the question ‘when did we become human?’ is
inseparable from the question ‘what does it mean to be human?’. As the
paleoanthropologist Sonia Cole writes:
Before beginning a study of man, it is important to define what is, in fact, 
meant by ‘man’. This sounds obvious and simple enough, yet when we try to 
arrive at such a definition, we find ourselves up against considerable 
difficulties.202
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It is because paleoanthropological research takes the human as its primary object of 
study that these debates take place. Yet at the same time, they deconstruct the 
opposition between human and animal on which they are premised.
The attempt to locate a moment of becoming human cannot help but dissolve the 
concept of the human itself. Paleoanthropology begins with a belief in the human and 
tries to fix its meaning by establishing a single limit which separates it from the 
animal. But precisely because paleoanthropologists try to determine the exact moment 
at which the human originates, they are constantly confronted by the instability of its 
borders and the lack of consensus about what it means to be human. In Origins 
Reconsidered, a thoroughly humanist text, Leakey writes: ‘Least certain of all is an 
understanding of the precise evolutionary change on which modem humans -  the 
complete essence of humanity -  is founded’ (p. 236). The ‘complete essence of 
humanity’ remains elusive. The human sciences wish to study ‘man’ but inevitably 
discover the impossibility of defining who or what this ‘man’ might be. In his 
discussion of psychoanalysis and ethnology, which ‘are not so much two human 
sciences among others, but [...] span the entire domain of those sciences’, Michel 
Foucault writes:
Not only are they able to do without the concept of man, they are also unable to 
pass through it, for they always address themselves to that which constitutes his 
outer limits. One may say of both of them what Levi-Strauss said of ethnology: 
that they dissolve man. [...] They ceaselessly ‘unmake’ that very man who is 
creating and re-creating his positivity in the human sciences.203
The human(ist) science of paleoanthropology cannot take the ‘concept of man’ for
granted, since it must ‘always address [...] his outer limits’. In confronting the
instability and plurality of those limits, ‘man’ is ‘unmade’.
The possibility of becoming human troubles the opposition between human and 
animal. It suggests that the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are plural and 
permeable. If the human can only be defined as differed-differing animal, as what the 
animal is not, then the instability of these boundaries means that the category of the 
human is itself unstable.
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Chapter 2
Acting Human
Autism, Anthropomorphism, and Differance in 
Behaviour
Thus nature made us to be lower than animals or at least to exhibit all the more, 
because of that native inferiority, the wonderful efficacy of education which 
alone raises us from the level of the animals and lifts us above them. But shall 
we grant the same distinction to the deaf and to the blind, to imbeciles, 
madmen, or savages, or to those who have been brought up in the woods with 
animals; to those who have lost their imagination through melancholia, or in 
short to all those animals in human form who give evidence of only the rudest 
instinct?
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, M an a M achine (1748), trans. by Gertrude C. Bussey and 
Professor M. W. Calkins (La Salle: Open Court, 1912), p. 114.
Because there is neither an ‘essence’ that gender expresses or externalizes nor 
an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the 
various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there 
would be no gender at all.
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f  Identity, 2nd edn (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 178.
The difference between the theatrical and the social may then only be a matter 
of the legibility or otherwise of quotation marks, but these quotation marks 
make all the difference.
Geraldine Harris, Staging Femininities: Perform ance and Performativity (Manchester and N ew  
York: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 77.
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In this chapter I focus specifically on the behavioural boundary of the human, in order 
to interrogate the way that an illusion of human essence is produced through 
performance. I am drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of gender as performative, in the 
sense that ‘acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or 
substance’.1 In Gender Trouble, originally published in 1990, Butler argues that 
gender is a sustained, repeated, primarily unconscious performance of norms learned 
from the surrounding culture. The existence of those who do not correctly perform 
their gender, such as homosexuals and transvestites, reveals the performativity of 
gender in general, as it demonstrates that gendered behaviour is not natural or essential. 
This contradicts the hegemonic view of gendered behaviour as a natural expression of 
an internal essence. Within Gender Trouble, there are many suggestive allusions to the 
process of becoming human and the ways that this process intersects with that of 
becoming gendered. However, although Butler’s model has been widely taken up by 
theorists of gender, sexuality and race, its potential as a posthumanist theory has not 
been explored.
According to humanism, humans naturally and by definition act human: for example, 
by socially interacting with other humans, wearing clothes, and walking upright. They 
act human because they are essentially human. Their internal identity is expressed 
externally by their behaviour. In this view, you can infer the presence (or absence) of a
human essence through the way they act; what they do tells you who (or what) they 
are. However, this structure is problematised when the behaviour does not match the 
supposed essence. This disturbance can work in two directions: people who do not act 
human, for example by not speaking, refusing to interact with other people, walking on 
all fours, or eating raw meat; and nonhuman animals who do act human, for example 
using language or tools or creating art. In these cases, from a humanist perspective, 
there is a mismatch between external behaviour -  the performance -  and internal 
identity -  the essence. This mismatch produces an uncanny effect, as there is 
uncertainty over whether someone /  something is or is not human.
In the first part of this chapter, I ask what it might mean to fail to act human. I look 
specifically at two examples, feral children and people with autism, and argue that they 
do not conform to norms of human behaviour. In a range of examples to which I will 
turn, the encounter with autistic people is experienced as uncanny because they do not 
act human in some crucial ways, which results in uncertainty over whether or not they 
are human. When humanism is threatened by this uncertainty, it tries to contain the 
threatening being by representing it as anomalous, false, or unintelligible. For 
example, autistic people are excluded from the category of the human by being 
represented as animals, inanimate objects, culture-less beings or even extraterrestrials. 
They are also forced to attempt to conform to the ‘correct’ behaviour. According to 
Butler, ‘we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right’.2 Similarly, people 
who fail to act human are routinely subject to punishments including physical violence, 
incarceration, psychological experiments and psychiatric treatment. In response to this 
treatment, the ‘autistic liberation movement’ aims to extend the boundaries of the 
human. However, this strategy retains the centrality of the term ‘human’ as a
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privileged category. An alternative strategy is to represent autism differently, such that 
the human is no longer the site of knowledge and power.
In the second part of this chapter, I turn to the second behavioural threat to humanism, 
animals who act human, and analyse the way that humanism responds to this 
challenge. One way is to use the accusation of anthropomorphism; in other words, to 
suggest that the performance is false or fictional. However, the ferocity of the reaction 
reveals that there is something very important at stake, and that the performance does 
indeed threaten the secure category of the human. Some instances of animals acting 
human are ‘authorized transgression’, to borrow Linda Hutcheon’s term.3 These are 
cases that do not pose a risk to humanism, since they are clearly marked as imitative, 
fictional, theatrical, or otherwise unreal. However, even these ‘authorised’ 
anthropomorphic performances have an uncanny effect. Although they may be 
presented as false or fictional, the fact that an animal can act human undermines the 
idea that human behaviour is a natural manifestation of an internal essence. Instead, it 
makes visible the performativity of all cases of acting human, no matter who is 
performing.
Theoretical Approach: Descartes and Butler
The idea that the presence or absence of a human essence can be detected by observing
behaviour can be traced back to Descartes’ 1637 Discourse on the Method.4 In a
famous passage from the Discourse, Descartes argues:
If any such machines had the organs and outward shape of a monkey or of 
some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that 
they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals; whereas if any 
such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as 
closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should still have two very
129
certain means of recognizing that they were not real men. The first is that they 
could never use words, or put together other signs, as we do in order to declare 
our thoughts to others. [...] Secondly, even though such machines might do 
some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would 
inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not through 
understanding but only from the disposition of their organs. [...] It is for all 
practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to 
make it act in all the contingencies o f  life in the way in which our reason makes 
us act. Now in just these two ways we can also know the difference between 
man and beast, (pp. 139-40, emphasis added)
What I would like to draw attention to here is the centrality of behaviour, of acting
human, in this passage. Although it is an abstract, internal feature ( ‘reason’) that is the
absolute difference between the human and the nonhuman, there is no direct access to
this feature. Reason is not something which can be made visible. Therefore, in order
to ascertain whether these machines (or animals) are ‘really men’ we must examine
their behaviour.
The first sign, that a machine ‘could never use words, or put together other signs, as we 
do in order to declare our thoughts to others’, is probably still the most widely accepted 
criterion of the absolute difference between the human and the animal. I discuss the 
importance of language in constructing the human/nonhuman boundary in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis, ‘Talking Human’. W hat I wish to emphasise here is that speaking or using 
signs to communicate thought is a behaviour, an action that must be performed. Even 
though the existence of internal thoughts is the real, underlying difference, these 
thoughts cannot be directly accessed. In order to tell the difference, we must look at 
the act of using words. The second sign that would reveal the machines to be 
nonhuman is that they would ‘inevitably fail’ in some tasks, which ‘would reveal that 
they were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their organs’. 
Once again, while the intangible ‘understanding’ is the actual distinction, it is the 
behaviour, the failure to perform correctly, which reveals that it is not human. The
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importance of behaviour is indicated in the penultimate sentence of the quotation 
above: that it is ‘for all practical purposes impossible’ for a machine to ‘act in all the 
contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act’. The repetition of 
the word ‘act’ here confirms the central importance of behaviour in this influential 
account of what it means to be human. Our reason ‘makes us act’; therefore, without 
this internal reason, a machine or animal could not act in the way ‘we’ do.
I would like to keep Descartes’ framework in mind throughout this chapter; according
to humanism, in order to know whether or not something is human, one must look at
what it does. Many contemporary humanists explicitly align themselves with this
belief. E. O. Wilson, for example, writes: ‘The impressive recent advances by
computer scientists in the design of artificial intelligence suggests the following test of
humanity: that which behaves like man is man’.5 However, the belief that ‘human is as
human does’6 has the potential to challenge humanism by questioning the idea that a
core human essence or ‘human nature’ necessarily underlies this ‘doing’. In Gender
Trouble, Judith Butler writes:
Because there is neither an ‘essence’ that gender expresses or externalises nor 
an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the 
various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there 
would be no gender at all.7
While the external markers of gender are conventionally read as signifiers of an
internal essence, Butler argues that these acts themselves constitute gender. Descartes’
influential account of telling the difference between human and nonhuman, as
discussed above, relies on behaviour truthfully signifying the presence or absence of an
internal human essence. But because this essence is intangible, it is possible that the
behaviour in fact ‘create[s] the idea of [the human], and without those acts, there
would be no [human]’. Does the essence produce the performance, or does the
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performance produce the (illusion of) essence? Any anomalous case, where a person 
fails to act human, calls the existence of a human essence into question. Therefore, 
humanism must try to deal with these ‘mismatches’ by either forcing them to act 
human, or categorising them as nonhuman.
I am aware that it is not possible to simply take a theory of gender performance and
transplant it into a discussion about being human. There are theorists who specifically
object to the over-use of Butler’s theory, or rather its indiscriminate application to
other ‘areas of existence’. For example, Geraldine Harris writes:
Both Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter sometimes do seem to have been 
seized upon as representing a single and ‘unimpeachable position’ which can be 
transferred across into any and all areas of existence in a fashion that ignores 
the specificity of the terrain that Butler covers.8
To demonstrate that I am not transferring the theory arbitrarily, it is important to show
that the terrain under discussion here (namely, the construction of the human through
performance) is not merely related to Butler’s subject area, but in fact inseparable from
it. Many theorists have noted the close association between becoming human and
becoming gendered. For example, Harriet Ritvo, in a discussion of hermaphrodites,
writes: ‘As individuals of apparently mixed sex threatened to unsettle human gender
categories, they could also undermine the equally well-defended barrier that separated
human beings from the rest of the animate creation’.9 According to Ritvo, this is
because it was known that hermaphroditism ‘occurred routinely in some organisms,
but only in plants or in such animals as snails and worms, which seemed very different
from people’ (p. 173). Because of this, hermaphrodites risked being excluded not only
from the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female,’ but from the category of the human. Ritvo
concludes the discussion by pointing out: ‘Not only did their anomalous sex exclude
them from the social order, but it made them hard to fit into the order Primates (or
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Bimana) and the class Mammalia’ (p. 174). The binary division of sex is an essential 
part of designating someone as human. A hermaphrodite does not only call into 
question gender categories, but also what Ritvo calls the ‘well-defended barrier’ 
between humans and other animals. This echoes Butler’s statement in Gender Trouble 
that
the very notion of ‘the person’ is called into question by the cultural emergence 
of those ‘incoherent’ or ‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear to be 
persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility 
by which persons are defined, (p. 23)
That is, we cannot conceive of a human who is not coherently gendered; gender is
needed to produce a human subject.10
Butler herself repeatedly refers to the process of becoming human, for example arguing 
that ‘discrete genders are part of what “humanizes” individuals within contemporary 
culture’ (p. 178). Implicit in this idea that individuals are ‘humanized’ is the concept 
that becoming human is a process, and a culturally specific process. It is inseparable 
from the process of becoming gendered; as Butler argues, ‘persons only become 
intelligible through becoming gendered in conformity with recognizable standards of 
gender intelligibility’ (p. 22). In the 1999 Preface to the second edition of Gender 
Trouble, she asks:
What will and will not constitute an intelligible life, and how do presumptions 
about normative gender and sexuality determine in advance what will qualify as 
the ‘human’ and the ‘livable’? In other words, how do normative gender 
presumptions work to delimit the very field of description that we have for the 
human? (p. xxii)
Once again, this quotation indicates that Butler sees the human as something that must 
be culturally constructed, and that this construction is inextricably linked with the 
constmction of ‘normative gender and sexuality’. In a similar passage, she argues:
‘To the extent the gender norms [...] establish what will and will not be intelligibly
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human, what will and will not be considered to be “real”, they establish the ontological 
field in which bodies may be given legitimate expression’ (p. xxiii). As a final 
example, Butler takes issue with Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that ‘one is not bom a 
woman, but rather becomes one’. Butler disputes the existence of a pre-gendered 
human subject:
Are there ever humans who are not, as it were, always already gendered? The 
mark of gender appears to ‘qualify’ bodies as human bodies; the moment in 
which an infant becomes humanized is when the question, ‘is it a boy or girl?’ 
is answered. Those bodily figures who do not fit into either gender fall outside 
the human, indeed, constitute the domain of the dehumanized and the abject 
against which the human itself is constituted, (p. 142)
In short, all of these quotations demonstrate that Gender Trouble is permeated by an
awareness of the human as a culturally constructed category which is deeply connected
with the construction of gender. The process of defining the ‘humanized’ and the
‘domain of the dehumanized’ is an integral concern in Gender Trouble. Indeed, I
would describe it as an incipiently posthumanist text.11 The category of the human is
shown to be a construction, and one which can only be constructed ‘against’ the
‘domain of the dehumanized and the abject’. I suggest that because Gender Trouble is
primarily concerned with gender and sexuality, and has therefore been categorised as
belonging to ‘Gender Studies’, attention has been deflected from this aspect of Butler’s
theory.
Butler herself makes the link more explicitly in the introduction to Bodies that Matter,
in which she writes:
The matrix of gender relations is prior to the emergence of the ‘human’. [...] 
Indeed, the construction of gender operates through exclusionary means, such 
that the human is not only produced over and against the inhuman, but through 
a set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the 
possibility of cultural articulation. Hence, it is not enough to claim that human 
subjects are constructed, for the construction of the human is a differential 
operation that produces the more and the less ‘human’, the inhuman, the
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humanly unthinkable. These excluded sites come to bound the ‘human’ as its 
constitutive outside, and to haunt those boundaries as the persistent possibility 
of their disruption and rearticulation.12
This demonstrates the relevance of Butler’s theory to the project of this thesis: to argue
that the human is produced as differed-differing animal, or as Butler writes here, that
‘the construction of the human is a differential operation’, and those ‘excluded sites’
persistently threaten the stability of its boundaries. Butler herself explores a particular
boundary of the human, that of gender, in order to argue that for ‘those abjected beings
who do not appear properly gendered it is their very humanness that comes into
question’.13 My project here is to explore the sites inhabited by those who are
excluded from the human because of other aspects of their behaviour (rather than
gender), and to examine the possibility of the ‘disruption and rearticulation’ of species
boundaries.
However, there is no straightforward equivalence between the production of gender
and the production of the human. In the Preface to the 1999 edition of Gender
Trouble, responding to work that followed its original publication, Butler discusses the
question of ‘whether or not the theory of performativity can be transposed onto matters
of race’, and suggests that
race and gender ought not to be treated as simple analogies. I would therefore 
suggest that the question to ask is not whether the theory of performativity is 
transposable onto race, but what happens to the theory when it tries to come to 
grips with race. [...] These categories always work as background for one 
another, and they often find their most powerful articulation through one 
another, (p. xvi)
I realise that in applying a theory of the relationship between race and gender to the 
relationship between gender and the human, I am proposing yet another level of 
analogy. But I believe that a similar structure applies: becoming gendered and 
becoming human are not identical processes, and the theory of one cannot simply be
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transposed on to the other. However, they are ‘powerfully articulated through one 
another’ and interact in complex ways. Therefore, the question to ask is: what happens 
to the theory when it tries to come to grips with being human? What would it mean to 
consider the human in the way Butler construes gender?
Animals in Human Form: Feral Children and Autism
In Butler’s theory of gender performance, the failure to perform gender correctly is an 
important clue which signals that the heterosexual matrix is not essential and natural, 
but a cultural construction. W hat would it mean to fail to act human correctly? ‘Feral 
children’ are perhaps the most obvious example. The phrase refers to people who have 
grown up without normal human interaction, and have therefore not learned language 
and other cultural customs. Feral children, biologically human but without culture, are 
mythologically associated with animals. They are given names like ‘wolf-boy’ and 
‘bear-girl’, and there are stories of them being brought up by animals; a well-known 
example is the story of Romulus and Remus, who were suckled by a wolf.14 A typical 
representation is this description of Peter the Wild Boy, who was discovered in 
Germany in 1724:
Always alert and suspicious, he sat on his haunches or waited on all-fours, as 
would a four-footed animal. Seemingly unused to beds, he rolled back and forth 
on the straw pallet provided. He did not care for cooked foods but readily ate 
raw vegetables and grass. He captured birds, dismembered them, and ate the 
pieces. He showed approval of foodstuffs by beating his chest with his fists.15
This is a classic list of how not to act human: humans stand upright and not on all
fours, they eat cooked rather than raw food, and express approval by speaking rather
than by beating their chests. Peter has the body of a human, but he does not act like
one: as Michael Newton writes, the many pamphlets published about Peter at the time
of his discovery depict him as ‘a human in bestial form, and also as a human-machine,
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having a human shape but lacking the essential guarantee of the human: that is, the 
possession of a soul’.16 For example, in his 1726 pamphlet Mere Nature Delineated: 
or, A Body without a Soul, Daniel Defoe describes Peter as ‘a Thing in human 
Shape’.17 The uncertainty over whether feral children should be categorised as human 
is indicated by Linnaeus’ inclusion of Homo ferus  as a separate sub-species of Homo in 
his Systerna Naturae, from the tenth edition of 1758 onwards. Giving specific 
examples of feral children, such as ‘Juvenis Ursinus lithuanus’ (the Lithuanian bear- 
child), Linnaeus characterises Homo ferus  as ‘tetrapus, mutus, hirsutus’ (four-footed, 
mute, hairy): all attributes usually descriptive of animals rather than humans.18
This disjunction between human physical form and animal behaviour is also discussed
by Julien Offray de La Mettrie in the 1748 text Man a Machine:
Thus nature made us to be lower than animals or at least to exhibit all the more, 
because of that native inferiority, the wonderful efficacy of education which 
alone raises us from the level of the animals and lifts us above them. But shall 
we grant the same distinction to the deaf and to the blind, to imbeciles, 
madmen, or savages, or to those who have been brought up in the woods with 
animals; to those who have lost their imagination through melancholia, or in 
short to all those animals in human form who give evidence of only the rudest 
instinct?19
As La Mettrie argues, feral children ( ‘those who have been brought up in the woods 
with animals’) disturb the boundaries of the human. They demonstrate that the 
features which distinguish humans from animals are not innate, but are learned through 
‘the wonderful efficacy of education’. Their failure to act human poses the question of 
what, if anything, differentiates them from other animals. How can a human essence 
be identified? La M ettrie’s question -  is someone human if s/he has not experienced 
‘the wonderful efficacy of education’? — is also asked by Jean-Frangois Lyotard in his
introduction to The Inhuman:
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The institutions which we call culture supplement this native lack. What shall 
we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity 
to acquire a ‘second’ nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share 
in communal life, adult consciousness and reason?20
This passage indicates doubts about the meaning of the signifier ‘human’. Lyotard
points out that each individual must learn to act human in order to become fully human
(a concept which is discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis), but at the same time, the
‘initial misery’ seems to represent a ‘true’ or natural humanity, unaltered by culture.21
La Mettrie calls feral children ‘animals in human form’: a persistent concept which
suggests that while behaviour may be culturally learned, the physical materiality of the
body is fixed, outside culture, and cannot transgress species boundaries. However, this
belief in the ‘irreducible materiality’ of the body, ‘posited as prior to the sign’, as
Butler phrases it, can be problematised.22 Accounts of feral children suggest that even
their physical form can alter and become less human-like. Myra Shackley recounts
that the ‘wolf child’ of Hesse, discovered in 1344, could only walk on all fours, ‘so his
legs were then strapped to boards to “help” him assume normal human posture’.23 In
another example, the Indian ‘wolf-girls’ Kamala and Amala showed evidence of
physical alterations as a result of being ‘mothered’ by a wolf. The missionary who
discovered them and took them in, Reverend J. A. L. Singh, writes:
The jaws also had undergone some sort of change in the chewing of bones and 
constant biting at the meat attached to the bone. When they moved their jaws in 
chewing, the upper and lower jawbones appeared to part and close visibly, 
unlike human jaws [...]. They could see better by night than by day [...]. They 
had a powerful instinct and could smell meat or anything from a great distance 
like animals. [...] The nails of the hand and foot were worn on the inside to a 
concave shape. This was due to scratching the ground with the fingers.24
Even in their physical form, then, Kamala and Amala blur the boundaries between wolf
and girl. These examples show that even the body, which is conventionally thought of
as being ‘naturally human’ and outside culture, must be trained to have the correct
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form. This suggests that acting human, performing in the correct way, can have such a 
profound effect that it alters the materiality of the body.
If feral children do not behave like humans and even their physical materiality is not
human, what then is it that differentiates them from animals? The traditional answer is
that they have the potential to become human. In order to re-establish the boundary
between humans and animals, feral children must be taught to act human. This
teaching process forms an important part of almost all narratives of feral children.25
Singh describes the process of teaching Kamala and Amala as ‘taming’.26 This
teaching was only partially successful. Amala died less than a year after being
discovered, but Kamala lived for another nine years, in which time she developed a
vocabulary of about thirty sounds, the concept of colour, and a preference for wearing
clothes, although she was only partially toilet-trained and ate dead birds or animals that
she found.27 Probably the most detailed account of teaching a feral child to act human
is Dr Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard’s Memoir sur les premiers developpements de Victor de
L ’Aveyron (1801) and Rapport sur les nouveaux developpements de Victor de
LAveyron  (1806), as well as F ra n c is  Truffaut’s 1969 film adaptation, L ’Enfant
sauvage. In attempting to teach Victor to act human, Itard repeatedly punishes him.
For example, he withholds water when Victor is ‘burning with thirst’ in order to try to
make him ask for it verbally:
In vain, in the moments when his thirst was most ardent, I held in front of him a 
vase full of water, by crying frequently water, water; by giving the vase to a 
person who pronounced the same word beside him, and reclaiming it myself by 
the same means, the unfortunate was tormented in all of his senses, waved his 
arms around the vase in an almost convulsive manner, made a sort of whistle 
and did not articulate any sound. It would have been inhumanity to have 
insisted further.28
This attempt to force Victor to imitate the cries of ‘water, water’ could be seen as an 
example of ‘the forcible citation of a norm’, as Butler writes, ‘one whose complex 
historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment’.29 In 
other instances, Itard forces Victor to study for so long that he has fits, strikes him on 
the fingers with a drumstick for not taking his lessons seriously, and punishes him 
when he has done nothing wrong in order to test whether he has ‘le sentiment interieur 
de la justice’ rather than merely a conditioned response to his punishments.30 Itard’s 
description of this last experiment as ‘vraiment penible’ (truly difficult or disturbing), 
and his reference to the ‘inhumanity’ of withholding water from Victor, show that he 
finds it distressing to inflict these punishments. This indicates that he is carrying them 
out not for sadistic reasons, because he feels it is necessary to try and make Victor 
human. He is being punished for not acting human.
Feral children are intriguing because they highlight the fundamental questions of what 
makes someone human: as Newton writes, the ‘feral child [is] a key symbolic figure in 
Enlightenment culture’.31 But they are not statistically significant. There are very few 
indisputably factual instances of feral children: most of the cases are ambiguous, 
mythological or outright fictional. Furthermore, it could be argued that their failure to 
act human is just an accidental result of unfortunate circumstances. Indeed, it is in part 
the contingency of feral children that makes them so fascinating, as it suggests the 
terrifying possibility that any one of ‘us’ could have failed to become human.
However, the category of feral children overlaps with another category -  people with 
autism -  which is, by comparison, a common condition.32 Many accounts of feral 
children describe features that sound very similar to autism; in fact, Andrew Ward 
claims that Itard’s Memoir sur les premiers developpements de Victor de L ’Aveyron is
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‘generally considered to be the first documented account of an autistic child’. There 
is no conclusive answer as to the explanation for this similarity; there is a question as 
to ‘whether [feral children] became autistic due to being abandoned, or whether they 
were abandoned because they were autistic’, or whether they were never in fact ‘feral’ 
at all.34 However, for the purposes of this thesis, I want to concentrate on the 
representation and treatment of people with autism rather than feral children. This is 
because, as a far more widespread and empirically important issue, it raises pressing 
questions about the way that the category of the human is constructed within 
contemporary culture, and the effects of being excluded from it.
Today, the commonsense view is that while mistakes may have been made in the past, 
there is now absolute certainty about who is and is not human. However, I do not 
believe that the boundaries of the human have been fixed, and there are many subtle 
ways of excluding people who do not perform correctly from the category of the 
human. This exclusion takes place within our own society and, while not always 
explicit, is often surprisingly easy to read. For example, the way that autistic people 
are represented shows that the category of the human is not as fixed and permanent as 
a commonsense view would have it.35
Autism is a complex neurological condition, or more accurately a spectrum of related 
syndromes, in which people have difficulties with social interaction and language. 
While there is still disagreement over the causes and diagnosis of autism, there is broad 
consensus about the main symptoms. In children, the early signs are ‘impairments in 
social interaction, lack of social smile, lack of appropriate facial expression, hypotonia, 
and poor attention’ followed by ‘ignoring people, preference for aloneness, lack of eye
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contact, lack of appropriate gestures, and lack of emotional expression’. In adults,
depending on the severity of their autism, symptoms can range from complete absence
of any language and social interaction, to so-called ‘high functioning’ autistic people,
who are capable of holding jobs and looking after themselves, but whose social and
interpersonal behaviour is noticeably unusual. For example, this is an observation of a
young autistic man during his sheltered employment placement:
After making a similar sarcastic remark to his supervisor, he turned away 
without a word indicating the end of the interaction, walked past a colleague 
brushing shoulders, stopped about ten inches away from a senior adviser’s face, 
and said, without a greeting, and in a loud and mechanical tone of voice, that 
his computer was ‘too slow even for a professor’. He then moved to his open 
office space, and paced back and forth in front of his computer talking to 
himself, completely oblivious to the fact that several employees and outsiders
37were observing him.
In a less formal tone, Oliver Sacks, describing his visit to see Temple Grandin, the 
famous autistic Professor of Animal Science, notes: ‘She sat me down with little 
ceremony, no preliminaries, no social niceties, no small talk about my trip or how I 
liked Colorado. [...] I was feeling somewhat exhausted, hungry, and thirsty [...] and I
o o
kept hoping Temple would notice and offer me some coffee. She did not’. These 
passages should give an idea of the sort of specific behaviours of autistic people that 
are characterised as not acting human.
Autism and the Uncanny
These passages describe how autistic people do not behave in the ‘correct’ human way, 
but it is also striking that in many cases, the behaviours described do not endanger or 
upset the autistic person. A preference for aloneness or failure to offer your guest a 
coffee may be social faux  pas, but they are not actually dangerous. However, what 
emerges from many texts dealing with autism is that it is often non-autistic people who
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are disturbed by the condition. They are made uncomfortable, disconcerted, and even 
angry by the autistic person’s failure to interact with them. The word autism comes 
from this sense of being entirely absorbed in your own self (from the Greek amoq,
39self). In her book Nobody Nowhere: The Remarkable Autobiography o f an Autistic
Girl, Donna Williams states specifically that she did not want to be human: ‘I became
angry at any need to go to the toilet, to eat, or any call to participate in the family [...].
In short my humanness, my mere physical existence, was my failing’.40 Williams
describes her childhood dislike of having to interact with people and the echolalic
behaviour she developed as a result:
Words were no problem, but other people’s expectations for me to respond to 
them were. This required my understanding what was said, but I was too happy 
losing myself to want to be dragged back by something as two-dimensional as 
understanding.
‘What do you think you’re doing?’ came the voice. Knowing I must respond in 
order to get rid of this annoyance, I would compromise, repeating ‘What do you 
think you’re doing?’ addressed to no-one in particular.
‘Don’t repeat everything I say,’ scolded the voice. Sensing a need to respond, 
I’d reply: ‘Don’t repeat everything I say’. Slap. I had no idea what was 
expected of me.41
Although Williams was desperately unhappy for most of her childhood, in the incident 
described here she does not suffer as a direct result of her autism. She describes 
herself as ‘too happy losing myself to want to be dragged back’, but her mother 
becomes angry at her failure to respond correctly and slaps her. Throughout 
Williams’s autobiography, she recounts stories of the people around her -  parents, 
teachers, friends, boyfriends -  who become angry and frustrated when she does not 
interact with them, and abuse her physically and verbally as a result.
If being human requires being recognised as such by other humans, I suggest that these 
violent reactions arise, in part, because autistic people do not confirm the human status 
of those around them. In his 1943 account, in which he coined the term ‘autism’, Leo
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Kanner wrote of an autistic child: ‘He never looked up at people’s faces. When he had 
any dealings with persons at all, he treated them, or rather parts of them, as if they 
were objects’.42 Similarly, Niko and Elisabeth Tinbergen write: ‘Most children will 
not even look at the observer’s face (this accounts for the statement, often found in the 
literature, that autists do not interact with you ‘as a person’)’.43 Many other clinical 
and personal descriptions of autistic people refer to the discomfort caused by the 
autistic person’s failure or refusal to acknowledge others as human: ‘Most of the 
children looked physically normal -  it was their remoteness, their inaccessibility, that 
were so uncanny’.44 The use of the word ‘uncanny’ here is significant, as it appears 
frequently in texts about autism. As Ernst Jentsch writes, ‘one of the most successful 
devices for easily creating uncanny effects is to leave the reader in uncertainty whether 
a particular figure in the story is a human being or an automaton’.45 This uncertainty 
causes the uncanny feeling associated with autistic people and feral children, for 
example in Reverend Singh’s account of his first encounter with Kamala and Amala. 
He first hears about the girls when a local tribesman tells him ‘in great fear about a 
man-ghost in the jungle close by’ .46 Singh goes with some villagers to find ‘the so- 
called ghost’. Suddenly, a mother wolf and her two cubs appear out of a hole in the 
ground:
Close after the cubs came the ghost -  a hideous looking being -  hand, foot, and 
body like a human being; but the head was a big ball of something covering the 
shoulders and the upper portion of the bust, leaving only a sharp contour of the 
face visible, and it was human. Close at its heels, there came another awful 
creature exactly like the first, but smaller in size. Their eyes were bright and 
piercing, unlike human eyes. I at once came to the conclusion that these were 
human beings.47
This passage shows an remarkable uncertainty about whether the ‘ghosts’ are human or 
not. On the one hand, Singh says their eyes are ‘unlike human eyes,’ yet he also says 
he ‘at once came to the conclusion’ that they were human; it is not clear why. This
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passage gives a vivid sense of the uncanny feeling caused by something that seems 
partially or ambiguously human.
Missing Persons: Autism and Exclusion from the Human
It seems that the experience of encountering autistic people can be uncanny, and it is
followed by an attempt to justify or rationalise this feeling. Ever since autism was first
described in the 1940s, autistic people have been depicted as nonhuman. In 2006, the
neurologist Vilayanur Ramachandran wrote an article in New Scientist reporting on his
research into ‘mirror neuron dysfunction’ in autistic children.48 It has recently been
discovered in experiments on monkeys that these mirror neurons (also known as
‘monkey-see, monkey-do’ neurons) fire not only when a monkey performs an action
itself, but also when it sees another monkey perform the same action. In this way,
Ramachandran writes, it enables ‘the monkey to put itself in another monkey’s shoes’.
He suggests that these mirror neurons are central to the development of the human:
It may even be that the emergence and subsequent sophistication of mirror 
neurons in hominids played a crucial role in the development of such 
essentially human abilities as empathy, language, learning through imitation 
rather than trial and error, and perhaps even the rapid transmission of what we 
call ‘culture’. We were struck by the fact that it is precisely these properties o f  
mirror neurons that are not functioning in autism, (emphasis added)
This structure is one that recurs repeatedly in discussions of autism. An attribute, such
as the functions of the mirror neurons listed here (empathy, language, culture, and so
on), is identified as ‘essentially human’, and it is then stated that autistic people lack
this attribute. Logically, this excludes autistic people from the category of the
human.49 It also demonstrates why it is ethically problematic to try to define exactly
‘what makes us human’.
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The way that this structure categorises autistic people as nonhuman is even more overt
in Ramachandran’s discussion of Steven, a six-year-old autistic boy:
But talk to him and you soon realise that there’s a sense in which Steven, the 
person, simply isn’t there. He is incapable of anything remotely resembling the 
two-way exchange of normal conversation. He refuses to make eye contact, and 
keeps fidgeting and rocking his body to and fro. All attempts at meaningful 
communication with him have been, and will be, in vain. [...] [He has] an 
absence of emotional empathy, and a profound inability to engage in normal 
conversation. Even more surprising in a species known for its playfulness, he 
has no sense of play, no ‘pretend’ games.
Once again, it is Steven’s lack of participation in ‘two-way exchange’ with other
people which means that Ramachandran can assert that as a person, he ‘simply isn’t
there’. A sense of frustration is evident from Ramachandran’s description here, for
example his indecision about whether Steven is unable or unwilling to interact: he is
‘incapable’ of conversation, but ‘refuses’ to make eye contact. In the final sentence,
Ramachandran’s description of the human species as ‘known for its playfulness’,
followed immediately by the assertion that Steven has ‘no sense of play’, again has the
effect of excluding him from the human species.
This article provoked a letter from Michelle Dawson, head of ‘No Autistics Allowed’, 
a Canadian organisation which investigates discrimination against autistic people. 
Dawson wrote:
Vilayanur Ramachandran and Lindsay Oberman [...] are not the only 
researchers who are sure that autistics have no personhood. We are simply not 
there. They are frantically searching for our missing persons. Other researchers 
and parent-advocates have gone beyond removing our personhood to declaring 
us more or less dead. The respected epidemiologist Walter Spitzer has 
described autistic people as being dead souls in live bodies, and autism as a 
terminal disease -  we just don’t know we are dead yet. [...] Does it take electro 
and magnetoencephalography to discover that interacting or conversing with 
people who see you as not there, or not having personhood, or in fact being 
dead, can be difficult, if not impossible?50
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As Dawson puts it, it is impossible to interact with people who are already treating you 
as effectively absent or even dead. The mutually reinforcing process of becoming 
human, in which children learn to behave a certain way and are then accepted as 
human by others, seems to have failed catastrophically in the medical treatment of 
autistic people. Because they do not participate in ‘normal conversation’, as 
Ramachandran phrases it, they are then treated as if they are not human. This 
treatment further exacerbates the behaviour that initially caused the exclusion. The 
medical profession has repeatedly portrayed autistic people as nonhuman. The specific 
form of this nonhuman has varied; autistic people have been represented as inanimate 
objects, animals, extraterrestrials, and as lacking a theory of mind or participation in 
culture or other feature that is described as a ‘crucial’ or ‘quintessential’ part of being 
human. I will now look more closely at the various ways in which autistic people are 
depicted as nonhuman.
Texts about autism are full of comparisons between autistic people and animals. For
example, in his 1997 book Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory o f Mind,
Simon Baron-Cohen writes:
It is probably impossible to imagine what it is like to be mindblind, in the same 
way as it impossible to imagine what it is to be a bat. [...] Conversely, it is 
probably impossible for a mindblind person to imagine what it is like to be a 
mindreader. In the words of Sperber, ‘attribution of mental states is to humans 
as echolocation is to the bat’. It is our natural way of understanding the social 
environment.51
This suggests that the ‘gulf between mindreaders and the mindblind’,52 between non- 
autistic and autistic people, is as great as the gulf between humans and bats. The first- 
person plural ( ‘our natural way’) reinforces the unity of all of ‘us’ (humans) against 
these ‘mindblind’ alien others. Baron-Cohen then admiringly quotes Nicholas 
Humphrey’s statement that ‘the best way to characterize humans is as Homo
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53psychologies’. This suggestion again excludes autistic people from the category of 
the human; by Baron-Cohen’s own argument, they may be sapiens, but they are not 
psychologies, so effectively, they are not part of ‘our’ species.
Autistic people are also identified with animals in the 1983 book ‘Autistic’ Children:
New Hope fo r  a Cure, by Nikolaas and Elisabeth Tinbergen. Nikolaas Tinbergen is
best known as a biologist and one of the founders of modem ethology, which is a
specific method of studying animal behaviour by focusing on four aspects: function,
causation, development and evolution. Towards the end of his career, Tinbergen’s
interest shifted from animals to children, and he and his wife began to apply his
ethological methods to the study of autistic children:
In our studies, started in 1970, we pooled our experiences as a lifelong student 
of animal behaviour (N.T.) and as a lifelong childwatcher and childminder 
(E.A.T.) and found that this dual expertise helped us to understand a great deal 
about autism that the experts in the field have so far been unable to explain.54
The comparison of autistic people to animals is quite overt in this text, as Tinbergen is
explicitly drawing on his experience of studying animals in order to understand autistic
children. For example, in a discussion of his methods he writes:
One of the valuable skills that ethologists have developed -  have had to 
develop in their studies of often extremely wary wild animals -  is just the one 
we need when studying autistic children: that of observing without the animal 
or the child (the ‘subject’) being aware of the observer’s presence, (p. 20)
‘The animal’ and ‘the [autistic] child’ are clearly interchangeable here. In addition to
methods of observation, the Tinbergens also seek to understand autism by reference to
ideas from ethology such as ‘adaptedness’ and ‘motivational conflicts’ (p. 35). The
book contains many pages of discussion and illustrations of animal behaviour, such as
an illustration of an oystercatcher bird hammering open a mussel with its beak (p. 36).
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This way of representing and studying autistic children, while it may be effective, also 
increases the distance between the human observer and ‘the “subject”’.
One of the most significant ways in which autistic children are categorised as
nonhuman is the commonly-encountered idea that they do not ‘really’ use language to
express themselves, but just mimic as a result of training:
One cannot help getting the impression that the speech-sounds of autists are 
inadequately rooted in a human inwardness. They appear to us as mere 
imitation, a mimicry of what careful training by others has added to their 
corporality.55
This definition of autistic people as ‘not really speaking’ excludes them from the 
category of the human, since spoken language is central to humanist definitions of 
what it means to be human. The connection of ‘speech-sounds’ with ‘a human 
inwardness’, for example, is central to Descartes’ account of the difference between 
humans and animals or machines. The suggestion that autistic people’s speech is 
merely ‘mimicry’ without ‘a human inwardness’ categorises them with parrots and 
machines rather than ‘true humans’. This idea that human speech has a true 
‘inwardness’, while the speech of parrots and machines is ‘mere imitation [...] added to 
[...] corporality’, is examined at length in Chapter 3 of this thesis. For the moment, I 
want to note that this passage categorises autistic people as nonhuman by suggesting 
that they are ‘not really speaking’.
The quotation in the previous paragraph is taken from the 1971 book Infantile Autistic 
Behaviour and Experience: A New Clinical Picture. This text is a particularly 
disturbing example of the professional tendency to depict people with autism as 
nonhuman. It is primarily a case-study of one girl, Mariet, whom the author J. J. G. 
Prick characterises as an ‘infantile autistic’. Almost every sentence contains a
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reference to the ‘fully-human’ or ‘generally-human’ mode of being, which is explicitly
opposed to ‘autistic’. For example: ‘In their development autistic children do not
attain the level of the fully-human act of seeing, which is the optic encounter, and a
fully human mode of existence, realized by means of man’s eyes’ (p. 14). Throughout
the book, Mariet is represented as an inanimate object rather than a human subject.
There is no attempt to understand or even speculate about her experience of the world.
In fact, Prick suggests that she does not have a subjective experience of the world:
The infantile autistic mode of life is hardly a human existence at all; in fact, it is 
an undifferentiated, primitive, prepersonal (pathic) mode of life of a human 
being, in which all the revelations of a personal mode of existence, such as 
consciousness, mental insight, objective knowledge of persons and objects, 
creativity, affective and value experience, morality, freedom of choice, a fully- 
human encounter, voluntary speech, and other manifestations of human 
language are absent, (p. 18)
In this passage, Prick calls the humanness of Mariet and other ‘infantile autistics’ into
question ( ‘hardly a human existence’) and denies that she is a person (she is
‘prepersonal’). The depiction of Mariet in this text is perhaps more shocking when it
becomes evident that the author has known her throughout her life. The book includes
several pages of photographs, starting in Mariet’s infancy and progressing to her
teenage years, most of which show disconnected parts of her body. The last few
photographs concentrate disproportionately on her breasts and genital area, and are
accompanied by prurient text commenting on her ‘outsize asymmetrical and very
flabby breasts’, her ‘excessive’ pubic hair, and her ‘primitive hetero-erotic behavioural
patterns’ (p. 32). There are also similar photographs of Mariet’s mother naked,
included on the tenuous basis that some aspects of the condition may be inherited. In
sharp contrast to accounts like Oliver Sacks’ An Anthropologist on Mars, which try to
describe the lived experience of autistic people, this demeaning description presents
Mariet (or ‘our patient’) as a series of unconnected body parts and ‘primitive’
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behaviours. The text explicitly places her outside the category of the human, 
describing her as ‘hardly human’, and reduces her to a ‘corporality’ without 
subjectivity.
Other Minds: Border Figures and the Limits of the Human
This is an extreme example and the overt opposition of ‘human’ to ‘autistic’ seems 
outdated. However, the idea that people with autism are not fully human is still 
current, albeit expressed in more subtle ways. This can be seen in Understanding 
Other Minds: Perspectives from  Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, a collection 
of essays on autism and theory of mind which is a key text in the field. The second 
edition, published in 2000, reinscribes the attitude of Prick’s 1971 text in constructing 
autistic people as nonhuman. As well as referring to the general philosophical question 
of the ‘other minds problem’ (how and whether you can know for certain that other 
people have internal experiences of their own), the title also refers to understanding 
minds that work differently from the unmarked norm. Thus, even the title designates 
autistic people as ‘other’. In the Preface, the editors note the interdisciplinary nature of 
the subject:
The topic of theory of mind brings together scholars from a range of 
disciplines, including developmental psychopathology, child psychiatry, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, primatology, special education, developmental 
psycholinguistics, and philosophy, (p. vi)
What all of these disciplines have in common is that they all work to establish the
borders of the human. Primatology is concerned with the human/animal boundary,
developmental psychopathology and child psychiatry with the boundary between
normal and pathological human behaviour, cognitive science with the artificial/organic
intelligence boundary, and paleoanthropology with the chronological border between
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human and pre-human. As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, these nearly- 
human border figures are necessary in order to define what the human is: ‘I know I am 
human because I am not that\ 56 But this collection of disciplines also indicates an 
uncertainty over whose job it is to deal with those who fall in the marginal border areas 
of the human.
One of the central themes of the collection is the so-called ‘theory theory’: that is, the 
hypothesis that autistic people lack theory of mind. This hypothesis is presented in 
conjunction with the equally insistent claim that theory of mind is an ‘essentially 
human competence’.57 For example, in the first essay the editor Simon Baron-Cohen 
writes: ‘a theory of mind remains one of the quintessential abilities that makes us
co
human’. Similar views are expressed throughout the collection; for instance, Henry
Wellman and Kristin Lagattuta begin their essay by stating that ‘humans are social
creatures’,59 while Hiram Brownell et. al. claim that ‘theory of mind [...] represents a
crucial human ability” 60 This double-stranded argument, that theory of mind is an
essential part of being human, and that autistic people lack theory of mind, effectively
excludes autistic people from the category of the human. For example, in ‘Do
Chimpanzees Use their Gestures to Instruct Each Other?’ Daniel J. Povinelli and
Daniela O’Neill argue that chimpanzees do not have a theory of mind:
The findings that we have reported here add to a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that humans may have evolved a psychological specialization in 
representing other minds. [...] This difference may simply be symptomatic of a 
much more profound difference between humans and other primates, one 
connected to an ability to represent theoretical causes of both social and 
psychological events. [...] [This] may be part of a much more fundamental 
psychological difference between their species and our own.61
This argument that theory of mind is ‘one of the most fundamental cognitive
specializations of the human species’,62 in conjunction with the claim that autistic
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people lack theory of mind, situates them on the nonhuman side of the species divide.
A similar argument is made in the essay which appears next in the volume, Steven 
Mithen’s ‘Paleoanthropological Perspectives on the Theory of Mind’, which argues 
that theory of mind is ‘an essential feature of the modem mind’ which distinguishes 
humans from prehumans. Again, the overall effect of this is to exclude autistic people 
from the human species: this time by suggesting that they are not fully or correctly 
evolved.
The final essay in the volume is ‘Culture and Understanding Other Minds’, in which
Penelope G. Vinden and Janet Wilde Astington argue that autistic people lack the
ability to ‘make culture’ which ‘is grounded in establishing connections among human
beings’.64 They write:
Making that connection seems to be hard-wired in normal individuals. The 
Genesis account of creation says it well, as it tells of an instant recognition 
between two of the species: surely this is flesh of my flesh, and bone of my 
bone, or, to put it in more modem terms, ‘Now here is something I can relate 
to’, (p. 514)
They go on to argue that because of this lack of mutual recognition, ‘the [autistic] child 
will never truly be a part of the culture’ (p. 515). Since they state that ‘human beings 
are first and foremost culture-makers’ (p. 514) and then that ‘people with autism are in 
some sense individuals without a culture’ (p. 516), they are effectively claiming that 
autistic people are not fully human. Vinden and Astington then argue that ‘autistic 
individuals are a culture unto themselves’ and that they experience a permanent form 
of ‘culture shock’, which they compare to a person from the Western world suddenly 
finding themselves in ‘a small village in a Papua New Guinean or Brazilian rainforest’ 
(p. 516). But they then slip from using this as a metaphor or analogy, to actually
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suggesting that autistic children might do better in ‘a culture where there is less 
diversity’:
An environment where everyone dresses in grass skirts and bark breech clothes, 
where every day the main meal consists of taro and squash and greens cooked 
in a bamboo tube, where daily activities are limited to hunting or gardening -  in 
such an environment the autistic child might find less conflict and more 
security, (p. 516)
In this essay, the non-Westerner functions as a liminal figure which marks the border 
of the human. The ‘lack of diversity’ of rainforest cultures (itself a problematic claim) 
is likened to autistic people’s preference for repetitive behaviours and fear of change. 
Vinden and Astington’s essay differs from others in the volume in that they see 
‘culture-making’ rather than theory of mind as the sine qua non of being human. 
However, structurally it has the same effect of placing autistic people outside the 
category of the human.
The Violence of Species Norms: Punishment of Autistic People
I have shown how autistic people are represented as nonhuman; I now want to look at
what happens as a result of this representation. What happens to those who do not act
human correctly? What are the real effects of being excluded from the category of the
human? In the 1999 Preface to Gender Trouble, Judith Butler refers to ‘the violence of
gender norms’ (p. xix). She makes it clear that this is not only metaphysical violence,
but often a very physical one. She cites examples from her own experience:
An uncle incarcerated for his anatomically anomalous body, deprived of family 
and friends, living out his days in an ‘institute’ in the Kansas prairies; gay 
cousins forced to leave their homes because of their sexuality, real and 
imagined; my own tempestuous coming out at the age of 16; and a subsequent 
adult landscape of lost jobs, lovers, and homes, (p. xix)
As I will argue, these forms of punishment, such as institutionalisation and alienation,
are also common experiences for people with autism. Butler argues that ‘we regularly
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punish those who fail to do their gender right’ (p. 178). Similarly, autistic people are 
regularly punished for failing to do their humanness right, but unlike homophobic 
attacks, this is still generally seen as acceptable. Following Butler, I describe this 
treatment as the violence of human or species norms.
The enforcement of species norms is evident in the story of Temple Grandin’s squeeze 
machine. Grandin is a well-known person with autism, who has articulated her 
experiences in a number of books, articles, and interviews. She loves the sensation of 
being hugged, but finds it too frightening to have another person in such close 
proximity. So she designed and built a ‘squeeze machine’: a large mechanical wooden 
box with padded cushions on the inside, which gives her the physical sensation of a 
hug without feeling threatened. She describes it as making her feel ‘relaxed and calm’, 
and also giving her ‘feelings of kindness and gentleness toward other people’.65 
Grandin used her creativity, intelligence and technical skill to invent a novel solution 
for her emotional difficulties. It enables her to function as a self-supporting adult, not 
as a patient or victim. But humans are supposed to seek comfort from other human 
beings, not from machines. Furthermore, she ‘failed’ to be either ashamed or boastful 
about it: ‘she neither exhibited nor concealed [it] but kept [it] openly in her room at 
college’.66 Oliver Sacks recounts that Grandin’s machine ‘excited derision and 
suspicion and was seen by psychiatrists as a “regression” or “fixation” -  something 
that needed to be psychoanalysed and resolved’. Grandin was not unhappy, but she 
was not acting human correctly, and because of this, she was subjected to ‘derision and 
suspicion’ while her squeeze machine was considered to be something pathological 
that needed to be ‘resolved’.
As Grandin’s story demonstrates, psychiatrists are key figures in policing the 
boundaries of the human and enforcing human norms, even at the expense of the 
‘calmness and security’ of their patients. Psychology books and articles about autism 
often contain long lists and discussions of test results, but rarely make reference to the 
effect of undergoing what they themselves describe as ‘batteries’ of tests. Some 
autistic people, such as those who have an older sibling who is autistic, are ‘in the 
system’ from just a few months old and spend much of their lives subject to tests, 
experiments, enforced psychiatric treatment, and institutionalisation. In recent years, 
there has been growing resistance among autistic people in response to these exercises 
of power. This resistance has been described as the autistic liberation movement: an 
umbrella term for a growing number of autistic people who object to the kind of 
treatments or punishments outlined above.68 The people involved in the autistic 
liberation movement connect their own struggle to other campaigns such as civil rights, 
gay rights, and feminism, which sought ‘to broaden the category of the human to 
include previously abjected and excluded others’.69 Just as institutionalised 
mistreatment by families and professionals (described by Butler, above) produced the 
gay rights movement, the autistic liberation movement has a similar impetus, in that all 
or most of the autistic people involved have had personal experience of abuse or 
incarceration as a result of their autism.70 They oppose the idea of ‘curing’ autism, and 
argue that they are punished not for their own well-being, but because non-autistic 
people find their behaviour disturbing.
One result of the autistic liberation movement is a growing body of texts in which 
autistic people tell their own stories, such as Donna Williams’ autobiography Nobody 
Nowhere, discussed above, in which Williams recounts many incidents of violence
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inflicted on her by her parents, boyfriends, and others around her.71 Many essays by
autistic people have been assembled online in the Autism Information Library on
Autistics.org: The Real Voice o f  Autism. This website, an important resource for the
autistic liberation movement, is run ‘by and for autistics’ and one of its key aims is to
allow autistic people to speak for and represent themselves. For example, here they
describe the reasoning behind their slogan:
The Autism Society of America, an organization composed almost entirely of 
non-autistic people and controlled entirely by non-autistic people, which 
performs few if any useful functions for autistic people, and which on 
numerous occasions has advocated against the best interests of autistic people, 
has started to call itself ‘The Voice of Autism’. In our judgment, such hubris 
demands a response. So we've changed our tagline to ‘The Real Voice of 
Autism’.72
The Autism Information Library is a growing collection of writings by autistic people
(currently comprising around fifty articles), such as Amanda Baggs’ essay ‘This Is
What your “Treatments” Do to U s’. Describing the effect of enforced psychiatric
treatment, Baggs writes about her feelings of ‘trappedness’ and the sense that there is
no way out of hearing these scary people saying they want to cure us or drug us 
or kill us or lock us up whatever else they want to do with us, no way of 
changing anything because I'm stuck here until I die.73
Texts such as this confirm that encounters with the psychiatric profession are
frequently experienced as punitive by autistic people. The punishment of autistic
people for failing to conform to species norms often spills into real physical violence.
The widespread acceptance of violence towards autistic people is indicated in this
passage:
My parents always presupposed that I was ‘broken’ and needed to be ‘fixed’ - 1 
think it simply never occurred to them that being different was not the same 
thing as being bad. [...] [The counsellors] didn’t even bat an eyelash when I 
described, in session, how my parents treated me. Even when I told them about 
my father picking me up bodily off the floor, flinging me across the room, 
slamming me into a wall, and screaming profanity at me -  all for the horrid, 
horrid, crime of stimming -  the co u n se llo rs  didn’t even blink.74
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This anonymous essay indicates that not only families but even professionals may 
accept extreme violence towards autistic people to punish them for not acting human in 
the right way: another instance of ‘the forcible citation of a norm’.75
These punishments are often intended to force the autistic person to conform to species 
norms: to ‘learn to ape human behaviour’, as one autistic family put it.76 The 
possibility of deliberately and consciously learning to act human is explored in an 
anonymous 2003 essay entitled ‘Faking NT vs. Being Yourself’, which argues that this 
performance is both ‘exhausting and depressing’ and bound to fail, since ‘no act is ever 
perfect, especially not when you’re exhausted from having to do it for most of your 
waking life’.77 The author argues that it is not worth the immense effort of consciously 
acting human ‘just so the NTs [‘neurologically typical’ or non-autistic people] don’t 
have to be uncomfortable with seeing me talk to myself, or drum my fingers on the 
back of my head, or perseverate on topics that they find boring or weird’. In fact, the 
author writes that s/he has been driven to the brink of suicide by attempting to ‘pass’ as 
neurologically typical. In Gender Trouble, Butler asks: ‘How must we rethink the 
ideal morphological constraints upon the human such that those who fail to 
approximate the norm are not condemned to a death within life?’ (p. xx). Many of the 
autistic people quoted here feel that they have been ‘condemned to a death within life’ 
because their body does not conform to the correct patterns of human behaviour; 
because they drum their fingers on their head, or ‘stim’, they ‘fail to approximate the 
norm’. The bodies of autistic people are regarded as incoherent, and their physical 
movements as frightening and ‘unintelligible’ (p. xxiii). There is clearly a pressing 
ethical need to rethink the ‘constraints upon the human’ in order to improve the way 
that autistic people are treated.
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Autism, Ethics and Power: Re-evaluating the Human
Autistic liberation activists demand that the category of the human be enlarged or
altered to include autistic people; for example, on Neurodiversity.org Kathleen Seidel
argues that ‘autism is as much a part of humanity as is the capacity to dream’.78
However, while this is no doubt politically and pragmatically necessary, it is also
problematic because it retains the term ‘human’ and means that power still rests with
those who decide who is allowed into this privileged category, since the goal is to have
autism accepted as ‘part of humanity’. This has also been noted by Cary Wolfe in
relation to Disability Studies. He writes:
But a fundamental problem with the liberal humanist model [is] [...] that in its 
very attempt to recognize the unique difference and specific ethical value of the 
other, it reinstates the very normative model of subjectivity that it insists is the 
problem in the first place.79
If the autistic liberation movement thus inadvertently ‘reinstates’ the ‘normative model
of subjectivity’, an alternative or supplementary strategy is to reconfigure the
relationship between autism and the human, so that the human is not automatically
considered superior.
An example of this ‘new and more inclusive form of ethical pluralism’, as Wolfe 
phrases it,80 is the way that Temple Grandin has reappropriated the identification of 
autistic people with animals. Instead of protesting about this association and thereby 
implying that both animals and autistic people are inferior to neurologically typical 
humans, she uses it to argue that her autism gives her a privileged insight into animal 
behaviour. In her 2005 book Animals in Translation: Using the Mysteries o f Autism to 
Decode Animal Behaviour (co-authored with Catherine Johnson), Grandin writes:
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Autistic people can think the way animals think. Of course, we also think the 
way people think -  we aren’t that different from normal humans. Autism is a 
kind of way station on the road from animals to humans, which puts autistic 
people like me in a perfect position to translate ‘animal talk’ into English. I can 
tell people why their animals are doing the things they do. (pp. 6-7)
Grandin re-evaluates the relationships between animals, ‘normal humans’, and autistic
people, such that the ‘normal human’ is no longer the privileged site of power and
knowledge. Rather than being disabled by her autism, she has used her abilities to
pursue a very successful career. In addition to her academic work, she is employed by
many major companies to design and audit slaughterhouses and other equipment for
meat-packing plants. Grandin specialises in solving problems which arise when
animals panic or refuse to move in certain locations. In Animals in Translation, she
argues that her autism enables her to do this job better than a non-autistic person:
It took me fifteen years to figure out that other people actually couldn ’t see 
what the problem was, at least not without a lot of training and practice. They 
couldn’t see it because they weren’t visually oriented the way animals and 
autistic people are. I always find it kind of funny that normal people are always 
saying autistic children ‘live in their own little world’. [...] There’s a great big, 
beautiful world out there that a lot of normal folks are just barely taking in. It’s 
like dogs hearing a whole register of sound we can’t. Autistic people and 
animals are seeing a whole register of the visual world normal people can’t, or 
don’t, (p. 24)
Here, Grandin’s autism enables her to examine and critique the ‘normal’ human from 
the outside. This means that ‘human’ is no longer the privileged, unmarked centre.
Another way in which autistic people can reappropriate their exclusion from the 
category of the human is to use this perspective to comment on ‘normal’ human culture 
from the outside. For example, several autistic people compare themselves to 
extraterrestrials (one of the most extreme ways in which autistic people are depicted as 
nonhuman). This can be negative, for example the autistic family described by Oliver 
Sacks who identify with the character Data from Star Trek: an android who, in Sacks’
words, ‘longs, above all, to be human’.81 This longing is understandable, since to be
human is to be part of the dominant, powerful group. However, this identification with
extraterrestrials can also be used to empower the autistic person. Sacks’ book title An
Anthropologist on Mars derives from a comment made by Temple Grandin: ‘[she] was
stumped by more complex emotions and the games people play. “Much of the time,”
she said, “I feel like an anthropologist on Mars’” .82 Although this partly represents
Grandin as lacking, since she is ‘stumped’ by some human behaviour, being an
anthropologist is also a position with unique insight and power. The anthropologist is
traditionally an outsider who does not understand all of the customs and rituals of the
tribe, but who is nevertheless in a position of power precisely because s/he can bring
comparative knowledge from another place and can view the tribe from an external
position. And the anthropologist is the person who has the ultimate privilege of
writing an account of the tribe from his or her own viewpoint. Indeed, in the case of
being ‘an anthropologist on M ars’, Grandin represents herself as the intrepid space
traveller, and ‘normal’ humans are the Martians. Jim Sinclair, an autistic man,
describes his experience in a similar way:
Each of us [autistic people] who does learn to talk to you, each of us who 
manages to function at all in your society, each of us who manages to reach out 
and make a connection with you, is operating in alien territory, making contact 
with alien beings. We spend our entire lives doing this. And then you tell us 
that we can’t relate.83
Sinclair here represents autistic people as the travellers who have the ability and
determination to communicate with an alien culture and learn alien customs: for
example, how to recognise emotions from facial expressions.84
This ability to view ‘normal’ human culture from the outside can also be expressed 
through satire. For example, The Institute for the Study of the Neurologically Typical,
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on the Autistics.org website, satirises the way that autistic people are exploited and
categorised as inferior. The autistic creator of the site writes:
Neurotypical syndrome is a neurobiological disorder characterized by 
preoccupation with social concerns, delusions of superiority, and obsession 
with conformity. [...] When in groups NTs are socially and behaviorally rigid, 
and frequently insist upon the performance of dysfunctional, destructive, and 
even impossible rituals as a way of maintaining group identity.85
This passage describes the group behaviour of ‘neurologically typical’ humans as a
‘performance’ of ‘rituals’. Writing from a position of exclusion, the author views
‘normal’ human interaction as an artificial act. This again challenges the traditional
power relations between non-autistic and autistic people by placing the autistic person
in the position of observing subject, and the ‘NTs’ as the object of their scrutiny: a
direct reversal of the traditional relationship. These texts are examples of ways in
which the category of the human can be revalued, and they demonstrate that exclusion
from that category can be used to challenge the dominant assumptions of humanism.
The fact that it is possible to ‘fake NT’ or to ‘make contact with alien beings’ shows
that acting human is something that can be learned. Like gender performance, while it
is for most people a primarily unconscious performance, it can also be performed
consciously and purposefully, as in cross-dressing or drag.
Human Drag
In Gender Trouble, Butler argues that while drag can reinforce stereotyped gender 
roles, it also has the potential to subvert the idea of natural genders: ‘In imitating 
gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itse lf (p. 175). This is 
because ‘gender parody reveals that the original identity after which gender fashions 
itself is an imitation without an origin’ (p. 175). If a man can perform femininity, the 
act does not require a female essence, so there is no reason to believe that a woman’s
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femininity is a manifestation of core gender identity. If external acts are not
necessarily the effect of an internal essence, this essence does not need to exist at all.
As Joan Riviere writes:
The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where I draw the line 
between genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade’. My suggestion is not, 
however, that there is any such difference; whether radical or superficial, they 
are the same thing.86
Riviere breaks down the binary opposition between ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ womanliness, 
between ‘radical’ and ‘superficial’ gendered acts. What could constitute an equivalent 
practice in the constitution of the human? What would it mean to do ‘human drag’?
I have already discussed the practice of autistic people consciously learning and 
performing ‘normal’ human behaviour. But it is not only people who can act human.
In contemporary culture and media, there are many examples of animals literally 
dressed up as humans, such as the chimpanzees from the PG Tips advertisements, 
William Wegman’s photographs of dogs posing as film stars, and the astonishingly 
popular pet clothing industry, to name but a few. These animals are performing a very 
literal type of ‘human drag’. They are cross-dressing across species rather than gender 
lines, but as Marjorie Garber has argued, cross-dressing has an ‘extraordinary power 
[...] to disrupt, expose and challenge’ binary oppositions in general by producing a 
‘category crisis’:
By ‘category crisis’ I mean a failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that 
becomes permeable, that permits of border crossings from one (apparently 
distinct) category to another: black/white, Jew/Christian, noble/bourgeois, 
master/servant, master/slave.87
I find Garber’s analysis very convincing, but it is notable that human/animal or
human/nonhuman does not appear in this, or in any of the other lists of binary
163
oppositions in Vested Interests. Indeed, interspecies cross-dressing is one of the few 
types of transvestism that Garber does not explicitly discuss in her book.88
However, the figure of the animal repeatedly appears in the text at odd moments.
Right at the beginning, in the Acknowledgements, Garber thanks the Chair of the 
Harvard Department of Anthropology for his account of ‘his own transvestic 
adventures among the baboons, whose preference for female human company led him 
on at least one occasion to cross-dress in the hopes of fooling them into amiability. 
(They were not deceived)’ (p. xi). There are no further details of this intriguing story. 
Elsewhere she uses the metaphor of ‘a dog walking on its hind legs’ to represent the 
idea of cross-dressing as ‘a stunt or a trick’, in opposition to a more institutionalised 
and meaningful practice of transvestism (pp. 37-38). During a discussion of butch- 
femme lesbian couples imitating heterosexual norms, she refers to ‘the aping of 
heterosexual roles’, and in the same paragraph she cites two instances of women who 
were mocked for wearing men’s clothes by being called ‘it’ rather than ‘he’ or ‘she’: 
“7f”’ is the word that stings, the third category, dehumanized and dehumanizing’ (p. 
148). In this passage, the uncertainty over gender leads to a ‘dehumanization’. This is 
tantalisingly close to Butler’s argument that the construction of a coherent human 
subject depends upon the construction of an unambiguous gender. However, Garber 
does not take it any further.
Indeed, she seems determined to avoid discussing the human/animal boundary, even 
when it is overtly present. In Chapter 7, ‘Fear of Flying, or Why Is Peter Pan a 
Woman?’, Garber analyses the J. M. Barrie story Little White Bird, in which the 
character of Peter Pan appears in print for the first time. In the story, Peter is
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diagnosed by ‘the wise old bird, Solomon Caw’ as ‘suffering from a kind of species
dysphoria’, as Garber puts it (p. 174). Caw, who is a crow, tells Peter that he will be
neither ‘exactly a human’ nor ‘exactly a bird’, but rather, ‘a Betwixt-and-Between’.89
For Garber, this ‘species dysphoria’ is simply an allegory for gender dysphoria:
‘A Betwixt-and-Between’. This is the ‘third sex’ in yet another guise, 
transparently displaced onto the antithesis between bird and human, but 
representing as well the dichotomies that both consciously and unconsciously 
obsess Barrie and his works. Man/woman, father/mother, man/boy. (p. 175)
I am not convinced, as Garber is, that the species dichotomy is nothing more than a
metaphor for these other oppositions, or a transparent displacement of Barrie’s
‘obsessions’ about gender, age, and sexuality. The ‘dichotomies’ she mentions are
indeed present in Little White Bird , but so is the human/animal dichotomy, the blurring
of which runs through the story. The protagonist’s dog, Porthos, is one of the main
characters and is described as being uncannily like a human being: ‘He has even been
to the club, where he waddles up the stairs so exactly like some respected member that
he makes everybody most uncomfortable’ (p. 38). Porthos repeatedly stands in for the
protagonist’s imaginary son Timothy, whom he has invented to explain why he buys
children’s toys. When people ask awkward questions about Timothy’s development,
he answers with his dog in mind:
It is well that dogs and little boys have so much in common, for it was really of 
Porthos I told him; how he slept (peacefully), how he woke up (supposed to be 
subject to dreams), how he fell off again (with one little hand on his nose), but I 
glided past what we put in his bath (carbolic and a mop), (p. 44)
In fact an entire chapter of the book, ‘David and Porthos Compared’, is devoted to a
detailed comparison of boy and dog. The characterisation of Porthos alone is full of
fascinating cross-species moments.
There is another, even stranger, human/animal transgression in Little White Bird, 
which is the idea that all children begin their lives as birds: ‘They came out of the eggs 
daily [...]; then off they soon flew to be humans, and other birds came out of other 
eggs; and so it went on for ever’ (p. 104). The transformation from bird to human is 
not instantaneous. It takes time for babies to realise it and to settle into their new 
species ‘for, having been birds before they were human, they are naturally a little wild 
during the first few weeks, and very itchy at the shoulders, where their wings used to 
be’ (p. 100). However, Peter managed to fly out of the nursery window when he was 
only a week old. This is why he will never grow any older, and why he can fly: ‘The 
reason is that he escaped from being a human when he was seven days old; he escaped 
by the window and flew back to the Kensington Gardens’ (p. 99). When Peter flies 
back to the park, he does not realise that he is human, and is confused by the way that 
all the birds and fairies in the park run away from him and treat him as an enemy: 
‘Peter heard the little people crying everywhere that there was a human in the Gardens 
after Lock-out Time, but he never thought for a moment that he was the human’ (p. 
102). It is in this context that the conversation takes place between Solomon Caw and 
Peter Pan, as recounted by Garber. Caw forces Peter to look at his own body, to 
recognise -  to his horror -  that it is a human body and not a bird’s: “‘Ruffle your 
feathers,” said that grim old Solomon, and Peter tried most desperately hard to ruffle 
his feathers, but he had none’ (p. 103). When Garber analyses this scene, she reads 
‘through’ the discourse of species (to use Cary W olfe’s term)90 in order to read into it 
her account of Barrie’s sexual desires. However, as I have argued, the discourse of 
species in Little White Bird  is complex and fascinating in itself. It suggests that each 
child must undergo a process of becoming human: indeed, must learn to realise that it
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is human. Peter never becomes fully human, but remains a ‘poor little half-and-half 
(p. 103).
In the concluding chapter of Vested Interests, Garber turns to the figure of the wolf, 
especially in relation to Freud’s case history of the Wolf-Man and the fairy tales Little 
Red Riding Hood and The W olf and the Seven Little Goats. In both of these tales, the 
wolf cross-dresses, in one case as Little Red Riding Hood’s grandmother, and in the 
other as the mother of the seven little goats. Garber’s main argument is that instead of 
reading the cross-dressing in these stories as representative of something else, such as 
feminism, female sexuality, becoming an adult, desire versus control, or civilisation 
versus wilderness, people should consider it on its own account, as cross-dressing. She 
argues:
I began this book by noting how frequently the phenomenon of cross-dressing, 
or transvestism, is looked through rather than at in critical and cultural analyses 
-  how often, indeed how insistently, cultural observers have tried to make it 
mean something, anything, other than itself, (p. 389)
Although I agree with Garber, what she says here about transvestism also applies to her
own text when it comes to looking at animals, and at cross-species cross-dressing. In
her reading of Little White Bird  she considers the species discourse to be a transparent
displacement of obsessions with gender and sexuality.
Similarly, in her analysis of the fairy tales and the figure of the wolf, she looks 
Through rather than at’ the animal figures and the destabilising of the species 
boundaries. For example, Freud traces the wolf phobia of his patient to illustrations 
from the two fairy tales mentioned above. Garber criticises Freud for failing to notice 
or consider as significant the gender-transgression of the wolves in both the stories: 
‘what he does not point out is that in both stories the wolf is a (grand)mother as well as
a father-substitute, and that in both he is masquerading as a woman’ (p. 385).
However, to turn the argument back on itself, what Garber does not point out is that in 
both the stories the wolf masquerades as a different species as well as a different 
gender. In Little Red Riding Hood, the male wolf disguises himself as a female human, 
and in The W olf and the Seven Little Goats, as a female goat. This is a classic example 
of the way that performing as human and performing as a particular gender are 
‘powerfully articulated through one another’, to paraphrase Butler.91 In another aside, 
Garber notes that Freud ‘holds up the possibility that the boy had seen copulation 
between animals (sheep-dogs standing in for wolves), and then transferred this new 
understanding onto the puzzle of parents in bed together’ (p. 388). Once again, there is 
cross-species slippage between animal and human, and between dogs and wolves; 
even the ‘sheep-dog’ is a hybrid term, like wolf-man. But by claiming that the species 
transgression must be a ‘displacement’ of something else, it seems that Garber is 
making it ‘mean something, anything, other than itse lf (p. 389). This seems to close 
down the possibilities, whereas by reading the way that both gender and species are 
represented in these stories, one can gain a more nuanced understanding of their 
interplay.
Of course, animals are very frequently used in the way that Garber reads the wolf here, 
as symbols for aspects of human behaviour. This is one type of ‘thinking with 
animals’, as described by Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman in their introduction to 
Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism : that humans use 
animals ‘to think with’ as you might use fingers ‘to count with’. Humans ‘recruit 
animals to symbolize, dramatize, and illuminate aspects of their own experience’.92 
The other meaning is thinking together with animals, in the sense of sharing ‘a
community of thought and feeling’. I want to look at, rather than through, cross­
species performances: to read them as examples of the discourse of species, not as 
allegories or symbols. Daston and Mitman identify two axes of anthropomorphism, 
which they categorise as anthropos: ‘the performance of being human by animals and 
being animal by humans’ and morphos: ‘the transformative processes that make 
thinking with animals possible’.93 I would argue that the very possibility of these 
performances and transformations disrupts the idea of a human essence. Just as 
Riviere argues that there is no difference between ‘genuine womanliness and the 
“masquerade”’, animals who act human cast doubt on the naturalness of people who do 
the same thing. The fact that a nonhuman is able to perform ‘human’ acts means that 
the behaviour is not necessarily an external indicator of an internal human essence.
The certainty of Descartes’ test is threatened if behaviour does not have to correspond 
to core identity. Therefore, from a humanist perspective, cross-species performances 
are dangerous, and must be categorised as false: as anthropomorphism.
A Brief History of Anti-anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism has been a pejorative term for a long time, but in recent years this 
has begun to change. In 1992 John S. Kennedy, an old-fashioned behaviourist, wrote 
The New Anthropomorphism , a scathing attack on what he saw as a dangerous 
resurgence of anthropomorphism within scientific writing. Kennedy’s book provoked 
responses from diverse subject areas, the range of which can be seen in collections 
such as Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, and Daston and Mitman’s 
Thinking with Animals 94 There are endless arguments about whether 
anthropomorphism is an unjustifiable contamination of scientific truth, or can play a 
valid part in understanding the world. However, the relationship of this debate to
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humanism is not straightforward. Anthropomorphism can reinforce humanism by 
being anthropocentric, if it sees all other animals merely as versions or reflections of 
the human.95 However, it can also challenge humanism by recognising shared 
characteristics between humans and other animals and challenging the borders that 
separate them.
The word anthropomorphism did not appear in English until the mid-eighteenth 
century, and did not originally refer to animals, but to gods.96 The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines it as ‘ascription of a human form and attributes to the Deity’, with a 
more general ‘ascription of a human attribute or personality to anything impersonal or 
irrational’ as a secondary definition.97 But this footnote in Wolfgang Kohler’s The 
Mentality o f Apes reveals that it was in common use in reference to animals by the 
1920s:
The term ‘measuring’ is no ‘anthropomorphism’. At any time it may be 
observed that a chimpanzee, before making a wide jump at a considerable 
height, looks carefully to and fro across the intervening space. As an arboreal 
animal with immense range of spring and the need to use it, he must be able to 
measure distances. It would be quite unjustifiable to object to the use of the
Q O
term ‘measuring’ in this connexion.
Since Kohler is here pre-emptively defending himself against accusations of 
anthropomorphism, it is clear that it was already being used pejoratively. This text was 
written at a time when the new science of behaviourism, or behavioural psychology, 
was at its peak. One of the key aspects of behaviourism was a rejection of the animal 
studies of the nineteenth century, such as Darwin’s, which tended to include anecdotal 
evidence and anthropomorphic descriptions: for example attributing emotional states to 
dogs.99 The rejection of anthropomorphism can be traced back to 1894 when C. Lloyd 
Morgan wrote: ‘In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of an exercise of 
a high psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one
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which stands lower in the psychological scale’.100 Morgan’s Canon, as it is known, 
marks a change from nineteenth-century anthropomorphism to twentieth-century 
behaviourism.101
A seminal behaviourist text is John B. W atson’s Behavior: An Introduction to
Comparative Psychology, first published in 1914, in which he argues for a new
practice of psychology that would avoid the complex metaphysical arguments entailed
by considering factors such as consciousness and intention. The aim of behaviourism
was to analyse all animals, including humans, only on the basis of empirically
observable actions:
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental 
branch of natural science. [...] The behaviorist attempts to get a unitary scheme 
of animal response. He recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The 
behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of 
his total field of investigation.102
As can be seen from this passage, behaviourism initially discarded assumptions of
human superiority. In Behavior, Watson exhorts behaviourists to follow the example
of post-Darwinian zoologists and reject anthropocentrism: T h e  moment zoology
undertook the experimental study of evolution and descent, the situation immediately
changed. Man ceased to be the center of reference’ (p. 5). Thus, as originally
conceived, behaviourism treated humans as one animal among many others, whose
behaviour should be analysed without referring to internal mental states. As Elizabeth
Knoll writes, ‘Morgan’s Canon is a double-edged sword [...]: if we cannot
103anthropomorphize the animals, we cannot anthropomorphize ourselves either’.
This line of thought, which considers humans in terms o f their behaviour and without 
reference to a soul or mind, can be traced back to La M ettrie’s eighteenth-century text
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Man a Machine. Unlike Descartes, La Mettrie does not consider that humans have an
intangible quality that makes them absolutely distinct from other animals; rather, as the
title indicates, he argues that ‘the human body is a machine which winds its own
springs’ (p. 93). Influenced by the clockwork machines and new discoveries in
anatomy of the eighteenth century, La Mettrie asks: ‘How can human nature be known,
if we may not derive any light from an exact comparison of the structure of man and of
animals?’ (p. 98). This view of ‘human nature’ leads La Mettrie to reject the idea of an
absolute difference between humans and other animals. He writes:
For it is this, this strong analogy, which forces all scholars and wise judges to 
confess that these proud and vain beings, more distinguished by their pride than 
by the name of men however much they may wish to exalt themselves, are at 
bottom only animals and machines which, though upright, go on all fours, (p. 
143)
Whereas for Descartes, acting human invariably follows from being human, La Mettrie 
shares with the behaviourists an emphasis on the external ‘structure’ and behaviour of 
humans and animals, rather than intangible aspects such as consciousness and reason.
However, as behaviourism developed, writers became increasingly desperate to avoid
the dreaded accusation of anthropomorphism. In The Singing Gorilla: Understanding
Animal Intelligence, George Page explains the extent to which behaviourists went to
avoid ‘anthropomorphic pitfalls’:
They wouldn’t use a phrase like ‘the dog threatened the cat’ because the term 
‘threaten’ anthropomorphically implies some kind of mental state (some 
intention or purpose) on the part of the animal. They might not even have said 
the dog ‘raised its right leg’, because this innocuous verb implies the intention 
to do so. It would be safer to put the phrase in the passive voice: ‘the right leg is 
raised’ or ‘the right leg goes up’.104
Whereas Watson’s original formulation meant that the animal’s potential internal state
was unknowable to the human observer, his followers ended up denying that an animal
could have any internal life at all. Like Descartes’ view that there would be no way of
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telling the difference between an ‘animal that lacks reason’ and a machine that exactly 
resembled it in ‘organs and outward shape’, animals are seen as machines who act in a 
particular way without any internal reason or knowledge. In its extreme form, anti­
anthropomorphism extends to claiming that animals have absolutely no internal life 
whatsoever and that they do not even feel pain.105
While behaviourism may theoretically also assume this to be true of humans, the fact
that all behaviourists are humans who experience their own internal lives tends to
create the idea that qualities such as consciousness, intelligence and emotion ‘belong’
exclusively to the human. To suggest that any other animal has them is to be
anthropomorphic. For example, here is a critical review by Thomas Sebeok of John C.
Lilly’s 1961 book Man and Dolphin:
Lilly’s anthropomorphic imagination is given physical force: ‘M an’ is printed 
in roman type, ‘and Dolphin’ contrastively in italics. His work is imbued with 
what Ruskin called the ‘pathetic fallacy’, the rhetorical device which 
humanizes animals or which, applied downward, projects man into the 
nonhuman world. The author himself is well aware of this but his metaphoric 
intuition proves stronger than his scientific discipline.106
Sebeok’s description of the pathetic fallacy as being ‘applied downward’ suggests that
he subscribes to a hierarchical view of the animal world in which humans occupy the
highest position, and to argue that any other animal shares certain qualities with ‘us’ is
to commit the ‘pathetic fallacy’. In fact, far from being anthropomorphic, Lilly’s point
is that dolphins are not like humans; he argues that ‘we must strip ourselves, as far as
possible, of our preconceptions about the relative place of Homo Sapiens in the scheme
of nature’.107 For Lilly, humans do not have an unmarked, objective view of the world,
but rather are situated within that world in a specific way: for example, being bipedal
and living on dry land. Explicitly placing his work in the anti-anthropocentric tradition
of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud, he argues that ‘man must once more remove himself
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from the centre of the universe’ (p. 94). He argues repeatedly against 
anthropomorphism:
We cannot and should not endow this animal with human purposes and human 
ideals. We should not attribute to him kinds of knowledge that belong to human 
experience and tradition but not to dolphin experience and tradition. It would 
certainly be a mistake to ‘put a man’ in the dolphin’s brain, (pp. 92-93)
It is therefore inaccurate to describe his work as ‘anthropomorphic’ since he
specifically argues against changing dolphins into a human ‘shape’. It seems that his
work is dismissed as anthropomorphic simply because he considers the possibility that
dolphins may have intelligence and traditions that are outside human knowledge. To
consider that these properties ‘belong’ exclusively to the human is itself
anthropocentric.108
Seductive Pollution
A similarly strong condemnation of anthropomorphism runs through Kennedy’s The 
New Anthropomorphism. Kennedy depicts anthropomorphism as a kind of virus, 
against which we can be ‘inoculated’.109 He describes it as a ‘disease’ and a ‘malady’ 
(p. 160), and argues that ‘we can be confident that anthropomorphism will be brought 
under control, even if it cannot be cured completely’ (p. 167). His overall argument is 
that anthropomorphism is almost impossible to resist, because it is ‘built in’ to the 
human brain. He writes: ‘Since anthropomorphism appears to be in large measure 
“human nature” our attempts to free ourselves from it are quite literally “against human 
nature” and must often fail’ (p. 155). This view that anthropomorphism is innate is 
shared by Daston and Mitman, who note that ‘humans think with animals and that they 
do so compulsively’; in their opinion, this is a good reason to ask ‘what is it good for,
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and how is it done?’.110 But for Kennedy, it is something to be fought, even if that
fight is doomed. For example, he writes:
The scientific study of animal behaviour was inevitably marked from birth by 
its anthropomorphic parentage and to a significant extent it still is. It has had to 
struggle to free itself from this incubus and the struggle is not over. (pp. 3-4)
Incubus, a medieval term for a male demon who has sexual intercourse with women
while they are asleep, is a strange word to use here. This passage creates a bizarre
image of behavioural science as a struggling child being raped by a demon -
anthropomorphism -  who is also its parent. This sexual imagery is not an isolated
example. Elsewhere, Kennedy argues that ‘anthropomorphic bias’ is the reason that
behavioural ecology is a ‘seductive’ subject (p. 56). And he quotes this warning from
the ‘radical behaviourist’ Clark Hull: ‘Even when fully aware of anthropomorphic
subjectivism and its dangers, the most careful and experienced thinker is likely to find
himself a victim to its seduction’ (p. 32). Anthropomorphism is depicted as an almost
irresistible, sexually desirable figure.
According to Kennedy, although anthropomorphism is evil, it is simultaneously 
essential to being human. He claims that the ability to anthropomorphise (or rather, the 
inability to resist anthropomorphising) was the catalyst of humans’ evolutionary 
progress: ‘The neurophysiological capacity for such inversion could well have been the 
key new feature that enabled Homo sapiens to “take o f f” (p. 30). So while 
anthropomorphism must be resisted, at the same time it is an integral part of being- 
human: a ‘powerful and pervasive’ force (p. 151). In fact, Kennedy 
anthropomorphises anthropomorphism, turning it into a cross between a contagious 
virus, a predatory demon, and an overbearing parent. Anthropomorphism is always 
already there, always already part of what it means to be human. It must exist in order
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for the human subject to come into being, and yet it must also be resisted in order to 
protect the superiority of the human. Anthropomorphising is an act that signifies that 
we are human, and yet simultaneously endangers that category by threatening to allow 
animals into it.
The New Anthropomorphism  was written in 1992, at the height of the moral panic 
about HIV and AIDS, which may have influenced Kennedy’s metaphors of 
transmission, contagion and dangerous sexuality. The image of an incubus, a 
specifically sexual, penetrating demon, suggests that the borders of the body and of the 
human are disconcertingly permeable. As Mary Douglas argues, ‘the orifices of the 
body [...] symbolise [the] specially vulnerable points’ of any structure of ideas.111 
Kennedy’s representation of anthropomorphism as a contagious disease also appears in 
other texts: for example, Emanuela Cenami Spada comments that ‘if 
anthropomorphism is a disease, this remedy cures its symptoms without affecting its 
causes’,112 and Hank Davis writes ‘this germ proved to be highly contagious and has 
contributed to the present epidemic of anthropomorphism’.113 These descriptions 
suggest that anthropomorphism is dangerous because it is an act of pollution that blurs 
the borders of the human: as Douglas argues, ‘all margins are dangerous. If they are 
pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental experience is altered’ (p. 121). In the 
case of the margins between one species and another, especially when one of these 
species is the human, there is particular danger. Anthropomorphism disrupts the 
humanist attempt to fix and secure the boundaries between human and animal, and is 
therefore seen as an act of pollution.
But why is this pollution considered so dangerous? In Purity and Danger, Douglas 
emphasises that while the structure of pollution is cross-cultural, nevertheless ‘each 
culture has its own special risks and problems’ (p. 121). That is, a contamination of 
the categories ‘human’ and ‘animal’ is not intrinsically problematic; the attention given 
to it is specific to our cultural context. Indeed, as Freud writes, many cultures are 
founded on the affinities that connect humans and animals, as shown in the concept of 
a totem or clan animal.114 Similarly, H. Lyn Miles notes that ‘in cultures where 
humans live with or near other primates, the similarities between monkeys, apes, and 
humans are readily recognized and reflected in world views which stress biological and 
psychological continuity’.115 Therefore, anthropomorphism need not necessarily be 
construed in a negative way, and the fear and distaste associated with it are culturally 
specific. Furthermore, only certain instances of anthropomorphic pollution are 
considered dangerous. While some examples of anthropomorphism are attacked 
vehemently, others are permitted within humanist culture. I will now look in more 
detail at which instances of anthropomorphism are considered acceptable and which 
are considered dangerous, and discuss the reasons for this difference.
PG, Pathe and Puns: Acceptable Anthropomorphism
Perhaps the best-known type of safe anthropomorphism is the appearance of animals 
literally in ‘human drag’ in many television programmes, films and adverts. One of 
the most famous examples of this is the PG Tips advertising campaign featuring 
chimpanzees. In 1956, inspired by the popularity of the daily Chimpanzee Tea Party at 
London Zoo, Brooke Bond began a series of adverts starring chimpanzees dressed in 
clothes and with human voices overdubbed. This became the longest-running 
advertising campaign of all time.116 The chimps perform as humans in a variety of
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scenarios: cycling in the Tour de France, trying to get a piano downstairs, sailing a 
boat, and even a James Bond spoof ( ‘The name’s Bond. Brooke Bond’).117 The 
adverts were so popular that a large amount of spin-off chimpanzee-themed 
merchandise was produced, such as egg-cups, cuddly toys, ceramic figurines and tea- 
towels.118
The PG Tips chimpanzees represent a strand of British popular culture of the mid­
twentieth century which features chimpanzees acting like humans.119 There is a wealth 
of this material in the British Pathe online archive.120 Pathe made short films which 
were shown in cinemas in Britain between the years 1910 and 1970. They include 
newsreels and various ‘cinemagazines’ such as the Gazette, the Pathetone Weekly and 
the Pathe Pictorial. Animals are staple features of these films, with approximately 
three hundred films of chimpanzees alone. Apart from news stories, such as the 
chimpanzees who were sent into space, the films fall into a few broad categories. The 
most common are performances presented purely as entertainment, such as ice-skating, 
walking a tightrope, or playing the guitar: the kind of acts that a human entertainer 
might also perform. Similar, but distinct, are those films in which chimps perform 
everyday human activities such as gardening, taking a bath or painting a wall. Other 
popular subjects include intelligence tests and psychological tests, films in which 
human women ‘mother’ baby chimps or gorillas, and films of apes painting pictures. 
While different types were more popular at different times (for example, the 
intelligence tests are mostly from the 1930s, and the ‘ape art’ films all from the late 
1950s and early 1960s), they are all unashamedly full of overt anthropomorphism.
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It is noticeable that the vast majority of the Pathe films discussed above feature apes 
mimicking human behaviour. Indeed, the general cultural interest in apes stems from a 
fascination with their similarity to humans, as indicated by the word itself, which refers 
to both a category of animals (humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and
191gibbons) and to the act of mimicking. However, these two meanings cannot be 
separated from each other. From the very earliest representations of nonhuman apes in 
western culture, they have been depicted as satirical copies of humans. The M. S. 
Bodley 764, a thirteenth-century bestiary compiled from sources dating back to the 
seventh century A.D., states: ‘Apes are so called because they ape the behaviour of 
rational human beings’.122 This seems to suggest that the verb, the idea of aping 
‘rational human beings’, preceded the noun. In medieval times, the phrase ‘to put an 
ape in his hood’ meant to make a fool of someone, especially by cuckolding him. The 
Canterbury Tales contain several references to ‘making an ape out of’ someone, such 
as the remark that a cuckolding monk ‘putte in the mannes hood an ape’123 and the 
description of the Pardoner’s habit of swindling money out of peasants: ‘And thus, 
with feyned flaterye and japes / He made the person and the peple his apes’.124 This 
was written in the late fourteenth century, at a time when very few Europeans had ever 
seen an actual ape; therefore, the mythological and metaphorical associations predate 
the appearance of real apes in Western culture. In the sixteenth century, the ape was 
frequently represented as the ‘dark’ version of the human, for example in Martin 
Luther’s 1566 Colloquia Mensalia: ‘For, where God build a church there the devil 
would also build a chapel. [...] Thus is the devil ever God’s ape’.125 This idea of the 
ape as the dark reflection of the human appears again in Linnaeus’ division of Homo 
into diurnus and nocturnus in the twelfth edition of Systerna Naturae in 1766. As well 
as the dark or evil double, apes have been represented as comic or offensive parodies
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of the human; for example, in 1607 Edward Topsell wrote ‘the body of an Ape is 
Ridiculous, by reason of an indecent likeness and imitation of man, so is his soule or
1 9 6spirit’. This brief historical overview demonstrates that the representation of apes 
within Western culture has always been associated with ideas of imitation, substitution, 
slippage and transformation; apes have always been represented in terms of both their 
difference from and similarity to the human.
The two meanings of the word ‘ape’ continue to be closely related; for example, a 
recent headline from The Independent read: ‘Fashion-Conscious Chimps Ape Habits of 
their Friends’.127 This article reported on a study, published in the journal Nature, 
which showed that ‘chimpanzees not only copy each other like humans, but are also 
victims of peer pressure’. The article continues: ‘M an’s closest relative possesses the 
very human characteristic of wanting to be like everyone else’. There is a double 
doubling here: the chimpanzees’ imitation of their peers is in turn represented as an 
imitation of human behaviour. Chimpanzees are ‘like humans’ and bowing to peer 
pressure is a ‘very human characteristic’. The way that this is phrased claims that 
chimpanzees are imitating or copying humans, rather than the more accurate statement 
that peer pressure is a characteristic shared by both species. As H. Lyn Miles argues,
‘it can be questioned whether descriptions of humanlike behavior in apes based on
appropriate descriptions of hominoid-hominid continuities are truly anthropomorphic
128because these behaviors are shared by the two and thus are not unique to humans’. 
However, because apes have always been represented as caricatures of the human, 
their behaviour tends to be interpreted as an imitation of acting human.
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The idea that apes are a kind of dark double of the human, and that they are inherently 
‘ridiculous’ because of their resemblance to humans, is still current in the twenty-first 
century. These notions of doubling and mimicry are indicated by the frequency of 
puns and wordplay in cultural representations of apes. Puns rely on simultaneous 
sameness and difference, on the existence of two different meanings within one word 
and the possibility of slippage between the two. Practically every news story or 
television programme about apes is accompanied by endless puns.129 These same puns 
appear frequently in the films from the British Pathe archive; chimpanzees are 
repeatedly described as ‘chumps’ or ‘champs’, and the voiceovers or intertitles 
constantly refer to ‘making a monkey out of him ’, ‘monkey business’, and so on. The 
1930 Pathe film Evolution: The Other Side o f  It stars a Prof Chim Panzee, while the 
worst pun must be in the 1940s film Animal Oddities: Barflies Now Wear Fur Coats, 
made in Australia, in which a chimp who chooses ice-cream over beer is described as 
‘one of those chimp-pansies’.130 Susan Wiseman notes the frequent use of puns in 
relation to apes during the Renaissance, and comments that: ‘The use of a pun to 
produce similarity suggests the troubled way in which apes and humans were found
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comparable in a dynamic of similarity and difference’. The sense in which it is 
‘troubled’ is shown in a particularly interesting pun in the Pathe film Chimpish 
Intelligence which was made at the Leningrad Institute of Scientific Medicine in 
1937.132 One shot shows a chimpanzee stacking various objects on top of each other to 
make a tower, which he then climbs to reach a bottle of drink suspended from a wire. 
The narrator says: ‘This chap or, or, rather, chimp, has advanced so far that now he’s 
building his castles in the air’. The hesitation, the half-deliberate slippage, indicates an 
uncanny moment of uncertainty. It is not accidental that this particular pun -  ‘chap’ 
for ‘chimp’ -  is used to describe a trained chimpanzee who performs the actions in a
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way that appears highly intelligent and intentional. This pun touches on the fascinating 
but frightening possibility of mistaking an animal for a human: taking a chimp for a 
chap.
This threat of mistaking ape for human is present in almost every representation of 
chimpanzees. In the Pathe film Chimp and Infernal Machine (1967), Daisy the chimp 
is presented with a ‘mechanical puzzle which would floor many intelligent children’, 
as the voiceover puts it. Daisy rapidly solves the series of puzzles, such as fitting 
two halves of a stick together, unlocking a box, and inserting a coin in a slot, in order 
to obtain her reward of orange juice. It is an impressive performance, no matter how 
practised, and the narrator ends with the line: ‘Daisy can even unscrew the cap. 
Fortunately she can’t talk, or nobody’s job would be safe’. Daisy’s ability is 
threatening to humanism; it is only her inability to speak that keeps human territory 
safe from usurpation. Another Pathe film which plays on the possibility of 
chimpanzees supplanting humans is Chimps Take Over.134 This light-hearted film 
shows chimpanzees dressed in clothes and performing a variety of human activities 
such as pushing a wheelbarrow, painting a fence, fishing and even going on a date, 
complete with goodnight kiss. The voiceover begins: ‘Here’s a world where human 
beings aren’t wanted. “W e’re in charge” say the champion chimps of Hints Zoo, 
Staffordshire’.135 Although the film itself is a classic example of unthreatening cross­
species transvestism, with chimps giving amusing performances, the suggestion of 
usurpation reveals an underlying anxiety. While the idea that the ‘champion chimps’ 
(yet more wordplay) have taken over the zoo and no longer need human beings is 
clearly a joke, nevertheless the spectacle of fully-clothed chimps confidently acting 
human has an uncanny effect. As Jacques Derrida writes: ‘such a reversal of power
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cannot be an accidental aberration. Usurpation necessarily refers us to a profound 
possibility of essence’.136 If they act human, could they become human? Or is there 
an essence, something intangible, that would prevent them crossing the border?
Another Pathe film, entitled Trying out D arwin?, appears to investigate precisely this
‘profound possibility of essence’ by testing the limits of ape/human similarity.137 This
1951 film tells the story of Mrs Doris Culshaw who is ‘making an experiment with her
baby chimp Pete’. The stated purpose of the experiment is ‘to find out how near to
human behaviour her baby chimp will grow’. The film shows the family -  mother,
father, child, and chimpanzee -  sitting around the dinner table. The chimp is wearing
baby clothes, a bib and a nappy. In other shots Pete is fed from a bottle, read to (from
a recipe book, oddly) and put to bed in a cot. The film ’s voiceover concludes: ‘The
secret of the test is that he must be brought up just like a human. [...] This is a serious
test, not just a way of making a monkey out of a chimp’. This last sentence refers to
the possibility of species transformation: of something becoming something else,
‘making a monkey [or even a human] out of a chimp’. This experiment is one of many
from the mid-twentieth century, known as ‘cross-fostering’, in which chimpanzees and
118gorillas were brought up ‘as human’ in order to see how human they would become. 
These experiments, which reflected the nature/nurture debates of the time, show an 
interest in the mutability of species and whether it was possible to transgress species 
barriers. On the one hand, there is a genuine curiosity about the possibilities and 
limitations of teaching an animal to act human. But at the same time, the ‘failure’ of 
these experiments confirms the belief in a human essence. Although the stated aim is 
to dissolve or transcend the species boundary, the fact that the chimp does not grow up 
to be a human is a reassurance that being human depends on some inner essence, and
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cannot be imitated. It is reminiscent of the theory of cross-dressing put forward by
Robert Stoller, that the male transvestite is ‘always aware even at the height of
feminine behavior -  when he is fully dressed in women’s clothes -  that he has the
1absolute insignia of maleness, a penis’. In this case, even when ‘fully dressed’ and 
socialised as a human, the chimpanzee lacks the ‘absolute insignia’ of being human -  a 
voice, perhaps? -  and thereby confirms that the category of the human is secure.140
Aping Art: Congo and Dangerous Anthropomorphism
If these Pathe films seem to confirm humanism by reassuring ‘us’ that a chimpanzee 
could never, in fact, become human, what happens when humanism is more seriously 
threatened? The divide between safe and dangerous anthropomorphism can be seen on 
the Gorilla Foundation’s website. This foundation, which raises money to protect 
gorillas, is centred around the Ape Language Research of Dr Penny Patterson, who 
claims to have taught over a thousand words to Koko the mountain gorilla. The online 
shop ‘Kokomart’ sells a range of products that could be described as anthropomorphic, 
such as ‘cute and cuddly’ Koko toys.141 These toys objectify the gorilla, transforming 
her into ‘a human-sculpted object in which the animal’s glass eye merely reflects our 
own projections’.142 The text describes the toy as ‘affectionate’; while this could 
clearly be described as anthropomorphic, it is acceptable within humanist culture.
In sharp contrast, Kokomart also sells limited-edition prints of paintings by Koko and 
Michael, accompanied on the website by photographs of the gorillas creating them, and 
descriptions which include terms such as ‘representational’, ‘from memory’, and 
expressing ‘emotion’.143 This suddenly transforms them into subjects, not objects. 
Unlike the toy Koko, these descriptions present the gorillas as subjects with their own
experiences, emotions, and memories. Instead of a glass eye that reflects ‘our own 
projections’, Koko’s eyes become something that a subject sees out of.144 Creating art 
is often cited as a key difference between humans and other animals, and within 
contemporary culture is often claimed to mark the beginning of ‘true humanity’.145 Art 
is associated with many of the attributes said to be key differences between humans 
and other animals, such as subjectivity, creativity, dexterity, and vision (which, as Cary 
Wolfe notes, is ineluctably tied to the specifically human’).146 Therefore, there is great 
resistance to any suggestion that animals can produce meaningful and intentional art, 
or indeed, calling it ‘art’ at all.
The intensity o f the anger provoked by ‘ape art’ was seen recently in the media 
coverage of the auction and exhibition of paintings by Congo the chimpanzee. Congo 
produced the paintings in the 1950s under the supervision of Desmond Morris, as part 
of a ‘new and biological approach to art’.147 Morris was interested in investigating ‘the 
origins of human art’, which had been previously ‘probed’ by looking at ‘the 
prehistoric remnants, the folk art of primitive peoples, the pictures of the mentally 
unbalanced, and the scribbles of children’ (p. 13). This is a familiar list of almost- 
human border figures being used to define the ‘origins’ and limits o f the human. The 
phrases ‘folk art’, ‘pictures’, and ‘scribbles’ all suggest that they are not quite worthy 
of being called ‘art’. Morris added chimpanzees to this list, and hoped to extend his 
research to ‘many individuals of different species’ as well as ‘other specialized groups 
from a variety of human cultures’, in order to establish what, if  any, were ‘the 
biological principles of picture-making’ (p. 168). He tested, for example, whether 
there was a tendency to ‘balance’ the composition of a picture and whether apes and 
children would complete unfinished figures.
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In 1957, the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London held an exhibition of Congo’s 
work, and he became something of a celebrity. Morris writes: ‘The serious purpose of 
the exhibition was almost obliterated by the joyous reaction of the popular press. 
Everything from Congo cartoons to Congo calypsos appeared and the situation was 
rapidly getting out o f hand’ (p. 27). Some paintings were acquired by artists such as 
Pablo Picasso and Joan Miro, as well as the Duke of Edinburgh and the Natural 
History Museum. The level of popular interest is reflected by a small spate of British 
Pathe films of ‘ape artists’ dating from 1959 to 1967.148 However, few other apes 
showed any inclination or talent for making pictures, and interest in the subject died 
down. Then in June 2005, three of Congo’s paintings were auctioned at Bonhams as a 
lot and sold for £14,400. This attracted considerable media interest and led to another 
exhibition, Ape Artists o f  the 1950s, which showed paintings by Congo, along with 
another chimpanzee, Betsy, a gorilla, Sophie, and an orangutan, Alexander.149
It is notable that many of the representations of this exhibition in the media depict the 
ape artists as the objects, rather than the subjects, of the gaze: for example, the ‘Congo 
cartoons’ that Morris mentions. Similarly, the invitation to the private view of the Ape 
Artists o f  the 1950s exhibition uses a photograph of Congo on its front cover. The 
photograph is a large monochrome close-up of Congo’s face as he looks off into the 
distance with what appears to be a serious, thoughtful expression. If paintings by a 
nonhuman are disturbing because a nonhuman is controlling the gaze, seeing without 
being seen, representing without being represented, this image reorients the gaze so 
that the ape is once again the object being looked at. As Wolfe comments about
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taxidermy, this reversal of the gaze ‘pretends that the look of the other -  in this case 
the nonhuman other -  can be reduced to the eyes of the other’.150
This focus on the artist, rather than his work, led some commentators to condemn the 
exhibition purely on the basis that the artist was not human: because they have ‘the 
humanist habit of making even the possibility of subjectivity coterminous with the 
species barrier’.151 A notable example of this is Philip Hensher’s Independent article 
‘Art that Makes a Monkey out of Us A ll’.152 Hensher describes Congo as ‘some semi­
trained chim p’, compares him to ‘poor dogs and cats [that] have had brushes tied to 
their tails’, expresses disbelief that the ICA held an exhibition of his ‘work’ (in 
quotation marks in the original article) and claims that both Picasso and Miro had 
‘their tongues firmly in their cheeks’ when they praised his paintings. Hensher fiercely 
criticises the idea that Congo’s paintings might be considered ‘art’:
This is a perfectly ludicrous story. There is no evidence at all that any of this 
could be regarded as ‘art’ in any rational way. Congo founded no school, failed 
to pass on his skills to others of his kind, did not develop, had no insight into 
his paintings, and the results are fantastically ugly anyway.
For Hensher, a chimp cannot have ‘insight’ by definition, therefore Congo did not have
insight, therefore his paintings are not art.
Despite dismissing it as ‘perfectly ludicrous’, Hensher’s article becomes progressively 
more vituperative. He argues that to consider Congo’s paintings art is ‘sinister’, ‘very 
unpleasant’, and shows ‘a high degree of unspoken malice’. According to Hensher, 
this is because it insults other genres of art: specifically ‘the products of very alien 
cultures once considered primitive’. In this category, Hensher includes ‘art from urban 
Africa, graffiti artists, Aboriginal painters, [and] manga’. This is a strange 
amalgamation with no obvious similarities between the genres; manga, for example, is
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characterised by finely detailed, representational cartoon drawings and is about as
different from graffiti art or Aboriginal paintings as can be imagined. Hensher’s
reasoning is that the work of these artists is devalued in comparison to Congo’s work:
The art world has seemed to embrace cultural diversity with an exemplary 
openness. But the degree to which this was just a question of money and 
saleability is apparent with the sale of Congo’s paintings. [...] A great painting 
by Clifford Possum Tjapaltjarri, say, can’t lift itself, in the eyes of the market, 
above the level of a painting by a trained chimp.
Why does Hensher make the connection between art from ‘primitive’ cultures and
chimpanzee paintings? It is not only artists from non-Westem cultures, or Western
subcultures, whose art remains unsold while Congo’s paintings make money.
Similarly, if Congo’s art sells partly because of the publicity value of its creator, this is
far from unusual. In comparison with many conceptual or minimalist artworks,
Congo’s paintings are relatively conventional; they are, after all, paintings.
In my opinion, what Hensher instinctively reacts against is not the appearance of the
paintings, despite his reference to them being ‘fantastically ugly’, but the fact that they
were not painted by a human. He concludes:
That’s why it’s important to say, humourlessly, that Congo’s paintings are not 
art; they don’t display the abilities and self awareness of any human art; and 
their physical resemblance to human artefacts is entirely accidental, and as 
manipulated as their meaning. It’s not just a funny story; behind it are some 
very unpleasant assumptions.
Hensher does not justify his claim that Congo’s paintings do not ‘display the abilities
and self awareness’ of human art with any close reference to the paintings themselves.
For him, that is unnecessary; the fact that Congo is not human is enough evidence that
he does not have ‘self awareness’. However, this view is contradicted by the detailed
accounts of Congo’s paintings provided by Morris in The Biology o f Art. Morris
writes that Congo always drew or painted on the paper, that he had a strong preference
for ‘marking objects’ (that is, adding to shapes already on the page) and that in many 
other ways he exercised ‘considerable visual control [...] during picture-making’ (p. 
113). In particular, Hensher’s assertion that ‘their physical resemblance to human 
artefacts is entirely accidental’ is contradicted by the characteristic radiating fan 
pattern, which is probably the m ost striking feature of Congo’s paintings. Morris 
suggests that it may be related to the ‘apparently inborn action of bed-making’ in 
chimpanzees, and argues that ‘there is a predisposition for this type of rhythmic 
response’ (p. 96). On seeing the Ape Artists exhibition, I was struck by the repeated 
variations on this fan pattern, in particular the resemblance between two of Congo’s 
last paintings, both entitled ‘Fan Pattern -  Finger Painting on Yellow Card’. In the 
first ‘Fan Pattern’ (catalogue number 30), the radiating fan shape is in a spectrum of 
colours, starting with a deep purplish-red on the left, shading through blue, then green, 
then vibrant yellow. In the other (catalogue number 33), there are two radiating fan 
shapes: a larger one which shades from yellowy-green through to blue and, overlaid on 
that, a smaller fan shape in red and purple.153 These paintings in particular seem to 
show planning and aesthetic judgement, and were created during Congo’s final 
painting session, on 9 November 1958, which seems to contradict Hensher’s claim that 
Congo ‘did not develop’ as an artist.
Morris has never claimed that Congo had a human level of artistic ability; in fact he is 
quite anthropocentric in his views, and has always been firm that there is a line, a 
‘threshold’, that chimpanzee art has not, and probably cannot, cross. However, there is 
a whole spectrum between Picasso and the ‘entirely accidental’ status that Hensher 
ascribes to Congo’s paintings, not just a simple binary opposition between ‘great art’ 
and ‘completely meaningless’. I certainly would not describe their appearance as
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‘accidental’. I suggest that Hensher has an intuitive angry response to the paintings 
because his humanism is threatened by the possibility of a chimpanzee acting human. 
As he says in the headline, Congo’s art ‘makes a monkey out of us all’; it destabilises 
the boundaries between species.154 Hensher therefore implies some kind of sinister 
racist agenda in order to persuade his audience (in this case, readers o f The 
Independent) to accept his point of view. However, his argument raises questions 
about why he him self makes that connection.
Similarly, in the two-part documentary What Makes Us Human? (discussed in the
Introduction to this thesis) the geneticist Armand Leroi argues that Congo’s paintings
are not art. Leroi’s main aim is to identify ‘what, ultimately, makes us human’. His
answer is the genetic differences between human and chimpanzee, and he argues that
all of the various aspects of acting human, such as producing art, arise from these
genetic differences. In the second programme, ‘Copycats’, Leroi begins by discussing
Congo’s paintings. Standing in an art gallery in Los Angeles, he says:
Among the paintings on display are three abstracts, recently bought at auction 
for £12,000. The painter of these paintings is rather famous. H e’s been 
compared by some critics to Kandinsky, by others to Pollock. In his day, 
Picasso was a fan, and so was Miro. W ho was he? Well, his name was Congo, 
and he was a chimpanzee. In the 1950s, Congo was the most famous 
chimpanzee in the world. Encouraged to paint by the zoologist Desmond 
Morris, his paintings have been heralded as the pinnacle of simian aesthetics -  
good enough to fool even the most discerning eye.
Leroi assumes that Congo’s paintings are designed to ‘fool’ people, as if their only
possible value is in tricking the viewer into believing that they were painted by a
human. For Leroi, this is a kind of drag act, a comic performance of being human,
with the punchline being the revelation that the ‘painter’ in question is a
chimpanzee.155 Leroi’s introduction is structured to fool the viewer into believing that
190
‘the painter of these paintings’, admired by Picasso and Miro, is human. The 
revelation that he was a chimpanzee is held back and then produced as a denouement.
Leroi follows this up with a longer version of the same speech, but this time conducted
as a kind of prank on the artist and art critic Tulsa Kinney. Leroi and Kinney stand in
front of one of Congo’s paintings in the art gallery, having the following conversation:
Tulsa Kinney: I think that it’s really bold, it’s abstract art that someone knows 
what they’re doing, it’s -  and it does appear to have -  it appears to be from the 
modem era. And I like it.
Armand Leroi: It does have a lot of energy, doesn’t it?
TK: Yeah. It has. It’s very strong, it’s a very strong piece of work -  
AL: Very basic palette. Limited.
TK: Yes, and it’s like, you know, even if  you go in close, it’s all the deliberate, 
um, painterly, you know, movement of the brushstroke, like, the artist leaving 
this stuff, and if it was a prominent artist, then it would, you know, could be 
easily half a million dollars. Easily.
AL: [smiling] H alf a million?
TK: Yes.
AL: Mmmm. W ell I can tell you that Picasso was an admirer of this chap -  
TK: Oh, okay. W ell, um, it’s probably -  you said it’s from the fifties -  it’s 
probably a Pollock. Is it a Pollock?
AL: Probably a Pollock?
TK: Yes.
AL: No.
TK: It’s not, okay.
AL: No.
TK: [laughs]
AL: The artist, his name, was Congo.
TK: Congo?
AL: Congo. And he was a -  chimpanzee.
TK: Oh a chimp -  oh chimpanzee. Really?
AL: Absolutely, [laughs]
TK: Well then, it’s not going to be a half a million dollars, okay?
As in his earlier speech to camera, Leroi is mocking both Congo’s paintings and the 
naivety of believing that they were made by a human artist. This time, however, the 
television viewer is meant to be in on the joke and mocking Kinney along with Leroi. 
When Kinney describes it as ‘bold’ and ‘strong’, Leroi appears to agree with her, but 
his adjectives, ‘basic’ and ‘limited’, have far more negative connotations. Ignoring her
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comments about the detailed and ‘deliberate’ brushstrokes, he focuses on her 
assessment of its monetary value, in order to heighten her embarrassment at the end. 
Leroi delays this until the last possible moment, and the purpose of the entire 
conversation appears to be to make Kinney look foolish: as he then says, she has been 
‘fooled’. He thus mocks the pretensions o f modem art, the gullibility of art critics and 
modem artists, and also the possibility of a chimpanzee producing a painting genuinely 
worthy o f admiration.
After this protracted joke, Leroi addresses the question of whether Congo’s paintings
should be considered art. Unlike Hensher, he finds them aesthetically pleasing, but he
comes to the same conclusion. Leroi says:
Congo’s paintings are certainly pleasing to the eye. I wouldn’t mind owning 
one of them myself. But are they art? The answer to that question is a 
resounding no. Congo’s work isn’t art because it isn’t part of a tradition. He 
just sat down and did what came naturally to him. But human artists are 
different. W e’re influenced by those around us. Great masters are influenced by 
the cultural currents of their time, children by the scribbles of their friends. 
Either way, the principle is the same. We think of culture as being about 
originality, but it’s not. It’s really about imitation. And we are a relentlessly 
imitative species.
For Leroi, Congo’s paintings are not art because they are original and produced 
‘naturally’, not imitative. This is in contrast to most of the other critical commentary 
on Congo’s art, and of animals acting human in general, which tends to claim that it is 
not art because it is merely imitative: aping art, not really art. Many of Leroi’s claims 
are contentious, such as the assertion that art must necessarily be ‘part of a tradition’.
In some way, Congo’s paintings are part of ‘the cultural currents of their tim e’. In the 
1950s, there was a lot of interest in the ‘natural’ foundations of art: an interest which 
was exemplified by M orris’ desire to investigate the biological origins of art. But like 
Hensher, Leroi makes a definitive statement -  ‘The answer to that question is a
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resounding no. Congo’s work isn’t art’ -  on the basis of nothing more than Congo’s 
species. It is the lack of doubt, the absolutist nature of this claim, which shows that 
this is a political statement, a statement of belief in humanism and in the absolute 
division between humans and all other beings: only humans make art, Congo is not 
human, therefore his paintings are not art.
However, this humanism, to borrow Neil Badmington’s phrase, ‘is there and not quite
there. It comes and goes, it flickers, it drifts [...]. Humanism, in fact, is eternally and
unwarily becoming alien to itself, becoming posthumanism’.156 Leroi clearly tries to
avoid using the word ‘artist’, as this would suggest that the paintings are art, referring
to Congo instead as ‘the painter of these paintings’. But in his conversation with
Kinney, he says: ‘The artist, his name, was Congo’. This slippage suggests that there
is more doubt there than Leroi admits. If a humanist subject allows space for this
doubt, rather than suppressing it, he or she can react differently when confronted with
evidence of an animal acting human. This is demonstrated by the art critic Waldemar
Januszczak’s account of his visit to the Ape Artists o f the 1950s exhibition. Januszczak
begins: ‘It is, or was, my firmly held view that, in the field of art, monkeys do
whatever they do by accident or coercion. Monkeys cannot paint’.157 This is
humanism in a nutshell. Painting (in any meaningful sense) is an expression of an
internal human identity, which is acting human and by definition can only be done by
humans. However, when Januszczak visits the exhibition, he finds his beliefs
challenged. He writes:
I am no longer so certain. [...] Having carefully examined Congo’s paintings, 
all of which might best be described as examples of lyrical abstract 
expressionism, I find myself assailed by doubts. I like Congo’s paintings. A 
couple of them I love.
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Januszczak’s confident and ‘certain’ humanism is shaken by the reality of the paintings
and his own reaction to them. This is a classic account of a humanist subject being
‘assailed by doubts’ and questioning what he has taken for granted. Januszczak wants
to resist these doubts, and to rest secure in his ‘firmly held view’ that ‘monkeys cannot
paint’, but cannot. He is struck by Congo’s paintings, which ‘shine off the walls like
stained glass’. He writes about one painting:
Composition on Buff Paper, painted on October 31, 1957, is perhaps Congo’s 
masterpiece. Built compositionally around a central expanse of Congo’s 
beloved crimson, it features an array of blacks and pale greens soaring around 
the red like vultures around a mountain. The mood is pure Kandinsky, the 
achievement profound.
Januszczak also notes the paintings’ compositional balance, ‘spectacular’ use of
colour, and ‘absence of muddiness, of colours mixed to sludge through mindless
scrubbing’. As an eminent art critic and author of books such as Understanding Art
and Techniques o f  the W orld’s Great Painters, Januszczak is knowledgeable about the
process of creating artworks of this type. It is from this position that he finds himself
unable to retain his absolute certainty that ‘monkeys cannot paint’.
What is especially interesting is that Januszczak finds himself repeatedly disturbed by 
the quality of Congo’s paintings. He describes the exhibition as ‘fascinating and 
slightly worrying’, refers to the ‘disquieting beauty’ of the paintings, and states that 
‘for a monkey to be this minimal [...] is deeply disconcerting’. While discussing the 
brush work, he writes: ‘W hat is really spooky is the care Congo always brings to 
working within the paper’.158 It is ‘worrying,’ ‘disconcerting,’ ‘disquieting’ and 
‘spooky’ because these paintings provoke uncertainty about the human status o f their 
creator. While it may be easy to tell the difference between a chimpanzee and a human
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by looking directly at them, it is not possible when looking at paintings. In the article, 
Januszczak writes:
There is some small room for doubt here about the role played by [Desmond] 
Morris himself. [...] Not for a moment do I question the authenticity of the 
images, or the methods used to produce them, but it would have been 
interesting to see the extent of M orris’s involvement in important aesthetic 
matters such as the choice of coloured paper for Congo to work on.
The ‘room for doubt’ indicates an uncertainty about whether the artist was human or
animal. Although Januszczak makes the point of saying that he does not ‘question the
authenticity’, several journalists expressed scepticism that Congo had ‘really’ created
the paintings; this is an alternative way of preserving art as the exclusive domain of the
human. However, Januszczak describes M orris’ own artworks as ‘awful surrealist
pastiches’ which he will ‘cross over many roads’ to avoid, which suggests that he does
not consider Morris capable of producing paintings of ‘disquieting beauty’ like
Congo’s. As an art critic, Januszczak is accustomed to judging artists through their
work, and the artist he perceives as the creator of these paintings is ‘talented’, with
careful brushwork, ‘a purist’ when it comes to pigments. He forms an impression of
the subject who created it. It is the fact that this subject is not human -  the disjunction
between essence and performance -  that produces the ‘disquieting’ uncanny feeling.
At the end of the article, Januszczak attempts to retreat back into humanism by 
suggesting that the real talent is the human ability to enjoy abstract art. He concludes: 
‘Confronted by a pleasing assortment o f abstract shapes, we humans have a wondrous 
ability to find meaning in them and to gain pleasure from them. Art, after all, is only 
as important as its audience’. This is an attempt to return to humanism, as it is ‘we 
humans’ who have the ‘wondrous ability’, but it is a return to a different, more 
nuanced, humanism, whose assumptions have been thoroughly destabilised.
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Januszczak no longer has ‘the humanist habit of making even the possibility of 
subjectivity coterminous with the species barrier’.159 His experience of Congo’s 
paintings has introduced the possibility that the subject may not always, necessarily, be 
human.
Parody and Risk
I have discussed different representations o f animals acting human, and argued that
some are considered acceptable within humanist culture, while others are not. Why do
some instances seem to support humanism, while others seem to threaten it in a more
serious way? In Gender Trouble, Butler makes a distinction between two types of
parodic repetition. She writes:
Parody by itself is not subversive, and there must be a way to understand what 
makes certain kinds o f parodic repetitions effectively disruptive, truly 
troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated and recirculated as 
instruments of cultural hegemony, (pp. 176-77)
This passage offers a way to conceptualise the different reactions to different instances
of anthropomorphism. In Butler’s formulation, the PG Tips chimps fall into the
second category of parodic repetitions. They are ‘domesticated and recirculated as
instruments of cultural hegem ony’, the cultural hegemony in this case being humanism
in addition to capitalism; the associated merchandise literally transforms them into
domestic objects which can be possessed. On the other hand, Congo’s paintings are
‘effectively disruptive, truly troubling’ and cannot be easily incorporated into a
humanist framework. Januszczak attempts to contain this disruption by arguing that
the truly ‘wondrous ability’ is the human ability to find meaning in abstract art, but his
strategy does not really succeed. His humanism has already been deeply troubled,
‘assailed by doubts’, as he puts it.
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The fact that Congo’s paintings are ‘truly troubling’ can be seen from the virulence of 
those that criticise them: for example, calling them ‘fantastically ugly’, as Hensher 
does. This strong language can be found in many accusations of anthropomorphism, 
such as Sebeok’s condemnation of Man and Dolphin as ‘a strange, irritating, anecdotal, 
and provoking book’,160 and a review of a book about the famous horse, Clever Hans, 
which described it as a ‘vile blot on our contemporary literature. Bom in the poisoned 
atmosphere of humbug and of trickery, it is a monument raised to the cult of the 
beast’.161 The ferocity of these attacks suggests that there is something very important 
at stake: a ‘truly troubling’ threat to humanism, in Butler’s terms, which needs to be 
denied as vociferously as possible. If there was no danger of people making the 
mistake of taking Congo’s paintings for art, it would not be necessary to protest so 
strongly.
From the point of view of humanism, it is a question of risk. The less obviously
‘humanlike’ an animal or object is, the more it can be anthropomorphised without
threatening the stmcture of humanism. For example, Claude Levi-Strauss notes that:
Birds are given human Christian names in accordance with the species to which 
they belong more easily than are other zoological classes, because they can be 
permitted to resemble men fo r  the very reason that they are so different. They 
are feathered, winged, oviparous and they are also physically separated from 
human society by the element in which it is their privilege to move.162
The point I wish to emphasise here is that because birds are ‘so different’ from
humans, the boundaries of the human are not threatened by treating them
anthropomorphically. Therefore, anthropomorphism is acceptable if  there is no real
chance of troubling the category of the human. In her article ‘Why Anthropomorphism
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Is Not Metaphor: Crossing Concepts and Cultures in Animal Behavior Studies’,
Pamela J. Asquith notes:
It should come as no surprise that true anthropomorphic metaphors that 
describe things or processes far removed from the grey areas of human 
uniqueness, such as in the physical sciences, are considered to be creative 
heuristic devices [...]. By contrast, where there is any likelihood of attributing 
‘hum anlike’ intentions to the behavior so described, as in the biological 
sciences, a much closer scrutiny of terms is called for.163
Anthropomorphism is safe when it does not pose a risk to humanism. No one would
ever mistake a raindrop or an oxygen molecule for a human being, for example, and so
it is acceptable to use it as a metaphor and attribute to it desires, emotions, and so
on.164 However, in the case o f a fish or a bee, it is somewhat risky to use
anthropomorphic vocabulary, since it is possible that a reader would mistake metaphor
for statement of fact. W hen it comes to chimpanzees, the ‘likelihood of attributing
humanlike intentions’ is so great that it is almost impossible to tell whether the
intentions are ‘humanlike’ or are in fact shared characteristics. It becomes very
difficult, if not impossible, to separate metaphor from fact, difference from sameness,
ape from human. In this case, anthropomorphism can only be acceptable if it is clearly
marked as fictional.
Quotation Marks: Performance vs. Performativity
By definition, parody needs both sameness (resemblance to the original) and difference 
(critical distance from the original) in order to function. As Linda Hutcheon writes 
‘parody is repetition, but repetition that includes difference’.165 When the sameness 
threatens to overwhelm the difference, as for example with Congo’s paintings, the 
resemblance becomes dangerous. By contrast, in the more literal kinds of ‘human 
drag’, such as the Pathe films and PG Tips adverts, the difference between ape and
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human is clearly marked. The visibility of the difference is reassuring, as it means 
there is no uncertainty about whether or not the performers are human. However, it is 
an oversimplification to say that these representations have no subversive effect. As 
Hutcheon has argued, parody cannot be simply categorised as either conservative or 
subversive: ‘Parody is fundamentally double and divided; its ambivalence stems from 
the dual drives of conservative and revolutionary forces that are inherent in its nature 
as authorized transgression’ (p. 26). ‘Authorized transgression’ is an apt description 
for the ways in which nonhumans are allowed to act human in certain circumstances.
Chimpanzees acting human in theatrical performances are accepted precisely because 
they are visibly marked as performances. Their humanlike behaviour is literally 
contained within bounds: a cage, circus ring, theatre auditorium or cinema screen. It is 
when the performance does not appear as such, when it appears to be real, that the 
boundary between human and animal is threatened. This is when the most ferocious 
accusations of anthropomorphism are made, and it is precisely the question of 
performance which is at stake. The issue of performance forms the basis of Thomas 
Sebeok’s 1979 article, ‘Performing Animals: Secrets of the Trade’, in which he 
denounces the Ape Language research of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Gardners’ 
work with the chimpanzee W ashoe, and the Premacks’ with Sarah.166 Sebeok argues 
that ‘except for the fact that there is no intended deception, the linguistic apes of recent 
fame are part of the same tradition o f animal-human communication as four-legged 
performers and talking horses’ (p. 78). The apparent success of these experiments can 
in fact be explained as a mixture of ‘unconscious bias, self-deception, magic [in the 
sense of conjuring], and circus perform ance’ (p. 79). As this quote demonstrates, 
Sebeok’s aim is not to accuse the Ape Language researchers o f deliberate deception
(although the subtitle of his article does hint at the possibility of trickery), but to 
resituate their experiments as fictional performances rather than scientific fact. In 
order to do this, he sets up an opposition: ‘M an trains animals in one of two distinct 
ways: apprentissage, or scientific training, and dressage, or performance training’ (p. 
79). He then argues that the Ape Language research has only been investigated by 
experts in apprentissage, whereas ‘what is needed is an expert in dressage, 
performance-oriented activities involving subtle deception’ (p. 81). Finally, he 
concludes that ‘real breakthroughs in man-ape communication are still the stuff of 
fiction’ (p. 91). W ithout entering into a debate here about the Ape Language research 
itself, what I want to note is that the distinction between fact and fiction, reality and 
performance, is central to Sebeok’s critique. As long as the apes’ actions are 
categorised as ‘performance-oriented’, they are ‘not real’, and do not threaten the 
concept of language as exclusively human. This is very similar to the strategy used by 
Leroi and Hensher to argue that Congo’s paintings are ‘not really art’.
In Staging Femininities: Performance and Performativity, Geraldine Harris argues that 
there is an important distinction between theatrical performance and social 
performativity:
In order for a performance to be intelligible as such, it must in the first instance 
and in some way give the appearance and effect of being mimetic. Butler’s 
notion of sex/gender as performative, on the other hand, refers to something the 
intelligibility of which depends on it having the appearance and the effect of 
being ‘real’, or there would be no point in ‘deconstructing’ it in the first 
place.167
A chimpanzee riding a motorbike or dressed as James Bond gives the ‘effect of being 
mimetic’, rather than ‘real’ or natural. It is obviously performing; the performance is 
‘intelligible as such’. Under these circumstances, the species transgression is 
authorised. In Vested Interests, Maijorie Garber notes a similar structure in the
Elizabethan theatre, as actors were permitted to ‘violate the sumptuary laws’ while 
onstage; ‘the stage was a privileged site of transgression’, a space in which it was 
permitted to wear the clothes of ‘the wrong rank as well as the wrong gender’ (p. 35). 
However, while this cross-dressing could be read as transgressive, in fact it can seem 
to confirm the ‘truth’ of gender, rank, or species, precisely because it opposes the overt 
fictionality o f the costume to the apparent truth of the body which lies beneath. This 
idea is expressed in an English proverb which specifically states that external dress 
cannot change an ape into a human. It is listed, for example, in George Puttenham’s 
1589 Arte o f  English Poesie, in which it is described as a ‘common Prouerbe’: ‘An ape 
vvilbe an ape, by kinde as they say, Though that ye clad him all in purple array’.168 A 
very similar proverb appears nearly three hundred years later in the form: ‘An Ape’s 
an ape: a varlet’s a varlet /  Though they be clad in silk or scarlet’.169 The message here 
is that you cannot make an ape into a human merely by dressing it in human clothes; 
the external ‘array’ cannot alter its internal ‘kinde’. In this way, rather than being 
transgressive, interspecies cross-dressing actually shores up the boundary between ape 
and human. Like the failure of the cross-fostering experiments, this reassures 
humanism by suggesting that the species difference is, indeed, stable.
In this way, chimpanzees performing in human drag can paradoxically confirm the
stability of the species difference. In Alien Chic, Neil Badmington argues that
the Alien Mask Voice Changer effectively affirms the pre-existence of the 
unquestionably human subject (if I must call upon an external object to make 
myself look and sound like an alien, I cannot already resemble or even be an 
extraterrestrial; I must, rather, possess a face and voice which are non-alien, 
and which can be manipulated by the device in question), (p. 106)
Similarly, overtly fictional parodic performances of human behaviour by animals
reaffirm the fact that the chimpanzee is not human, since it ‘must call upon an external
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object’ to appear temporarily human. Because the chimpanzee’s human act consists of 
exterior props, it must lack an interior human essence. Furthermore, it also affirms the 
authenticity of the human audience, since the overt and excessive theatricality of the 
chimpanzee’s performance can make the humans’ behaviour appear more natural in 
comparison.
Humanism relies on the unbreakable connection between human essence and human
behaviour. Derrida writes: ‘W ith regard to this unity [of sound and sense in spoken
language], writing would always be derivative, accidental, particular, exterior,
doubling the signifier’.170 Whereas human behaviour seems to have a natural ‘unity’
with human essence, the chimpanzee’s performance appears to be ‘derivative’ and
‘exterior’. It merely ‘doubl[es] the signifier’ without affecting this ‘unity’. Performing
animals thus confirm and secure the category of the human by producing a set of
linked binary oppositions: human/animal, real/fake, original/imitation,
natural/artificial, essence/performance, interior/exterior. As Harris writes:
In order to be intelligible as such, a theatrical performance depends on the 
legible presence of the quotation marks, which, as described by Butler, the 
process of performativity as citation operates to conceal in ‘everyday life’. [...] 
The difference between the theatrical and the social may then only be a matter 
o f the legibility or otherwise of quotation marks, but these quotation marks 
make all the difference.171
Sometimes the quotation marks are literally legible. For example, Hensher’s
Independent article, discussed above, includes the phrase: ‘Congo’s “art” has risen
again to public attention’. This labels his paintings as not-really-art. The quotation
marks do not have to be quite so literal; the bars o f a cage or the edges of a cinema
screen can enclose the performance and separate it from the ‘real world’. A
chimpanzee which is very evidently acting human is clearly signalled as fictional; by
contrast, human behaviour appears that much more ‘real’. The human does not appear
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to be performing, and this lack of legible ‘quotation marks make[s] all the difference’. 
Marjorie Garber notes that ‘quotation marks [...] can convey both absolute authenticity 
and veracity, on the one hand, and suspected inauthenticity, irony, or doubt, or the
172other’. In this case, the chimpanzee’s human drag act appears to be an inauthentic, 
ironic copy of authentic, original human behaviour. But, as Garber argues, the 
quotation can also ‘cas[t] doubt on the veracity of the person quoted or underscore] 
the suspicious significance of the utterance’.173 To conclude, I want to look at what 
happens when an anim al’s performance of human drag ends up ‘casting doubt on the 
veracity’ of apparently natural human behaviour.
Conclusion: The Showman and the Marquis
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed Descartes’ confident humanist claim that 
it would always be possible to tell the difference between a human and a nonhuman by 
looking at their behaviour. The intangible human quality of reason would ‘mak[e] us 
act’ in a way that could not be successfully imitated by a machine or an animal. But, 
as I have argued, acting human does not follow naturally from, nor does it rely upon, 
an interior human essence. The hierarchical oppositions between inside and outside, 
essence and performance, true and false, human and animal, cannot be sustained. Even 
those performances which appear to be safely enclosed within quotation marks have a 
habit of leaking out into the real world. As a final example, I will examine a British 
Pathe film from 1954 entitled Chimpanzee, in order to show how these quotation marks 
fade in and out of legibility and even begin to appear in new and unexpected places.174
In this short film, a young couple take their chimpanzee out for dinner with them to a 
restaurant in Soho. The three diners are described by the voiceover as ‘showman Gene
Letroy, Valerie Glenn, and their almost human stage performer, the Marquis’. The 
Marquis is dressed smartly in a suit and hat. He sits at the table, eats a three-course 
dinner, including soup and spaghetti, drinks beer, and smokes a cigar. His hand 
movements are noticeably dextrous, and he uses cutlery adeptly. In general, he 
behaves impeccably and is treated by Letroy and Glenn as a normal person sharing a 
dinner table. At no point does the Marquis do anything completely inappropriate, such 
as defecate or become violent, which would mark his human performance as an 
unconvincing act. His biggest breach of etiquette (one that the narrator remarks upon) 
is that he starts eating his soup without waiting for the others to start.
Because this is not taking place within a clearly delimited theatrical space or a zoo, but 
in a London restaurant, it is not entirely separate from real life. At one point, the 
narrator says: ‘Really though, [eating spaghetti] is as simple as swinging off a tree for 
this 13-year-old champion of monkeys. In his stage act, he walks a tight wire, rides a 
motorcycle, and dresses h im self. This comment opposes the fictionality of the 
theatrical performance to the reality o f eating dinner in a restaurant. O f course, in a 
sense Chimpanzee is still within quotation marks, as it is a film, and everything within 
it, from the taxi driver’s bemused head-scratching to the reactions of the diners at other 
tables, is staged to some extent. But at the same time, the Marquis is actually eating 
spaghetti, drinking beer, and smoking a cigar. It is both real and fictional, and this 
ambiguity blurs the boundary between theatrical performance and everyday 
performativity. This also has the potential to make it uncanny rather than simply 
amusing; as Freud argues, ‘a great deal that is not uncanny in fiction would be so if it 
happened in real life’.175 Perhaps for this reason, the narrator expresses disgust and 
exasperation when he makes this strange remark: ‘W hen a young couple take a
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chimpanzee out to dinner, it’s enough to make anyone feel like giving up’. It is, as 
Januszczak writes, ‘spooky’ when you are ‘assailed by doubts’ about who is human 
and who is not, who is performing and who is not, what is real and what is not.
As the film progresses, the M arquis’ human act starts to have an even stranger effect. 
The humans in the film begin to appear more and more theatrical, as if they, too, are 
performing a human act. Like the Marquis, Gene Letroy is a ‘showman’, a 
professional entertainer. Letroy is wearing a dinner suit and bowtie, and Valerie Glenn 
a very large and dramatic fur coat, both of which are particularly ‘unnatural’ forms of 
clothing; they are noticeably ‘dressed up’. The rituals of restaurant dining -  the waiter, 
menus, tablecloth, and so on -  begin to look like stage props. The after-dinner 
smoking (cigars for Letroy and the Marquis, cigarette for Valerie Glenn) seems no
1 7  fimore ‘natural’ performed by a human than by a chimpanzee. In this sense, the 
Marquis’ performance of human rituals ‘serves a subversive function to the extent that 
it reflects the mundane impersonations by which [human behaviour is] performed and 
naturalized and undermines [its] power by virtue o f effecting that exposure’.177 The 
Marquis is thirteen years old and has evidently had many years of experience of acting 
human. He looks entirely at ease in his suit and hat, and somehow appears no more or 
less ridiculous, no more or less natural, than the humans around him. The Marquis’ 
aping of the human is disconcertingly accurate; so accurate that you are reminded that 
acting human is an act, no matter who does it.
The possibility of a nonhuman animal acting human, or a person failing to do so, 
troubles the opposition between human and animal, because it suggests that there is no 
necessary link between a core identity and an external performance, and consequently,
that there might not be a core human identity at all. If the human can only be defined 
as differed-differing animal, as what the animal is not, then it is necessary to be able to 
identify the behavioural differences between the human and the animal. When these 
differences are uncertain, the categories themselves are brought into question.
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Chapter 3 
Talking Human
Speech, the Unconscious, and Differance in 
Communication
In some deep, unconscious way we ‘know ’ that dogs, cats, chimpanzees, and 
other intelligent animals would be human if they could only talk. Intuitively 
we know that talking = thinking = being human. The studies discussed below 
show that this intuition is correct.
Philip Lieberman, Eve Spoke: Human Language an d Human Evolution  (N ew  York and 
London: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 4.
But, for that matter, had language arisen prior to the split that produced them 
and us -  had we all spoken the same language -  there might not have been a 
them and an us.
Joel Wallman, Aping Language  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 153.
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In this chapter I analyse the linguistic/communicatory boundary of the human. The 
doubleness of this name is not accidental; at stake is the opposition between human 
language and animal communication which underpins contemporary humanist 
discourse. I read biological, psychological and (paleo)anthropological explanations 
alongside philosophy and critical theory, in order to take issue with what Jacques 
Derrida describes as ‘the hegemonic permanence o f the “Cartesianism” that dominates 
the discourse and practice of human or humanist modernity with respect to the 
animal’.1 Approached in isolation, each of these discourses unproblematically uses the 
idea of human language as fundamentally different from animal communication but 
does not take responsibility for explaining it; instead, each defers the explanation to 
other fields of study. It is therefore necessary to read these texts in conjunction with 
each other, as accomplices to each other’s humanism, in order to show that no single 
discourse can fully account for this opposition without resorting to ‘free and mythic 
invention’, as Derrida puts it.2 The wide textual range demonstrates the working of the 
myth of human language across many discourses.
As I have argued, within contemporary humanist discourse, the question ‘what does it 
mean to be human?’ is identified with ‘what is the difference between a human and an 
animal?’. This question is answered differently at different historical moments; 
responses have included the soul, reason, tool use, tool making, awareness of death,
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laughter, culture, art, among others.3 At the present moment, the commonly accepted 
answer is language. Language is what makes us human; you can tell who is human 
because they talk. This belief means that it is vital for posthumanist theorists to 
interrogate the binary opposition between human language and animal communication: 
as Cary W olfe puts it, ‘to rigorously theorize the disarticulation between the category 
of language and the category of species, for only if we do so can the relation between 
human, animal, and language be theorized in both its similarity and its difference’.4
The human/animal opposition is identified with the opposition between language and 
communication. Because language is represented as qualitatively different from any 
other form of communication, it must have materialized instantaneously; the moment 
at which ‘we’ became human is the moment at which ‘w e’ first spoke. Within 
humanist discourse, there is a constant slippage between ‘language’ and ‘speech’, and 
it is speaking in its specific physical form which is represented as the crucial human 
attribute. For this reason, in this chapter I focus on the role played by the act of 
speaking (as opposed to the more abstract concept of ‘language’) in constructing the 
human as the animal in differance. The voice is identified with presence, truth and 
subjectivity, and those who lack it, such as deaf-mute people, are denied full human 
status. Without a voice, unable to articulate, one cannot be a subject or exercise power.
However, the existence of ‘talking’ birds, especially parrots, threatens this structure of 
oppositions: human/animal, speaking/mute, articulate/wordless. I argue that humanism 
attempts to contain the threat of a speaking nonhuman by representing parrots’ speech 
as ‘not really talking’: by bracketing it as a fictional performance of ‘true’ human 
behaviour. However, the illusion that the parrot is really speaking always threatens to
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return and disrupt the idea o f human speech. The uncertainty over whether parrots are 
speaking subjects or mechanical objects is shown by the importance of the uncanny in 
representations of parrots. I argue that the figure of the parrot functions as a kind of 
writing in the broader Derridean sense: an imitative representation of true human 
speech, which, like writing, signifies the possibility of the death of the original 
speaking subject. However, just as Derrida argues that ‘the violence of writing does 
not befall an innocent language’,5 I argue that representations of parrots also show that 
human speech itself does not guarantee truth or presence. The question of whether 
parrots can talk has some potential to challenge humanism; however, it is far more 
troubling to question the values attributed to human speech.
Having shown how the linguistic capabilities of animals can trouble the 
human/nonhuman boundary, I then argue that we must also interrogate the idea of the 
human ‘having’ language. In ‘And Say the Animal Responded?’, Derrida deconstructs 
Jacques Lacan’s opposition of human response -  conscious, free and in control -  to 
animal reaction -  nonconscious, automatic, and innately determined. In this context, I 
discuss the way that human speech inevitably signifies in ways that exceed conscious 
control and intention; slips of the tongue and blushing, for example, show that the 
human is not ‘master’ of its own speech. Even the voice itself is not a pure expression 
of internal thoughts, but signifies in extraverbal ways: a concept which Roland Barthes 
names ‘the grain of the voice’. Indeed, research in nonverbal communication studies 
argues that the voice is the ‘leakiest’ channel of communication: that is, the one most 
difficult to control consciously. While humanism tries to deny the signifying potential 
of nonverbal communication, it cannot be denied in the case o f people with receptive 
aphasia, who cannot understand words but still grasp the meaning of what is said to
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them. In order to challenge humanism, it is necessary to recognise the shared aspects 
of human and nonhuman communication while also respecting the radical otherness of 
animals’ experience.
Finally, I argue that if  the human is defined by ‘having language’ and language is 
‘what humans have’, there is a lacuna at the centre of these signifiers. Whenever a 
nonhuman animal exhibits a particular linguistic ability previously thought to be 
exclusively human, this aspect is then excluded from ‘language’ and relegated to 
‘communication’ or ‘vocalisation’. Similarly, those aspects of human communication 
which are seen as automatic, determined, or involuntary are suppressed, and excluded 
from language. Therefore, I argue that language and the human are constituted only by 
referring to each other. In Derrida’s terminology, there is an active movement of 
differance which displaces the meaning; it is both differed and deferred, but never 
reaches the ultimate signified which provides the true and definitive answer.
Theoretical Approach
In the discussion that follows, my reading is guided by the strategy outlined by Derrida
in ‘And Say the Animal Responded?’. Derrida criticises the type of scientific writing
about animals which ‘repeats the most wom-out truisms of metaphysics even as it
appears to resist them’,6 by describing animals’ behaviour as ‘prewired’ or
‘programmed’ and thereby reinscribing the binary opposition between human response
and animal reaction. In a footnote, he describes the type of reading that he sees as
necessary to challenge this:
The critical or deconstructive reading I am calling for would seek less to 
restitute to the animal or to such an insect the powers that it is not certain to 
possess (even if that sometimes seems possible) than to wonder whether one
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could not claim as much relevance for this type of analysis in the case of the 
human, with respect, for example, to the ‘wiring’ of its sexual and reproductive 
behaviour, (p. 144, note)
I aim to produce this type o f ‘critical or deconstructive reading’ by examining those
places where the humanist myth of the individual, as a self-conscious, self-aware being
who is always in control of his/her language, becomes unstable. In this key passage
from Derrida’s essay, he examines Jacques Lacan’s opposition of human response to
animal reaction:
Once again, we are not concerned with erasing every difference between what 
we are calling reaction and what we commonly call response. [...] W e are even 
less concerned with attributing to what Lacan calls ‘the animal’ what he also 
calls a ‘subjectivity’ or an ‘unconscious’ such as would, for example, allow us 
to put the said animal in an analytic situation (even if such analogous scenarios 
cannot be completely excluded for certain animals, in certain contexts -  and if 
time permitted we could imagine some hypotheses that would allow us to refine 
that analogy). My hesitation concerns only the purity, the rigor, and the 
indivisibility of the frontier that separates -  already with respect to ‘us hum ans’ 
-  reaction from response; and as a consequence, especially, the purity, rigor, 
and indivisibility of the concept of responsibility that ensues, (p. 127)
In this chapter, I question ‘the purity, the rigor, and the indivisibility’ of the boundary
between response and reaction, language and communication, human and nonhuman. I
am also interested in Derrida’s parenthetical comment here, that ‘if time permitted we
could imagine some hypotheses’ concerning the possibility of ‘the animal’ having a
‘subjectivity’.
I am not asking what language is, trying to define it, or arguing that animals do or do
not have language. Nor am I trying to erase the differences between some aspects of
human language and the myriad communication systems of other animals. As Derrida
argues in ‘And Say the Animal Responded?’:
Far from erasing the difference -  a nonoppositional and infinitely 
differentiated, qualitative, and intensive difference between reaction and 
response -  it is a matter, on the contrary, of taking that difference into account 
within the whole differentiated field of experience and of a world of life-forms.
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And that means refraining from reducing this differentiated and multiple 
difference, in a similarly massive and homogenizing manner, to one between 
the human subject, on the one hand, and the nonsubject that is the animal in 
general, on the other, (p. 128)
Therefore, rather than attempting to argue for a homogeneity between human language
and other forms of communication, I seek to demonstrate how the signifiers ‘language’
and ‘the human’ interact with each other in an active process of differing the human
from the animal. I do this in order to question the following humanist beliefs: that
there is an absolute and monolithic opposition between human language and animal
communication; that human language is inherently superior to all other species’ forms
of communication; and that language enables ‘us’ to master the rest of the world.
For Derrida, there are three main concepts which must be taken into account and which 
trouble these humanist beliefs:
1. when one is required to take account of an unconscious that should prevent 
us having any immediate and conscious assurance of the freedom presupposed 
by any notion of responsibility;
2. especially when -  and this is singularly the case for Lacan -  the logic of the 
unconscious is founded on a logic of repetition which, in my opinion, will 
always inscribe a destiny of iterability, hence some automaticity of the reaction 
in every response, however originary, free, deciding [decisoire] and a- 
reactional it might seem;
3. when, and this is true of Lacan in particular, one gives credence to the 
materiality of speech and to the corporality of language, (p. 127)
These concerns -  the unconscious, the ‘automaticity’ of human reactions, and
especially ‘the materiality of speech and [...] the corporality of language’ -  guide my
readings of various texts from paleoanthropology, animal cognition research,
communication studies, linguistics, and neurology, as well as from fiction and popular
culture. My aim is to expose the fault lines in the humanist concept of language, and
thereby to challenge the overall structure of humanism. As W olfe notes in Animal
Rites'.
■w
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While the question of signifying behaviors may seem relevant only for some 
animals in particular -  namely those, such as the great apes, in whom linguistic 
behaviors have been observed -  the larger point is that this reopening of the 
question of language has enormous implications for the category of the animal 
in general -  the animal in the ‘singular’, as Derrida puts it -  and how it has 
traditionally been hypostatized over and against the human -  again in the 
singular, (p. 80)
The ‘reopening’ of this ‘question of signifying behaviours’ makes it possible to 
interrogate the category of the human as a whole.
Language / Communication = Us / Them
The central importance o f language in differing the human from the animal can be
traced through philosophers such as Rene Descartes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as far
back as the Bible, in which the first use of language by a human is to name the
animals. From the earliest texts, the idea of the human as ‘the speaking ape’ is
established through the contrast with other animals. A typical contemporary example
is this extract from Aping Language, the linguist Joel W allman’s sceptical review of
Ape language Research:
Language, at least in the European intellectual tradition, is the quintessential 
human attribute, at once evidence and source of most that is transcendent in us, 
distinguishing ours from the merely mechanical nature of the beast. Language 
is regarded as the sine qua non of culture, and its presence in our species is the 
most salient behavioral difference between us and the other hominoids -  with 
the relinquishing of tool use and, more recently, tool making as uniquely 
human capabilities, the significance of language as a separator has grown.7
This passage contains many of humanism’s key beliefs about the role of language in
defining the human. Language is the ‘quintessential’ attribute of the human. It is both
‘evidence’ and ‘source’ of our ‘transcendent’ nature; it both indicates and constitutes a
human essence. By contrast, animals are ‘merely mechanical’. Language is described
here as ‘the most salient behavioural difference’, which suggests that to be recognised
as human, you must act human, as I have argued in the previous chapter of this thesis.
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The qualifying statement ‘at least in the European intellectual tradition’ and the 
observation that ‘the significance of language as a separator has grown’ show that this 
belief in language as ‘the quintessential human attribute’ is culturally and historically 
specific. As W allman notes, within the last fifty years other attributes such as tool use 
have been equally prominent, but these have been ‘relinquished’ as primatologists and
o
other scientists have discovered evidence for these attributes in nonhuman animals.
As indicated by words such as ‘relinquishing’, Wallman chooses to frame this narrative 
in terms of loss, rather than increased knowledge and scientific discovery: language is 
represented as a kind of last-ditch barricade between ‘them’ and us’.
This idea that the ‘exclusivity’ of the human is under attack, and that language is the
last remaining ‘separator’ between humans and nonhumans, is encountered very
frequently. In Through our Eyes Only? The Search fo r  Animal Consciousness, Marian
Stamp Dawkins (professor of animal behaviour at Oxford University) recounts a
narrative that is almost identical to W allman’s. She writes that since ‘Man the tool-
user’ and ‘Man the tool-maker' were no longer ‘unique’, ‘language had come to be
seen as the last great bastion of human uniqueness, the one thing that separated us from
all other species’.9 Dawkins argues that the results of chimpanzee language
experiments ‘struck at the very basis of what many people saw as the essence of
humanness’ (p. 72) and that the apes were ‘hammering on the door of humanness’ (p.
74). The violent metaphors used here, the sense of territory being attacked and
defended, are echoed in this extract from Richard Passingham’s The Human Primate:
It was believed not so long ago that man was unique in making tools and 
transmitting cultural traditions. We now know that chimpanzees have a crude 
technology which they learn from each other. We are still the only animal that 
speaks; but we now find that we can teach chimpanzees to communicate with 
signs other than spoken language. Our pre-eminent position is clearly under 
attack, and it is time to take stock.10
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Like Wallman in the passage quoted above, Passingham makes liberal use of the first- 
person plural. The ‘w e’ in this passage refers to human beings, even as Passingham 
notes that ‘our’ uniqueness is being called into question. It functions not only as a 
description, but also as a reminder of a supposed uniformity among all humans, and a 
way of unifying all o f ‘us’ against the threatened interlopers, ‘them’. It could be 
compared to what Derrida calls the ‘metaphysical familiarity which so naturally relates 
the we of the philosopher to “we-men”, to the we o f the total horizon of humanity’.11 
Thus Passingham begins his book by ensuring that ‘we’ and ‘they’ are in separate 
camps (to retain his military metaphor). The battle to preserve ‘our pre-eminent 
position’ is the fight to maintain a fixed, impermeable boundary between ‘us’ and 
‘them ’.
I quote these passages as examples to demonstrate that the importance of language in
defining the human, especially in differing the human from the animal,12 cannot be
overestimated. Language has become increasingly central to the definition of the
human in recent years, as a result of a series of discoveries in primatology, ethology,
zoology, and so on. With the knowledge that nonhuman animals use and make tools,
that they teach this tool use to their offspring, and that they engage in complex politics,
language has become, as Wallman writes, ‘the sine qua non of culture’. Sine qua non :
by saying that there is no culture without language, he can preserve both of these as
‘exclusively human’ attributes. But it also indicates the vulnerability of this
construction, as it depends upon language remaining exclusively human. As W allman
writes in Aping Language:
If the capacity for language, too, had arisen prior to that last hominoid 
divergence, then linguistics might have been a branch of comparative 
psychology, the ape-language experiments would never have been conceived,
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and this book would have been about something else, say patterns of 
interspecies marriage. But for that matter, had language arisen prior to the split 
that produced them and us -  had we all spoken the same language -  there might 
not have been a them and an us. (p. 153)
Without language as a barrier, the very categories of ‘them and us’, human and animal,
would not even exist. Even within humanist discourse, there is a recognition that the
split between human and animal is conditional upon language remaining exclusively
human. This is why it is necessary to interrogate the concept of language, and to ask
exactly what is meant by it, order to question the absolute and monolithic divide
between human and animal.
Sudden Emergence of Language
The origin of language is of central importance in the study of human evolution 
because it marks ‘the split that produced them and us’. As discussed in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis, paleoanthropological texts generally represent the human as coming into 
existence in a single moment; often, this is the moment of acquiring language. The 
idea that language must have appeared instantaneously is widespread. In The Monkey 
in the Mirror: Essays on the Science o f What Makes Us Human, Ian Tattersall asks 
‘how that innate instinct [...] made such a rapid and unprecedented appearance’. He 
surmises:
What must have happened, instead, is that after a long -  and poorly understood 
-  period of erratic brain expansion and reorganization in the human lineage, 
something occurred that set the stage for language acquisition. This innovation 
would have depended on the phenomenon of emergence, whereby a chance
1 3combination of preexisting elements results in something totally unexpected. 
Tattersall’s answer is couched in conditional and speculative terms, and he defers an 
actual explanation of this ‘innovation’. He suggests that the event which produced 
language may have been ‘an epigenetic rather than a genetic one’ (that is, dependent on
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environmental influences, rather than a change in the genetic code) which was
triggered by some unspecified neural event:
Just as the keystone of an arch is a trivial part of the structure yet is essential to 
the integrity of the whole, this innovation (whatever it may have been, and we 
are very fa r  from  understanding that) was the final physical element that 
needed to be in place to make possible language and symbolic thought -  and all 
that has flowed from them, with such fateful consequences for the w orld.14
This idea that language appeared instantly, what Derrida calls the ‘epigenetist thesis’,15
is also proposed by Claude Levi-Strauss in a passage quoted in O f Grammatology.
Levi-Strauss writes:
W hatever might have been the moment and the circumstances of its appearance 
on the scale of animal life, language could only have been bom  suddenly. 
Things could not have begun to signify progressively. Following a 
transformation whose study does not belong to the social sciences, but to 
biology and psychology, a passage was effected from a stage where nothing 
had sense to another where everything did.16
Like Tattersall, Levi-Strauss uses the forms ‘must have happened’ or ‘could only have
been’, without fully justifying why this is so. Derrida notes the same type of narrative
at work in Rousseau’s discussion of the origin of society:
The passage from one structure to the other -  from the state of nature to that of 
society for example -  cannot be explained by any structural analysis: an 
external, irrational, catastrophic factum must burst in. [...] And when history is 
incapable of determining this fact or facts of this order, philosophy must, by a 
sort of free and mythic invention, produce factual hypotheses playing the same 
role, explaining the coming into being o f a new structure.17
It is not a coincidence that this particular ‘passage from one structure to another’ -
namely, from nature to society, from non-language to language, from animal to human
-  should cause problems for every writer who considers it. The central problem is
summarised by Wallman, when he writes ‘the young child’s language, which may not
yet be language, will eventually become language. How is this discontinuity in
development to be bridged?’.18 This becoming language is an especially difficult
transition to account for; indeed, I would argue, impossible to account for within a
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humanist framework. H um anism  requires that language ‘must have’ emerged 
suddenly for the same reason that it requires ‘the hum an’ to have sprung into existence 
instantly; because hum anism  posits an essential difference between humans and other 
living beings, and a similar gulf between language and other forms of communication, 
it cannot tolerate any overlap between the two categories. But because this ‘instant’ 
cannot truly have existed in a factual sense, ‘history is [necessarily] incapable of 
determining’ its actual structure. Indeed, Tattersall seems aware of this, as he 
comments: ‘The history o f the emergence of language is undoubtedly complex -  
indeed, this emergence only seems even possible from our perspective because we 
know  it must have occurred’.19
I have placed Tattersall’s and Levi-Strauss’s arguments together to demonstrate that 
they both defer answering how this transformation could have occurred: defer in the 
double sense o f delaying, and passing responsibility to someone else. Tattersall states: 
‘Exactly how this fateful novelty [i.e. language] may have been invented is a separate 
question, upon which it is beyond my expertise to speculate’.20 In a very similar move, 
Levi-Strauss claims that the study of this transformation ‘does not belong to the social 
sciences, but to biology and psychology’; as Derrida comments parenthetically, ‘that 
biology and psychology could account for this rupture would seem to us more than 
problematic’.21 I agree, and this is why it is necessary to interrogate biological, 
psychological and anthropological explanations alongside philosophy and critical 
theory. Approached in isolation, each of these discourses can unproblematically use 
the idea of the sudden emergence of language and the human without having to explain 
it, by simply deferring the explanation to other fields o f study. However, if one 
examines these discourses together, it becomes clear that no single one can account for
i
V219
this transition without resorting to ‘free and mythic invention’. Therefore, it is only by 
approaching these various discourses together that the myth of the human can be 
challenged.
The Myth of Language: Freedom and Constraint
As I argue in Chapter 1 o f this thesis, creation myths influence contemporary
representations o f human origins. The Biblical influence is clear in the title of Philip
Lieberman’s book Eve Spoke: Human Language and Human Evolution.22 Sometimes
the mythological aspect is less explicit but emerges in the narrative structure, for
example John M cCrone’s introduction to his book The Ape that Spoke :
It all started with an ape that learned to speak. M an’s apeman ancestors were 
doing well enough, even though the world had slipped into the cold grip of the 
ice ages. They had solved a few key problems that had held back the other 
branches o f the ape family [...]. Then m an’s ancestors happened on the trick of 
language. Suddenly, a whole new mental landscape opened up. M an became 
self-aware and self-possessed. He broke free of the grip of the present -  the 
moment-to-moment life lived by all other animals -  and became master of his 
own memory. Language allowed man to relive his past, plan for the future and 
step back to consider the fact of his own existence. Through speaking, man 
rapidly developed a self-conscious mind.23
This passage reads like a fairy tale or fable: ‘It all started w ith .. . ’. M cCrone suggests
that the transformation between ‘apeman ancestors’ and ‘man’ takes place in an
instant: ‘Suddenly, a whole new mental landscape opened up’. The terminology of a
landscape opening is rem iniscent o f Derrida’s ‘abyssal rupture’ between ‘those who
call themselves men and what so-called men [...] call the animal’.24 McCrone
encounters a distinct difficulty with the line he is trying to draw between ‘man’s
apeman ancestors’ and ‘m an’ himself. It m ust be the ancestors that ‘happened on the
trick of language’ because they have to be pre-human, pre-linguistic, in order to
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happen upon this trick. And yet, in the moment that they discover it, they have to 
become human.
In M cCrone’s creation myth, language is represented as a ‘trick’, but a trick that 
confers great powers on those who perform it. The lists of what language enables ‘us’ 
to do are long and often hyperbolic. Steven Pinker, for example, writes: ‘W hat is tmly 
arresting about our kind is better captured in the story of the Tower of Babel, in which 
humanity, speaking a single language, came so close to reaching heaven that God 
himself felt threatened’.25 In The Language Instinct, Pinker argues that there is a 
impermeable boundary between human language and the communication systems of 
other animals.
Language is obviously as different from other animals’ communication systems 
as the elephant’s trunk is different from other animal’s nostrils. Nonhuman 
communication systems are based on one o f three designs: a finite repertory of 
calls (one for warnings of predators, one for claims to territory, and so on), a 
continuous analog signal that registers the magnitude of some state (the livelier 
the dance of the bee, the richer the food source that it is telling its hivemates 
about), or a series o f random variations on a theme (a birdsong repeated with a 
new twist each time: Charlie Parker with feathers), (p. 334)
I reiterate at this point that I am not seeking to erase the differences between human
language and other animals’ communication, but, in Derrida’s terms, to question the
‘purity, rigor, and indivisibility’ o f this opposition. For Pinker, the human language /
animal communication opposition is indeed pure, rigorous and indivisible. The
passage above outlines the binary oppositions: animal communication systems are not
language because they are ‘finite’ (as opposed to the potentially infinite combinations
of human words), ‘analog’ (as opposed to arbitrary), ‘repeated’ (as opposed to
original), and ‘random’ (as opposed to deliberately or consciously chosen). By
contrast, humanist discourse represents language as a magic tool which enables ‘man’
to become ‘self-possessed’, to ‘break free’, to become ‘master of his own memory’.
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_ These ideas of freedom and self-possession are central to the humanist myth of 
language. This is in contrast to nonhuman animals, who can only react passively to 
their environment:
It is very hard to imagine being inside the head of an animal but the essence of 
the difference is that animals are chained to the present. Their wordless minds 
can only react to the events that surround them at a particular moment. Human 
minds, however, have broken free. W e can think about the past, make plans for 
the future and fantasise about imaginary events.26
In this quotation, language is identified with freedom: without language, animals are
‘chained’, ‘tied’ or ‘shackled to the present’.27 Derrida uses similar terminology in his
summary o f the Cartesian idea o f the animal: ‘It is thought that “the animal” is capable
only of a coded message or o f a meaning that is narrowly indicative, strictly
constrained’.28 By contrast, humans can use language to ‘break free’. Miraculous
powers are attributed to this behaviour: ‘Because speech is a skill under our own
control, we can steer our consciousness around our vast memory surface, exploring the
past or wondering about the future’.29 ‘W e’ can control ‘our’ own minds, whereas by
contrast: ‘Chimps may often look as if they are thinking even when simply sitting in
the shade of a tree, yet they are still being driven by the changing world around them
rather than responding to chains of internal thoughts’ .30 Chimpanzees are passively
‘being driven’ by their environment, whereas humans can actively ‘respond’ in ways
that are not determined or constrained by anything external. As Derrida comments in a
discussion of Rousseau, ‘animal language -  and animality in general -  represents here
the still living myth o f fixity, of symbolic incapacity, of nonsupplementarity’.31 In this
way, the myth of language plays a vital role in constructing the ‘individual’, in the
fullest sense of Enlightenment humanism: a self-possessed free agent with mastery of
both the external and internal worlds.
222
From Language to Speech
In these texts, there is a constant slippage between speech and language. Indeed, this
slippage is so frequent that the meanings of the two words cannot be fully separated, as
in this passage from M cCrone’s The Ape that Spoke:
Human speech is commonly recognised as the dividing line between ourselves 
and the rest of the animal world. It must also be an important dividing line 
between us and our apemen ancestors. The reason why the ability to speak is 
such a sharply defined boundary goes deeper than the mere existence of a 
method o f communication. It is what we have done with language that counts. 
As we shall see, language paved the way for all the special human abilities that 
we so value, (pp. 32-33)
W hile it is ‘the ability to speak’ which divides ‘us’ from both ‘our apemen ancestors’
and ‘the rest of the animal world’, by the fourth sentence McCrone is referring to
‘language’ without any acknowledgement o f a shift in meaning. The emphasis on
speech arises because, as I argue in Chapter 2 of this thesis, abstract concepts such as
‘hum an’ and ‘language’ cannot be directly perceived. Therefore, one must examine
behaviour, such as talking, in order to know whether the intangible essence is present.
When it comes to looking at the past, for example the history of human evolution, even
behaviour cannot be seen, as it does not leave direct fossil remains. In these cases,
researchers identify the ability to speak with a particular anatomical feature that can be
physically examined. Over the centuries, the concrete essence of speech (and therefore
of language and of the human) has been located in many different places, including the
larynx, the hypoglossal canals (two holes at the base of the skull which are connected
to the nerves which control the tongue), the ‘flexion of the skull base’ and, most
'X'Xrecently, the hyoid bone. The hyoid plays a crucial role in the extremely heated 
debate about whether Neanderthals could speak: what Lieberman calls ‘the 
Neanderthal speech storm’.34 For example, the 2005 BBC documentary ‘Neanderthal’
223
(discussed in Chapter 1 o f this thesis) identified the hyoid with speech and therefore
with the superiority o f Homo sapiens:
[Speech is] an ability that has been crucial to our progress, ever since our 
ancestors spread out o f Africa. W ithout the power of speech our Neanderthal, 
for all his big brain, would have been inferior. So now the question was, could 
he talk? Even here our skeleton contains a clue. A tiny bone called the hyoid.
To try to answer this question of whether Neanderthals could talk, some researchers
have made ‘endocasts’ (casts of the inside of fossil skulls) from the ‘traces’ left on the
inside o f the skull by the brain, which has long since disappeared, in order to
reconstruct the shape o f the original brain. But as Lieberman comments, the results are
difficult to interpret because of ‘the faint, uncertain nature of the endocast markings’.36
The tangible essence o f speech, and by implication of the human, proves to be very
elusive. Lieberman’s research has focused on the flexion of the skull base and on
reconstructions of the vocal tract. His theory is that ‘the brain mechanisms that control
our tongues, larynx, and lips when we talk are the evolutionary bases for complex
human thought’ .37 One of his methods is to make comparative studies of the brains
and vocal tracts of chimpanzees, monkeys, newborn human babies, and human adults,
in order to infer the structure of the Neanderthal vocal tract. W hat is demonstrated by
this kind of research and the way that it is narrativised is that scientific humanism
attributes the miraculous powers of language to speech in a very concrete, material,
and specific form.
While scientific humanists generally agree that speaking is central to being human, 
different writers suggest different reasons for its importance. For example, McCrone 
writes:
Once early man developed the first symbolic words, he had no choice but to 
speak them one at a time. He could not do as he could with gestures and 
achieve several things at once [...]. The serial nature of speech would probably,
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in fact, have been a serious drawback to early attempts at language. [...] But 
eventually the two-dimensional limitations of speech turned out to be in fact an 
advantage. M an was forced to put his words into some sort of sensible order 
and the beginnings o f grammar would have been bom .38
According to this argument, because speech is ‘two-dimensional’ (a problematic
assertion to which I will return), it forces the development of grammar and therefore
logical thought. For Derrida, this ‘linearist concept of speech’ is central to traditional
metaphysics. He writes:
A ‘vulgar concept of tim e’ [...] is intrinsic to the totality of the history of the 
Occident, o f what unites its metaphysics and its technics. And we shall see it 
later associated with the linearization of writing, and with the linearist concept 
of speech. This linearism is undoubtedly inseparable from phonologism.39
However, for Lieberman, it is not ‘linearism’ but the speed  at which humans can
comprehend speech which marks it out: ‘human vocal communication is a key element
that makes it possible for us to transmit complex thoughts to each other at rates
unattainable by other m eans’.40 As these examples demonstrate, it is not merely
language in general but the specific form of speech which is represented as the
privileged form of ‘truly hum an’ communication; but the disagreement about why
spoken language is so special suggests that the privileging of speech, ‘phonologism’,
comes before the logical justifications for it.
Logos and Phone
The human is defined as ‘having language’, which is then displaced onto the act of 
talking. Common metaphors such as ‘Freud says’ or ‘this book really spoke to m e’ 
indicate a very deep connection between speech and truth in contemporary culture. In 
‘Speech and Phenomena \  Derrida analyses ‘the strange prerogative of the vocal 
medium’41 in the metaphysics of presence. He writes:
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W e will be less astonished before this oblique and laborious, tenacious 
endeavor o f phenomenology to protect the spoken word, to affirm an essential 
tie between logos and phone , when we remember that consciousness owes its 
privileged status [...] to the possibility of a living vocal medium [la vive voix]. 
(p. 15)
The ‘essential tie between logos and phone’ is still a key part of defining the limits of 
the human; the voice is identified with subjectivity, consciousness, and truth.
To be human, then, is to speak, and this structure is evident in the historical treatment
of mute people. In The Language Instinct, Pinker describes language as ‘an ability that
is uncontroversially present in every one o f us’ (p. 15): an assertion which should
immediately provoke questions about who is being excluded from this ‘us’. In Seeing
Voices: A Journey into the World o f  the D e a f  Oliver Sacks writes:
To be defective in language, for a human being, is one of the most desperate of 
calamities, for it is only through language that we enter fully into our human 
estate and culture. [...] It was for this reason that the congenitally deaf, or ‘deaf 
and dum b’, were considered ‘dum b’ (stupid) for thousands of years and were 
regarded by an unenlightened law as ‘incompetent’ -  to inherit property, to 
marry, to receive education, to have adequately challenging work -  and were 
denied fundamental human rights.42
Sacks also notes that ‘some of the deaf children o f noble families had been taught to
speak and read, through many years of tutoring, so that they could be recognized as
persons under the law (mutes were not recognized) and could inherit their families’
titles and fortunes’ (p. 14, note). To be mute was to be ‘practically denied human
status’ (p. 11). D eaf people can communicate through sign language, which is a fully
developed language with its own syntax and grammar, but historically, there has been
‘an almost insanely fierce, righteous prohibition of sign language’ (p. 12), which Sacks
traces back to Aristotle and to ‘the biblical exaltation of the voice and ear as the one
and true way in which man and God could speak’ (p. 15).43 Although some progress
has been made in recent years, sign language has traditionally been characterised as a
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‘rudimentary, primitive, pantom im ic’ (p. 20) imitation of speech; even today, deaf
children are often forced to learn to speak instead. The general belief that speech is
necessary to become fully human is still current:
The lack of functional speech causes both emotional and developmental 
difficulties. It interferes with language acquisition, and blocks the development 
o f thought processes and of higher intellectual functioning. W ithout the ability 
to express consent, dissent, needs, emotions, and ideas, individual autonomy is
, 44arrested.
In order to become the autonomous individual of humanism, speech is essential.
Phone and logos are still tied to each other, and this means not only that people with 
speech problems, but also nonhuman animals who communicate in other ways, are 
excluded from the possibility of becoming subjects.
One of the earliest references to the possibility o f teaching language to a nonhuman
ape is found in Julien Offray de La M ettrie’s Man a Machine. La M ettrie does believe
that the human/nonhuman boundary is coterminous with language, but he does not see
this as an immutable difference: rather as a way in which the species barrier could
potentially be transgressed. He writes:
Such is the likeness of the structure and functions of the ape to ours that I have 
very little doubt that if this animal were properly trained he might at last be 
taught to pronounce, and consequently to know, a language. Then he would no 
longer be a wild man, nor a defective man, but he would be a perfect man.45
For La M ettrie, language is not an outward expression of an inner human essence, but a
specific act -  the act of speaking or pronouncing -  which, if performed correctly,
entitles the speaker to be classified as human. The speaking ape ‘would be a perfect
man’. In this view, to be human is to act human (as discussed in Chapter 2 of this
thesis). La Mettrie was writing in 1748, but his prediction that an ape might ‘be taught
to pronounce, and consequently to know, a language’ has not come true, despite many
attempts.
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It is specifically the ‘pronouncing’ which has not been achieved in Ape Language
Research, although apes have been proved beyond doubt to have significant cognitive
and linguistic abilities. For example, probably the most successful Ape Language
Research project is Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s work with the bonobos Kanzi and
Panbanisha. The bonobos can comprehend spoken language, understand and use
abstract symbols, and have a large vocabulary. They can even write these symbols.46
However, the impact of these abilities is greatly diminished because they do not
literally talk. In a 1998 interview in the New York Times, headlined ‘She Talks to Apes
and, according to Her, They Talk Back’, the first question put to Savage-Rumbaugh
was: ‘Do your apes speak?’ She replied:
They don’t speak. They point to printed symbols on a keyboard. Their vocal 
tract isn’t like ours, and they don’t make human noises. However, they do make 
all kinds of ape noises. And I believe they use them to communicate with one 
another. [...] I believe they are communicating very complex things.47
Despite Savage-Rumbaugh’s best efforts, the first question will always be ‘Do they
speak?’. No matter how many times the bonobos’ communicative abilities are
demonstrated, the fact that they cannot literally speak still overshadows this. It is
talking which absolutely defines the human: humanists claim that ‘’dogs, cats,
chimpanzees, and other intelligent animals would be human if they could only talk’.48
Because apes lack phone, they must also lack logos: the ability to reason, to think, to
become a subject.
Voicelessness, Advocacy, and Articulation
If talking is crucial to defining the human, then animals’ lack of a voice is not merely 
one attribute among many. To have a voice is to be human, and to be ‘mute’, ‘silent’
or ‘voiceless’ is the condition of ‘the animal’. This dichotomy can be read in the texts 
of animal rights activism, which draw heavily on the terminology of the voice. 
Contemporary examples include: the Bristol-based Viva! Vegetarians [sic] 
International Voice fo r  Animals; Animal Voice, a South African journal published by 
the Humane Education Trust; IMOM.org, an American charity which raises funds to 
prevent the euthanasia of pets and whose website is entitled ‘Voices for the Voiceless’ 
an Australian animal welfare fund simply called Voiceless; and a British animal rights 
organisation, Advocates fo r  Animals, whose by-line is ‘Giving voice, taking action’ 
and whose website headline reads: ‘An “advocate” is a person who [...] pleads for or 
speaks on behalf o f others’.49 The branch of Animal Studies which is primarily 
concerned with achieving political change (as opposed to analysing cultural 
representations) is commonly referred to as ‘animal advocacy’, thus preserving the 
centrality of the voice.50 For example, Richard Kahn writes that ‘animal advocates 
[are] the representative voices for non-human animals in an institutional structure that 
both tends to exclude nonhuman animals and considers them voiceless’.51 ‘Animal 
advocates’ thus assert the right to represent nonhuman animals in the political sense 
( ‘To take or fill the place o f (another) in some respect or for some purpose; to be a 
substitute in some capacity for (a person or body); to act for (another) by a deputed 
right’)52 and they assert this right using the terminology of the voice and of 
voicelessness. W hile Kahn critiques the ‘institutional structure’ for considering 
nonhuman animals to be voiceless, ‘animal advocates’ must also consider them to be
C l
voiceless, since they arrogate to themselves the right to speak fo r  them. In this way, 
the project of ‘animal advocacy’ reinscribes the humanist binary opposition between 
speaking human subject and voiceless animal object.
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An influential early example o f this rhetoric of ‘speaking for’ animals is the poem ‘The
Voice of the Voiceless’ by the American poet Ella W heeler Wilcox, first published
around 1900 by the American Humane Association (an animal welfare organisation).
W ilcox’s poem begins:
I am the voice o f the voiceless;
Through me the dumb shall speak;
Till the deaf w orld’s ear be made to hear 
The cry of the wordless weak.
From street, from cage, and from kennel,
From jungle and stall, the wail 
O f my tortured kin proclaims the sin 
O f the mighty against the frail.54
The pathos o f this poem relies heavily on the inability of animals to speak for
themselves. They are ‘dum b’ and ‘wordless’ and need a human advocate to ‘speak the
word’ for them. ‘Voiceless’ here is synonymous with ‘powerless’: to speak is to
exercise power. W ilcox’s poem demonstrates the paradoxical nature o f the claim that
animals cannot speak for themselves. W hile they may be ‘dum b’, they are clearly not
silent, as shown by her references to ‘the cry’ and ‘the wail’ of animals. Indeed, she
writes that their wails ‘proclaim the sin’, which suggests that the animals are capable of
communicating somehow; if they are themselves ‘proclaim[ing]’, then why is it
necessary for W ilcox to ventriloquize for them?
The difference between her speech and their cries and wails is articulation. In O f 
Grammatology, discussing Rousseau, Derrida refers to ‘the problem of the cry -  of that 
which one has always excluded, pushing it into the area of animality or of madness, 
like the myth of the inarticulate cry -  and the problem of speech (voice) within the 
history of life’.55 Derrida here identifies ‘animality and madness’ as the areas 
immediately outside the speaking human subject, and what they lack is articulation.56 
He goes on to analyse Rousseau’s article on ‘Song’:
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Through that example one may analyze the subtle functioning of the notions of 
nature and imitation. On several levels, nature is the ground, the inferior step: it 
must be crossed, exceeded, but also rejoined. W e must return to it, but without 
annulling the difference. This difference, separating the imitation from what it 
imitates, must be almost nil. Through the voice one must transgress the nature 
that is animal, savage, mute, infant or crying; by singing transgress or modify 
the voice. But the song m ust imitate cries and laments. This leads to a second 
polar determination of nature: it becomes the unity -  as ideal limit -  o f the 
imitation and what is imitated, of voice and song. If that unity were 
accomplished, imitation would become useless: the unity o f unity and 
difference would be lived in immediacy, (p. 197)
W hile Rousseau and Derrida are referring to musical song which literally imitates cries
and wails, it is also possible to read W ilcox’s poem with this structure in mind. Her
poem seeks to produce the same emotional effect as the wordless crying and wailing of
animals, but cannot be an exact imitation without becoming incoherent and destroying
its purpose. W ilcox must, through her poetry, both imitate and exceed ‘the wail of
[her] tortured k in’; she must re-present the emotional effect, but with the added clarity
of words. The key difference here is what Derrida refers to as ‘articulation’ (p. 229).
According to Rousseau, it is this transformation from wordless cries to articulate words
which distinguishes human speech. He describes this transformation as a process
whereby words are gradually substituted for the ‘natural voice’: what Derrida calls the
‘language uncontaminated by supplem entarity’ (p. 247). As Derrida notes, within
Rousseau’s own structure this ‘natural voice’ is ‘impossible’, and yet Rousseau
continually ‘attempts to define the limit of possibility o f the thing whose impossibility
he describes’ (p. 247). Looking at both phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes,
Rousseau tries to identify the moment at which language comes into existence:
No longer the animal cry before the birth o f language; but not yet the 
articulated language, already shaped and undermined by absence and death. 
Between the prelinguistic and the linguistic, between cry and speech, animal 
and man, nature and society, Rousseau looks for a limit ‘being bom ’, and he 
gives it several determinations, (p. 247)
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In terms of the individual’s development, Rousseau writes: ‘When children begin to 
talk they cry less. This progress is quite natural; one language supplants another’.57 
Rousseau describes this development as a series of substitutions: the thing itself is 
supplemented by gesture, which in turn is supplemented by the cry, then by somewhat 
articulate language, which becomes increasingly articulated and ‘monotonous’, more 
removed from its natural origin, as it develops.
Darwin presents a similar model in The Descent o f  Man in arguing that ‘the faculty of
articulate speech [does not] in itself offer any insuperable objection to the belief that
man has been developed from some lower form ’.58 Like Rousseau, he argues that
articulate language developed from musical, inarticulate cries:
I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification, 
aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other 
animals, and m an’s own instinctive cries. [...] The imitation by articulate 
sounds of musical cries might have given rise to words expressive of various 
complex emotions, (p. 810)
The point I wish to emphasise is that what is attributed specifically to human language
is the ability to articulate. Animals may use sounds to communicate, but these sounds
are ‘w ordless’ and formless. Darwin draws this distinction explicitly in a discussion
about whether or not ‘language’ constitutes ‘an immeasurable gulf between [man] and
the brutes’ (p. 808). Having presented a number of counter-examples to this argument,
such as the ‘six distinct sounds’ produced by the Cebus azarae monkey, Darwin
writes: ‘Articulate language is, however, peculiar to man; but he uses in common with
the lower animals inarticulate cries to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the
movements of the muscles of the face’ (p. 809). Darwin rightly emphasises the role
played by non-verbal communication in human language (a point I return to later in
this chapter) but here I want to note that the concept of articulation is a vital part of
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differing human speech from animal cries, and thus producing the meaning of the 
human within humanism.
Aping and Parroting
Because o f the importance o f articulation in differing the human from the animal,
talking birds, in particular parrots, threaten the binary opposition between talking
human subject and mute animal object. Parrots play a significant role in the animal
language debate. W ithin humanism, they occupy a structurally opposite position to
apes, who may possibly think about the world in a similar way to us, but are denied
admission to the human category because they cannot speak. Parrots, on the other
hand, can produce articulate words, but apparently cannot link this ‘speech’ with
‘thought’: their phone has no logos. This idea can be traced back to Descartes’
Discourse on the M ethod , in which he argues:
For it is quite remarkable that there are no men so dull-witted or stupid -  and 
this includes even madmen -  that they are incapable of arranging various words 
together and forming an utterance from them in order to make their thoughts 
understood; whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well- 
endowed it may be, that can do the like. This does not happen because they lack 
the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we 
do, and yet they cannot speak as we do: that is, they cannot show that they are 
thinking what they are saying.59
Descartes here makes a distinction between the ability to ‘utter words’, and true
speech, in which the human speaker ‘show[s] that they are thinking what they are
saying’. Parrots can ‘utter words’, but as these words do not express their thoughts,
their speech is not ‘really’ speech. This argument appears in many canonical scientific
texts. For example, in The Descent o f  M an, having claimed that ‘articulate language is
[...] peculiar to m an’, Darwin presents a very similar argument to deal with the
exception of parrots:
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It is not the mere power of articulation that distinguishes man from other 
animals, for as every one knows, parrots can talk; but it is his large power of 
connecting definite sounds with definite ideas; and this obviously depends on 
the development of the mental faculties, (p. 809)
This viewpoint also appears in John B. W atson’s Behavior, a founding text of early
twentieth-century behavioural psychology that is in most other respects completely
opposed to Darwin. W atson writes:
Not all habits formed in the vocal cords are true language habits. The parrot and 
many other birds learn to speak and sing words; the dog even may possibly 
form certain vocal habits. [...] Vocal habits do not become language habits until 
they become associated with appropriate bodily habits, and even substitutable 
for these acts.60
Because parrots’ vocal habits are not ‘substitutable’, because they do not refer to 
something else, they are not ‘true language habits’. This true/false opposition is central 
to the representation o f parrots.
The word ‘parrot’ is also a verb, meaning to speak without understanding what one is 
saying, as in this example from Ruth Deich and Patricia Hodges’ Language without 
Speech: ‘According to this definition [of language] an echolalic person does not 
command language since he only echoes, or parrots, what he hears’.61 Just as the verb 
‘to ape’ entered the English language at approximately the same time as the noun, the 
earliest recorded use of the verb ‘to parrot’ is in 1596, only seventy years after the 
word ‘parrot’ itself was first recorded in English. The secondary meaning of the noun, 
‘applied contemptuously to a person; esp. in reference to an unintelligent mechanical
AO _repetition of speech’ is first recorded in 1581. Thus, the ‘literal’ and ‘metaphorical’ 
uses of the word are not separate; the concept of mindless repetition, of speech without 
thought, has informed the cultural representation o f parrots from the very beginning. 
Like the word ‘aping’, discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, ‘parroting’ implies 
imitation: specifically, imitation of the human. As suggested by the title of the 1929
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book Apes and Parrots: An Anthology o f Parodies,63, apes and parrots are understood
as inherently parodic; they are both seen as comic or grotesque imitations of the
human. This means that they occupy a privileged position among nonhuman animals,
as indicated, for example, by this quotation from Marian Stamp Dawkins:
Perhaps all I will have done is to raise a whole new set of questions such as 
which animals we should be concerned about. Is it just chimpanzees and clever 
parrots that are candidates for consciousness or must all the rest be considered 
too?64
Because of their resemblance to humans, ‘chimpanzees and clever parrots’ would be 
the first ‘candidates for consciousness’ if  the category were to be expanded.
In Chapter 2 , 1 argue that chimpanzees’ performances of human behaviour have the
potential to disturb the boundaries of the human, and that humanism attempts to
contain this threatening potential by defining it as fictional, by placing it in quotation
marks. In a similar way, parrots’ threatening ability to articulate is suppressed within
humanist discourse by representing it as artificial or unreal. For example, in a footnote
to an argument that talking is what differentiates the human from all other animals,
Lieberman tackles the issue of parrots:
One question that must occur to you is, ‘How do talking birds talk?’. The 
answer is that they don’t really ‘talk’. Birds produce sound by a very different 
mechanism. [...] Perceptual experiments [...] show that if  you put yourself into 
the right mental set, the bird mimicry will ‘sound’ like speech. Bird speech 
mimicry otherwise doesn’t sound like speech.65
This passage is a typical example of how humanist discourse deals with the ‘speech’ of
parrots and other birds: by claiming ‘that they don’t really “talk”’, but merely ‘mimic
speech’.66 The sense that they are talking is a ‘perceptual’ illusion: a side-effect of the
human tendency to anthropomorphise. Like chimpanzees in human drag, humanism
insists that the resemblance of parrots’ speech to human behaviour is superficial and
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misleading: it is ‘an exterior reflection of the reality of language’.67 Tattersall deals
with the question of talking birds in a similar way:
To speak you need a brain that will tell your vocal tract what to do; but you also 
need a vocal tract that will respond appropriately to the brain’s instructions.
And the prim itive primate vocal tract cannot respond in this way. In fact, adult 
human beings are the only creatures, apes included (though some birds can 
mimic speech), that can physically make the sounds that are essential to 
articulate speech.68
Tattersall’s casual parenthetical comment reassures humanism in two ways. It tackles 
the nagging doubt -  surely birds can also physically make articulate sounds? -  but by 
placing it in parentheses he suggests that it is trivial and should not detain the 
argument. The same applies to Lieberman placing his discussion of parrots in a 
footnote.
Parrots’ speech, according to humanism, does not communicate thoughts; it is not ‘the 
expressive channel o f an interiority’, to borrow Roland Barthes’ phrase.69 But if 
parrots’ ‘vocal habits’ are not ‘true language habits’, why do they reappear so often in 
definitions of ‘true language’? A great many writers, including Descartes, Darwin, 
Watson, Deich and Hodges, Lieberman, and Tattersall, invoke parrots when defining 
language in order to demarcate the limits o f the human. They define what human 
speech is by establishing what it is not. Commenting on Rousseau’s ‘laborious ruse to 
disqualify the interest in writing’, Derrida writes: ‘Such is the situation of writing 
within the history of metaphysics: a debased, lateralized, repressed, displaced theme, 
yet exercising a permanent and obsessive pressure from the place where it remains held 
in check’.70 I suggest that the figure of the parrot, ‘that external phenomenon, that 
exiled figuration, that outside, that double’,71 plays a similar role in defining human 
speech. Humanist texts about language present the speech of parrots as a ‘debased’ 
and false version of ‘true’ human speech, but its repeated appearance within these texts
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shows that it exercises ‘a permanent and obsessive pressure’, a never-entirely-appeased 
doubt as to whether the parrots are ‘really talking’. As Lieberman writes above: ‘One 
question that m ust occur to you  is, “How do talking birds talk?”’.72 Humanist 
discourse has repeatedly tried to dismiss it as merely an illusion, but it is a remarkably 
persistent one.
With reference to Saussure’s prolonged argument that writing is exterior to language, 
Derrida writes:
It is less a question of outlining than of protecting, and even of restoring the 
internal system of the language in the purity o f its concept against the gravest, 
most perfidious, most permanent contamination which has not ceased to 
menace, even to corrupt that system.73
Similarly, the various arguments that parrots are ‘not really speaking’ can be viewed as
attempts to protect the ‘purity’ o f language. As I will argue, the analogy between
parrots and writing can be extended much further than this. Like writing, the parrot’s
ability to re-present speech in the absence o f the original speaking subject disrupts the
relationship between speaking and truth: ‘it erases the presence of the self-same
[propre] within speech’.74 Representations of parrots in both fictional and nonfictional
texts continually return to themes of imitation, substitution, truth, re-presentation, and
death: the same concepts which Derrida identifies with the representation of writing
within metaphysics. Derrida writes:
The voice [...] is the unique experience o f the signified producing itself 
spontaneously, from within the self, and nevertheless, as signified concept, in 
the element of ideality or universality. [...] This illusion is the history o f truth 
[...]. W ithin the closure o f this experience, the word [mot] is lived as the 
elementary and undecomposable unity of the signified and the voice, of the 
concept and a transparent substance of expression.75
Whereas human speech is considered to be ‘the signified producing itself
spontaneously, from within the se lf , the parrot’s repetition breaks the
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‘undecomposable unity’ between ‘the signified and the voice’. Parroting disrupts the 
unity between concept and speech, and therefore is opposed to ‘truth’. I will now turn 
to several texts in which parrots figure prominently in order to show how these themes 
reappear across very different discourses, and how the figure o f the parrot suggests 
ways to destabilise the concept of authentic human speech.
‘An Animal Looks at Me’
Representations o f parrots frequently display uncertainty about whether they are
speaking subjects or mechanical objects. A recent news story in The Sun, headlined
‘Birdbrain Kidnaps Parrot’, played on this uncertainty:
A burglar abducted M onty the talking parrot during a raid -  because he feared 
it would reveal his identity to police. The African Grey was the only witness as 
dozy David Carlile, 32, stole antiques, jewellery and cash from an isolated 
country house. W hen cops arrested him and asked why he took the bird [...] 
Carlile said: ‘Parrots can talk and I didn’t want it grassing me up.’ A police 
source revealed: ‘W e were in stitches. This guy really thought we could 
interview the parrot. It’s ju st as well we nicked him through fingerprints and 
DNA - 1 wouldn’t have liked to have introduced the parrot to a judge as our 
chief prosecution witness’.76
The burglar believes that the parrot is a witness who could observe him and could
‘grass him up’; in his opinion, the parrot has the potential power of true speech. The
police are ‘in stitches’ at what they see as his mistake in categorising Monty the parrot
as a seeing, speaking subject, rather than an object which happens to be able to mimic
human speech. Like those who respond to Congo’s paintings without realising they
were created by a chimpanzee, Carlile has been tricked by the illusion. The ridicule of
both the police and the journalist suggests a slightly excessive reaction which seeks to
categorise the anomalous performance as fictional and amusing rather than uncanny
and disturbing.77 Like the scenario which begins ‘The Animal that Therefore I A m ’, in
which Derrida finds himself embarrassed at being naked in front of a cat, this scene
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calls into question the possibility of being seen by an animal. ‘An animal looks at me. 
W hat should I think of this sentence?’.78 Is the pet in the comer of the room a subject 
which can observe you, or merely an object, no more able to witness and judge your 
actions than the other items of furniture?
Another recent and widely reported news story also played on this uncertainty. It told 
the story o f Ziggy, an African Grey parrot, and his role in the break-up of a 
relationship:
W hen Chris Taylor’s best friend repeatedly mentioned the name Gary, his 
suspicions were aroused. [...] And, when the best friend made slurpy kissing 
noises every time he heard the name Gary on television, Chris wondered if 
Ziggy was trying to tell him something about some other pretty boy. The penny 
dropped when, one romantic evening as M r Taylor cuddled his girlfriend Suzy 
Collins on the sofa, Ziggy blurted out: ‘I love you, Gary.’ What gave the game 
away was that Ziggy spoke the fatal phrase in Ms Collins’s voice. Even by the 
standards of African grey parrots, Ziggy is a mimic and a half, and from his 
cage in the com er he had heard every bill and coo of a secret love affair. [...] 
[Suzy] was forced to admit to a month-long fling with Gary, some of their 
intimacies conducted in M r Taylor’s home while he was out at work, but Ziggy 
wasn’t. She could not deny it; every time her mobile phone had rung, Ziggy 
had piped up in perfect imitation of her: ‘Hiya Gary.’ 9
This incident was reported internationally.80 Ziggy’s ‘I love you Gary’ was selected by
more than one newspaper as a ‘Quote of the W eek’: the first time a nonhuman has had
that distinction?81 This level of interest seems out of proportion to the significance of
the events, but this contemporary fable contains classic themes of high drama, such as
love, betrayal, and the uncanny. What I want to focus on here is the uncertain status of
Ziggy the parrot, who oscillates between subject and object. While the burglar in the
first news story made the apparent error of believing that the parrot could bear witness
to his crime, Suzy made the opposite mistake. She seems to hold two contradictory
beliefs about Ziggy’s status. She speaks about him as a personality in his own right ( ‘I
couldn’t stand Ziggy, and it looks like the feeling was mutual’), but on the other hand,
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she did not think that there was any danger in conducting her affair ‘while [Chris] was 
out at work, but Ziggy w asn’t ’, because she believed that she and Gary were alone.
A very similar structure occurs in Pierre Boulle’s Monkey Planet, only in this case it is
the human whose presence is disregarded. The human protagonist Ulysse Merou,
trapped on a planet ruled by apes, has won the confidence of the chimpanzee scientist
Zira. By learning her language, he convinces her that he is intelligent, and she releases
him from captivity and takes him to meet her fiance, Cornelius. The first encounter is
described as follows:
The engaged couple embraced in the manner of the lovers in the park. He had 
opened his arms wide without a glance in my direction. In spite of what she had 
told him  about me, it was clear that my presence counted no more for him than 
[that] o f a pet animal. Zira herself forgot me for a moment and they exchanged 
long kisses on the muzzle. Then she stiffened, broke free from him and 
bashfully lowered her eyes.
‘Darling, we are not alone.’
‘Yes, I am here,’ I said with dignity, in my best simian language.
‘W hat’s that?’ Cornelius exclaimed with a start.
‘I said, I am here. I am sorry to have to remind you of the fact. Your 
demonstrations do not embarrass me in the least but you might hold it against 
me later.’83
Just like Suzy and Gary in the newspaper story, this scene involves a couple engaging 
in a private embrace in the presence of an animal and failing to realise that they ‘are 
not alone’. Even Zira ‘forgot [him] for a moment’. The status of animals oscillates 
back and forth between subject and nonsubject; indeed, in this passage ‘a pet animal’ is 
the exemplar of a ‘presence’ that does not really count, that can be forgotten. Derrida
R4raises this question, asking ‘is one ever alone with a cat?’. Ulysse must explicitly 
remind the lovers of his presence: ‘I am here’. It is his ability to speak which makes 
his presence count.
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Smart Alex: Parroting, Uncertainty and the Uncanny
While the first news story ridicules the burglar as a ‘birdbrain’ for believing that the 
parrot could ‘grass him  up’, an adjacent panel on the same page of the newspaper 
seems to contradict this. Under the headline ‘Smart Alex’, the article reports on the 
remarkable achievements of Alex, an African Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) who 
has a vocabulary o f over seven hundred words and a knowledge of at least a hundred 
different objects, which he can accurately select on the basis of either colour, material, 
or shape. Alex is one o f the most famous animals in the world; he features in almost 
every discussion o f animal language and cognition, and even appears in Margaret
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Atwood’s novel Oryx and Crake. For twenty years, he has worked at the University 
of Arizona with Professor Irene Pepperberg, who researches the cognitive and 
communicative capacities o f African Grey parrots. Pepperberg does not see her 
research as prim arily an investigation of animal language, but rather of cognition: 
‘Animal language studies are special because of their potential to provide, in a form
86that can easily be evaluated, data about the relative cognitive capacities of animals’.
She argues that ‘interspecies communication ought to be used as a tool for studying 
comparative cognitive rather than linguistic processes’.87 Unlike some other animal 
language research, Pepperberg’s is generally accepted by the scientific community, 
because she uses very strict criteria for measuring success, has rigorous experimental 
procedures to avoid unintentional cueing by human experimenters, and is extremely 
cautious about interpreting her results.
However, others who observe Alex are less cautious. As well as his impressive 
cognitive abilities, he also speaks spontaneously. For example, when he was left at the 
vet’s to undergo lung surgery, he called out to Pepperberg, ‘Come here. I love you.
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I’m sorry. I want to go back’.88 Many anecdotes from different sources suggest that
Alex’s words are not mere empty ‘parroting’, nor simply answering test questions, but
that he may in fact be speaking to communicate:
Alex proceeded to show his grasp of human words by spontaneously using 
them in entirely appropriate ways. It is disconcerting, to say the least, to watch 
a videotape o f an unsuccessful training session in which a parrot refuses to co­
operate with his trainer and then see it terminated by the bird itself moving off- 
camera muttering the words ‘I’m going away!’. His use of the word ‘No!’, too, 
had an uncanny aptness. Just as his trainers had said ‘No!’ if he had given the 
wrong word to something they had shown him, so he started saying ‘No!’ back 
to them if  they gave him something he didn’t like.89
This scene is perceived as ‘disconcerting’ and ‘uncanny’ (even by a professor of
animal behaviour) because Alex is ‘spontaneously using [human words] in entirely
appropriate w ays’: in other words, he is speaking.90 In other animal language
experiments, for example Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s work with bonobos, animals
spontaneously use other arbitrary symbols to communicate. This does have a certain
uncanny effect, but it pales into insignificance beside the impact of a nonhuman using
spoken words as the arbitrary tokens of communication. At this point, the difference
between true human speech and empty echolalic parroting threatens to disappear
entirely. W hat, where, exactly is the difference between Alex saying ‘No!’ and his
trainer saying ‘N o!’? If A lex’s appearance o f talking is just an illusion, where does the
difference lie between this ‘illusion’ and human speech?
The uncanny effect of A lex’s speech arises specifically from the uncertainty over 
whether ‘there is someone in there’: as Jean Craighead George writes, ‘A parrot is the 
ultimate possession for those who long to talk to the animals, not only because parrots 
mimic, but because these birds ju s t might know  what they are saying’.91 Similarly 
Charlotte Uhlenbroek writes, ‘Alex certainly seems to know what he is talking about, 
or does heV .92 A lex’s speech could be categorised with the first type of uncertainty
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outlined by Freud in ‘The “Uncanny”’: doubts about whether something that we would 
assume to be merely an automaton is in fact conscious ( ‘whether a lifeless object might
• Q 'J
not be in fact anim ate’). An uncanny effect is produced because there are doubts 
about whether the parrot, rather than being a clever mimicking machine, ‘might not in 
fact be anim ate’.
The Case of the Perjured Parrot Death and Doubling
As well as uncertainty, parrots’ repetition of speech invokes another aspect of the
uncanny, that of the double or doppelgdnger. Drawing on Otto Rank’s work, Freud
argues that, ‘from having been an assurance o f immortality, [the double] becomes the
uncanny harbinger of death’.94 The parrot’s ability to preserve speech after the death
of the original speaker is explored in Erie Stanley Gardner’s 1948 detective novel The
Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, one of the Perry Mason series.95 The story begins with
the murder of the millionaire Fremont Sabin. His body is discovered by a neighbour
who is alerted by the screeches of his parrot, Casanova. The police take possession of
the parrot in the course o f their investigation. However, Perry Mason is then
approached by the dead m an’s son, who tells him that the parrot is not really Casanova.
Someone has substituted a different parrot, which appears almost identical, except that
Casanova has a missing claw.96 Mason tracks down the original Casanova at the home
of a local woman named Helen Monteith. Instead of ‘go[ing] to the front door and
interview[ing] Helen M onteith’ as his assistant suggests, Mason decides to ‘go to the
back door and interview the parrot’ (p. 70). Mason identifies the parrot as Casanova
by spotting its missing claw, and says ‘Hello, Polly’. The story continues:
The parrot, as though mocking him, burst into high, shrill laughter; then, 
evidently in high good humor, preened his glossy, green feathers, smoothing 
them carefully between the upper hooked beak and the surface of his black-
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coated tongue. Abruptly, the bird turned its wicked glittering eyes on Perry 
Mason. It ruffled its feathers as though showing great excitement and suddenly 
squawked, ‘Put down that gun, Helen! Don’t shoot! Squawk. Squawk. My God, 
you’ve shot m e.’
The parrot paused and cocked its head on one side as though seeking by a 
survey o f the three startled faces lined up in front of the screen to estimate the 
sensation its words had produced, (pp. 71-72, emphasis added)
In this uncanny scene, the voice of the dead man seems to be speaking through the
parrot. There are complex layers of appearance and reality: it is ‘as though’ Sabin is
speaking, whereas it is actually the parrot; in another sense, it is ‘as though’ the parrot
is speaking, whereas in fact it is ‘really’ Sabin. Throughout the book, as exemplified
in this passage, the parrot’s actions are continually described using terms like ‘as i f ,
‘as though’, and ‘apparently’. This textual feature suggests that we should not be
‘taken in’ by the surface appearance of the parrot’s behaviour. It might appear to be
mocking Perry Mason, or to be enjoying the sensation of shocking its audience, but the
qualifying words warn us to resist this interpretation, and to recognise that this is
merely an illusion. It is not a talking animal, it is an animal that only appears to talk.
And yet there is slippage within the text itself. While the passage quoted above refers
to ‘his’ feathers and ‘his’ tongue, it then changes to ‘its’ eyes and ‘its’ words, which
indicates uncertainty about the parrot’s status: is Casanova a ‘he’, a subject, or an ‘it’,
an object? Similarly, although the parrot only appears to be mocking Mason, the same
sentence describes it as ‘evidently in high good humor’, without any hesitation or
moderation. W ithin the text, the boundaries between appearance and truth,
representation and reality, are blurred.
The preservation of speech after the death o f the original speaker, associated here with 
parrots, is exactly the function that is conventionally associated with writing within 
linguistics and philosophy, as Derrida maintains in O f Grammatology. He writes:
244
The immediate and privileged unity which founds significance and the acts of 
language is the articulated unity of sound and sense within the phonie. With 
regard to this unity, writing would always be derivative, accidental, particular, 
exterior, doubling the signifier: phonetic, (p. 29)
In a similar way, the parrot’s speech is a ‘derivative, accidental’ repetition of ‘true’, 
expressive, m eaningful human speech. W hen the implied original speaker, the murder 
victim Fremont Sabin, said ‘D on’t shoot!’, there was a ‘unity’ between ‘sound and 
sense’, between his speech and his thoughts. But when the parrot repeats it, this is a 
‘doubling [of] the signifier’: ‘signifier of the first signifier, representation of the self­
present voice, o f the immediate, natural, and direct signification of the meaning’.97 In 
The Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, the parrot’s speech functions as a type of writing, in
Q O
the broader Derridean sense: ‘the durable institution of a sign’, an inscription that 
literally survives the death o f its original ‘author’. The parrot can only repeat and 
represent meaning, it cannot produce it; like writing, it ‘must necessarily operate from 
already constituted units of signification, in the formation of which it has played no
_  99part .
However, ju st like writing, once a parrot has learned to repeat words, the original 
speaker can no longer control when and where its speech is reproduced. This is of 
practical concern to many parrot-owners today. A recent article in the Daily 
Telegraph, ‘W ho’s a Perverted Polly?’, told the story of Barney, ‘the notorious 
swearing macaw of Nuneaton’, who was previously owned by a lorry driver and now
i onlives in a wildlife sanctuary where he regularly swears at and insults visitors.
Although the article was humorous, an online guide entitled ‘Teaching your Bird to
Talk’ warns about the dangers of teaching a parrot to swear:
Keep in mind that many of our larger handfed parrots may live up to 70 years, 
if given a good diet and proper care. W hat do you want to hear for seventy 
years? Obviously, if you don’t like opera, don’t teach it to your birds. [...] Be
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careful of profanity, too. [...] W hen you consider that your bird may outlive 
you, ending up in a new home, then choose the words you teach carefully.101
‘Your bird may outlive you’, and continue to repeat and re-present your speech even
after your death. Like the unfortunate Fremont Sabin, your words may be preserved in
ways that always exceed your control and which do not require your presence.
The Great Taboo: Voice and the Transmigration of Souls
Perhaps the most famous example of parrots preserving words after the death of the
original speaker is the nineteenth-century story known as ‘Humboldt’s parrot’.
According to this legend, the explorer Alexander von Humboldt encountered a native
tribe in South America. He noticed that their pet parrots spoke a different language to
the people o f the tribe. W hen he asked his hosts about this, they explained that they
had recently exterminated a rival group, the Maypure, during tribal warfare. The
parrots were spoils of war, and were in fact the only living speakers of the Maypure
language. Although Hum boldt’s journals do contain the phonetic transcriptions of the
language, they do not corroborate the rest of the story. But it is nevertheless a popular
and durable legend which still appears regularly in various forms; for example, it is
mentioned in passing in Darwin’s Descent o f  M an.101 A recent reworking is Rachel
Berwick’s 1997 art installation may-por-e, for which Berwick and Sue Farlow, a parrot
behaviour expert, taught two parrots to speak the Maypure language, based on the
10^phonetic transcriptions from Humboldt’s journals. The parrots were trained for 
several months using methods based on Irene Pepperberg’s training of Alex. For the 
installation itself, the birds were placed inside an illuminated, translucent aviary where 
they spoke the Maypure words.104 Berwick and her team ‘successfully recreated the
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experience of hearing an extinct language being spoken by a living bird’, as Farlow 
writes.105
The legend of Hum boldt’s parrot is also explored in Grant Allen’s 1890 novel The
Great Taboo}06 It tells the story of a young English couple, Felix and Muriel, who are
shipwrecked on a remote island in the South Pacific. Their only hope of escape lies
with the parrot M ethuselah, the last of his species, who is said to know a secret that
could help them, but apparently speaks a ‘strange jargon’ (p. 193) which the island
natives cannot understand. However, when Felix and Muriel hear the parrot speak,
they realise that he is speaking English. They experience this as highly uncanny:
They couldn’t say why themselves; they didn’t know wherefore; yet this 
unexpected echo of their own tongue in the mouth of that strange and 
mysterious bird thrilled through them instinctively with a strange unearthly 
tremor, (p. 193)
They are further shocked when the parrot begins to say phrases such as ‘God save the 
king! A fig for all arrant knaves and roundheads!’ (p. 198) which suggest that 
Methuselah is ‘speaking to them in the words of seventeenth-century English’ (p. 196). 
They surmise that M ethuselah’s original owner must have ‘beguiled his leisure by 
imparting to the unconscious ears of a bird the weird secret of his success, for the 
benefit o f any others of his own race who might be similarly treated by fortune in 
future’ (p. 196).
The original speaker’s deliberate use of the parrot to preserve his speech after his own
death echoes Roland Barthes’ description of writing as the “toilette of the dead”:
We talk, a tape recording is made, diligent secretaries listen to our words to 
refine, transcribe, and punctuate them, producing a first draft that we can tidy 
up afresh before it goes on to publication, the book, eternity. Haven’t we just 
gone through the ‘toilette of the dead’ ? W e have embalmed our speech like a 
mummy, to preserve it forever. Because we really must last a bit longer than
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our voices; we must, through the comedy of writing, inscribe ourselves 
somewhere.107
In The Great Taboo , the original speaker has used the parrot to inscribe himself in this 
way; even more strangely, he has embalmed not only his speech, but his actual voice. 
Methuselah delivers his speech ‘in a thick and very harsh voice, and, what was more 
remarkable still, with a distinct and extremely peculiar north country accent’ (p. 201). 
Through the parrot, the original speaker identifies himself as ‘Nathaniel Cross, of the 
borough o f Sunderland’ and explains that he was shipwrecked on the island with two 
companions, who were both tortured and eaten (p. 201). But Cross was promoted to 
become the island chief, the incarnation of the god Tu-Kila-Kila. Cross/Methuselah 
tells them: ‘I, myself, having through God’s grace found favor in their eyes, was 
promoted to the post which in their speech is called Korong, the nature of which this 
bird, my mouthpiece, will hereafter, to your ears, more fully discover’ (p. 206).
The uncanniness o f the parrot speaking to them in the first person, in the voice of a
long-dead man, is made clear in the text:
It was strange how they all hung on the words of that unconscious messenger 
from a dead-and-gone age, who himself knew nothing of the import of the 
words he was uttering. Methuselah laughed at their earnestness, shook his head 
once or twice, and seemed to think to himself. Then he remembered afresh the 
point he had broken off at. (p. 207)
As in The Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, the parrot here oscillates between subject and
object, between the ‘unconscious messenger’ who knows nothing, to a seemingly
knowing subject who ‘laugh[s] at their earnestness’ and ‘remember[s]’ where he has
stopped speaking. Just as in the Perry Mason book, the phrase ‘seemed to think to
him self defers the question of whether Methuselah is really thinking or only appearing
to. There is a constant uncertainty between appearance and reality which produces an
uncanny effect. There is also slippage between the two speakers: Cross, the original
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human author o f the words, and M ethuselah, the parrot repeating them two centuries 
later. Allen writes:
As he reached these words Methuselah paused, and choked in his throat 
slightly. The mere m echanical effort of continuing the speech he had learned 
by heart two hundred years before, and repeated so often since that it had 
become part o f his being, was now almost too much for him. (p. 209)
Once again, there is an uncertainty between the ‘mechanical effort’ of repeating the
speech, and the sense that ‘it had become part o f his being’, which suggests that by
repeating Cross’s words, M ethuselah is somehow partaking of their meaning.
This transference o f subjectivity from Cross to M ethuselah is echoed in the speech
itself. The secret o f the islanders’ religion is that Tu-Kila-Kila protects himself by
keeping his soul not in his own body, but in a sacred tree. The soul of Tu-Kila-Kila is
transferred from one human incarnation to the next (pp. 212-13). The current Tu-Kila-
Kila gives Felix and Muriel ‘a theological lesson’ and tells them:
Each god, as he grows old, reincarnates him self visibly. Before he can grow 
feeble and die he immolates him self willingly on his own altar; and a younger 
and a stronger than he receives his spirit. [...] Am I not very ancient? Have I not 
passed through many bodies? (p. 127)
In the same way, it seems that by repeating Cross’s words, Methuselah has received
the m an’s spirit; Cross’s soul, embodied by his voice, has passed into the parrot. After
two centuries, the speech ‘had becom e part o f his being’ (p. 209). This idea that a
transmigration of souls can occur through the transference of the voice echoes beliefs
from many cultures: as Anne K arpf notes, ‘in ritual, voice and breath often connect a
speaker with spirits handed down by their forebears’.108 If Cross has passed on his
spirit to Methuselah, the parrot him self is now ‘very ancient’ and must pass on the
spirit to another before he ‘grow[sj feeble and d ie[sj’. Nearing the end of his speech,
the parrot’s strength finally wears out, and he falls ‘off his perch, stone dead, on the
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ground’ (p. 215). The reaction of the listeners to M ethuselah’s death seems to suggest
that he has indeed absorbed Nathaniel Cross’s spirit:
The parrot’s words were so human, its speech was so real to them, that they felt 
as though the English Tu-Kila-Kila o f two hundred years back had really and 
truly been speaking to them from that perch; it was a human creature indeed 
that lay dead before them. Felix raised the warm body from the ground with 
positive reverence. ‘W e will bury it decently,’ he said. (pp. 215-16)
Far from mere parroting, M ethuselah’s speech is ‘so human’ and ‘so real’ that he
effectively becomes ‘a hum an creature’ deserving a decent burial. The boundaries
between original and copy, human and parrot, have become fatally blurred.
Whereas the parrot is associated with false, second-degree representation, and opposed
to the truth o f hum an speech, Felix and M uriel feel that Nathaniel Cross has ‘really and
truly been speaking to them ’. W ith M ethuselah’s death, Cross’s voice finally dies too;
but his words have been passed on to Felix and M uriel. Having finally delivered his
speech, after two centuries o f repetition, to listeners who can understand it, the parrot is
i noable to die, as ‘a younger and a stronger than he [has] receive[d] his spirit’.
Because the voice is so closely identified with ‘the spirit’, this preservation of speech
can be deeply disturbing, as demonstrated in a recent advice column in The Times. An
anonymous woman wrote in with a problem. Her husband has recently died, and is
survived by his African Grey parrot, who ‘continues to deliver snatches of “Tarrah,
love” and “By gum, in ’t it ready yet?” and others [sic] phrases o f Jack’s in a Yorkshire
accent identical to Jack’s. His wife finds this morbid and ghoulish’.110 The columnist
considered the problem:
If only a smart entrepreneur had had the foresight to persuade Peter Ustinov, 
Noel Coward or David Niven to play host to a few parrots [...] once the birds 
had soaked up their m aster’s voice, they could have been sold. Cohabiting with 
an African Grey that mimics your late husband’s everyday chit-chat, and in his 
accent [...] might distress any grieving widow. [...] Donating him to a new 
home would certainly move the parrot out o f the widow’s earshot. But she
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might feel it to be a kind of avian adultery to think of her late husband as, albeit 
only via his undeceased parrot, making marital small talk to another woman. 
Perhaps a friend [...] might take in the African Grey as a lodger until it has 
learnt some new dialogue before returning it, reprogrammed, to the widow.
The almost nervous jokes that open this article, and the suggestion that the parrot can
simply be ‘reprogrammed’, are not unexpected; they provide reassurance that the
parrot’s imitative abilities are trivial, comic and mechanical. But this is contradicted
by the strange suggestion that her late husband might be able to commit ‘a kind of
avian adultery [...] via his undeceased parrot’. ‘The strange prerogative of the vocal
medium’111 is evident here. The connection between the voice and the self is so
powerful that the parrot’s mimicry of Jack’s ‘marital small talk’ could even constitute
‘adultery’. Once again, the status of the speaking parrot is unstable in this text.
Replaceable Subjects
In the novels discussed here, the parrots’ speech is only necessary because the original
human speaker cannot be present. It is taken for granted that would be preferable to
have the original speaker present to guarantee his words, but in the circumstances, the
parrot can allow him to continue signifying and communicating even after his death.
In this sense the parrot is a kind of ‘dangerous m eans’:
Rousseau considers writing as a dangerous means, a menacing aid, the critical 
response to a situation of distress. W hen Nature, as self-proximity, comes to be 
forbidden or interrupted, when speech fails to protect presence, writing 
becomes necessary. It must be added  to the word urgently. [...] It is the addition 
of a technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when it
WOis actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the language.
In a literal way, this describes the function of the parrot in The Case O f The Perjured 
Parrot. The imagined murder scene is ‘a situation of distress’ which requires the 
parrot as a ‘critical response’. Sabin is present, but his words ( ‘D on’t shoot!’) fail ‘to 
protect [his] presence’. Their ‘natural destiny’ is not fulfilled, because Helen does not
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obey his command; she shoots him. The parrot’s ability to re-present these words then 
‘becomes necessary’. Casanova the parrot is ‘a menacing aid’, an ‘artificial and artful 
ruse’ which will enable Sabin’s words to be preserved in his absence. The murder 
scene can then be imagined and reconstructed from the ‘writing’ which is the parrot’s 
speech.
If the parrot’s ability to re-present speech makes it possible for the original speaker to 
communicate important information, such as the identity of a murderer or the secret of 
Tu-Kila-Kila, after his death, then why should it be seen as ‘dangerous’ or ‘menacing’? 
To understand this, it is necessary to continue the plot of the story. The police in The 
Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, as in all classic detective novels, are too easily contented 
with simple explanations. They believe that Casanova’s words are a true imitation of 
Sabin’s dying words ( ‘Put down that gun, Helen!’) and so they arrest Helen Monteith, 
Sabin’s mistress, for his murder. W hat the police do not realise is that there are two 
parrots: Casanova was not in fact present at the murder scene, so he cannot be 
repeating Sabin’s dying words. But Perry Mason does know this, and therefore 
concludes that someone has taught Casanova his speech in order to frame Helen for the 
murder:
The m urderer must have been someone who had access to the parrot, someone 
who had planned the murder for a long time; someone who intended to pin the 
crime on Helen Watkins Sabin [Sabin’s wife], since he probably knew nothing 
of Helen Monteith. [...] [He] started in educating the parrot to say, ‘Drop that 
gun, Helen ... don’t sh o o t... My God, you’ve shot m e!’. The whole crime had 
been carefully planned, (p. 262)
Far from being spontaneous expressions of Sabin’s thoughts, the words which the
parrot is imitating have been carefully drilled into it. The police were fooled by the
binary opposition between false parroting and true speech, but it turns out that the
original speech was in no way ‘true’. Just as Derrida argues that the possibility of
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writing informs speech from  the very beginning, the parrot was taught these words in 
order to re-present an event that never actually took place. The speech does not 
therefore have an origin in any kind of natural ‘self-proximity’. Furthermore, the 
murderer had to repeat the speech ‘many tim es’, had to parrot it himself, in order to 
ensure the parrot would repeat it: as another character confirms, ‘I knew Casanova 
wouldn’t say anything unless someone had been to some trouble to repeat it many 
times in his presence’ (p. 277). Similarly, in The Great Taboo, Cross had to repeat his 
‘original’ speech many times in order to impress it upon M ethuselah’s memory. There 
is thus no place or time that can be identified as the simple and true origin of the 
parrots’ speech.
Thus, in The Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, there is no such thing as ‘the proper place of 
the sentence, the unique time of the sentence pronounced hie et nunc by an
113irreplaceable subject’. The sentence was never in its ‘proper place’: the implied 
‘here and now ’ o f Helen shooting Sabin. Even more strangely, it turns out that neither 
o f these characters are ‘irreplaceable subject[s]’. As the story proceeds, characters and 
events continually double; there are two wives, two parrots, characters with two names, 
and names shared by two characters. At the end of The Case o f  the Perjured Parrot, 
although the m urderer has been caught, the reader does not have the feeling of 
‘closure’ that is usually promised by the modem  detective novel, in which ‘the events 
o f the story become fully intelligible to the reader’.114 Instead, the narrative becomes 
increasingly complicated as the characters and events in the story multiply. The 
murder victim, Sabin, turns out to have a hitherto unsuspected brother, who tells 
Mason: ‘W e aren’t twins, but, as we got older, there was a striking family resemblance.
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People were always getting us mixed up’ (p. 275), and the story leaves all of the
characters hopelessly ‘m ixed up ’. As Drake, M ason’s assistant, says:
We have two suspects in this case, both of them named Helen. Perry, if you 
introduce that parrot in evidence to show that Helen W atkins Sabin fired the 
shot, the district attorney will turn your own evidence against you to show that 
Helen M onteith did it. (p. 201)
This doubling of names suggests that even in ‘true’ human speech, there is uncertainty
and slippage of meaning. A  word, specifically a proper name, is supposed to refer to
something: in this case, to literally point to the murderer ( ‘Put down that gun, Helen!’).
As Levi-Strauss writes, ‘proper names represent the quanta o f  signification below
which one no longer does anything but point’.115 But in The Case o f  the Perjured
Parrot, even such an apparently transparent word does not refer unproblematically to a
single person, and your own speech can be ‘tum[ed] against you’. Instead of a
narrative that ends in closure, the basic elements in the story continue to divide and
double, and the book leaves the reader with unresolved uncertainties about who is the
‘true’ wife, the ‘true’ parrot, the ‘true’ Sabin.
W ith reference to the relationship between speech and writing within metaphysics, 
Derrida argues: ‘Deconstructing this tradition will therefore not consist of reversing it, 
o f making writing innocent. R ather of showing why the violence of writing does not 
befall an innocent language’.116 Therefore, instead o f arguing that parrots can ‘really 
speak’, I suggest that these texts problematise the possibility o f a true, original, pure 
human speech. The possibility o f parroting is not an ‘accidental and therefore 
effaceable addition’117 to speech, but is intrinsic to it.
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Blushing: Betrayal and Self-control
In both of the novels discussed above, once the parrot has learned its speech, it can no 
longer be controlled. For example, once Perry Mason realises that Casanova was not 
present at the m urder scene, its speech becomes dangerous for the person who taught it 
to him, since it proves that he intended to frame Helen. As Mason says, ‘That’s the 
trouble with teaching a parrot something to say: you can never tell how often he’ll say 
it, or when he’ll say it’ (p. 266). This same sense o f uncontrollable repetition can be 
read in the news story about Chris, Suzy, and Ziggy. The unfaithful girlfriend is 
exposed by the parrot’s reproduction o f her words to her lover: it is her voice, but she 
can no longer control it.
But this particular story contains another, perhaps more fascinating, loss o f control. 
W hen Chris turns to his girlfriend questioningly, her ‘cheeks had flushed to 
beetroot’.118 She ultimately betrays herself: ‘The blush announces at once a scandalous 
confession and yet also a balancing re-assertion o f modesty’.119 Her body signifies in
190ways which are beyond her conscious control; her guilt is ‘written all over her face’. 
The illicit love affair itself, described in the article above as ‘bill and coo’, suggests 
animal desires. But whereas her infidelity represents a deliberately chosen, conscious 
betrayal, this second betrayal is neither conscious nor voluntary. Like the ‘bill and 
coo’ of lovemaking, blushing occupies ‘an uneasy borderland between the mental and 
the bodily, the rational and the physiological, the intellectual and the appetitive’ (p.
26), as Brian Cummings writes. He argues that, on the one hand, blushing signifies the 
human, since it requires ‘intelligence’, ‘reflectiveness’ and a sense of morality: ‘an
5 121animal can be thought neither to experience nor to recognise shame’ (p. 28). Yet
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simultaneously, Cummings notes that ‘the comprehensive involuntariness of blushing’ 
is a reminder of the anim ality o f the human body (p. 28).
In The Expression o f  the Emotions in Man and Animals, first published 1872, Charles
Darwin devotes an entire chapter to the subject o f blushing.122 In general, Darwin
analyses emotions in exactly the same way whether he is discussing humans or
animals. He states this explicitly in the introduction: ‘No doubt as long as man and all
other animals are viewed as independent creations, an effectual stop is put to our
natural desire to investigate as far as possible the causes of Expression’ (p. 1266).
Throughout the book, Darwin describes human and animal expressions using the same
explanations. But he opens the final chapter in this way:
Blushing is the most peculiar and the m ost human o f all expressions. Monkeys 
redden from passion, but it would require an overwhelming amount o f evidence 
to make us believe that any animal could blush. The reddening of the face from 
a blush is due to the relaxation of the muscular coats of the small arteries, by 
which the capillaries becom e filled with blood [...]. W e can cause laughing by 
tickling the skin, weeping or frowning by a blow, trembling from the fear o f 
pain, and so forth; but we cannot cause a blush, as Dr. Burgess remarks, by any 
physical means, -  that is by any action on the body. It is the mind which must 
be affected. Blushing is not only involuntary; but the wish to restrain it, by 
leading to self-attention, actually increases the tendency.
(p. 1443)
In this passage, blushing blurs the boundaries between those aspects conventionally 
associated with the human -  the mind, morality, shame -  and those associated with the 
animal -  the body, instinct, desire. The detailed description of the process leaves no 
doubt that it is a concrete physiological event, and yet it cannot be caused ‘by any 
action on the body’ and cannot be consciously controlled or restrained.
The complex relationship of blushing to the human/animal opposition is also 
demonstrated by Darwin’s interest in whether different categories of people blush:
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The young blush much more freely than the old, but not during infancy, which 
is remarkable, as we know that infants at a very early age redden from passion. 
[...] M any children, at a somewhat more advanced age blush in a strongly 
marked manner. It appears that the mental powers of infants are not as yet 
sufficiently developed to allow of their blushing. Hence, also, it is that idiots 
rarely blush. [...] Nevertheless some, if  not utterly degraded, are capable of 
blushing. [...] W omen blush much more than men. (pp. 1443-44)
This passage sets up an intricate hierarchy o f humanness. Children, because they are
closer to animals, ‘blush much more freely’ than adults, but there is a limit which lies
between infancy and later childhood. This is because the infants’ ‘mental powers [...]
are not as yet sufficiently developed’; D arw in’s note that they do however ‘redden
from passion’ indicates that there is no physiological reason for their lack of blushing,
but rather it is because they do not have the concept of shame yet. They are too close
to animals, with not enough o f the human in them  to produce the right mixture for
blushing.123 Similarly, women are said to blush ‘much more than m en’; like children
‘at a somewhat more advanced age’, presum ably they have the right combination of
human and animal to produce ideal conditions for blushing. Infants and those who are
‘utterly degraded’ are too animal; adult men are too human; the more ambivalent
figures of children and women are most likely to transgress the boundaries between
human and animal, mental and physical, reason and passion.
Blushing also disrupts the opposition between conscious, freely chosen human 
response and automatic, determined animal reaction. Suzy blushes because of her 
guilt, but she has no control over it. By contrast, Ziggy the parrot seems to use words 
to deliberately communicate information, at least in his owner’s opinion: ‘Ziggy was 
one in a million; he was a loyal friend, and I have no doubt he was looking out for 
m e’.124 Darwin links blushing with a series o f other involuntary events, writing that 
blushing causes ‘extreme disturbances o f m ind’:
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Persons in this condition lose their presence of mind, and utter singularly 
inappropriate remarks. They are often much distressed, stammer, and make 
awkward movements or strange grimaces. In certain cases involuntary 
twitchings o f some of the facial muscles may be observed. I have been 
informed by a young lady, who blushes excessively, that at such times she does 
not even know what she is saying, (p. 1450, emphasis added)
While blushing is ‘the most human of all expressions’, the human represented here is
far from the masterful, speaking, controlling individual. Instead, this ‘young lady’ is
subject to ‘involuntary twitchings’ and a failure to control, or even to understand, her
own speech. She has lost her ‘presence of m ind’: that self-presence which underlies
the phenomenological concept of speech seems to have dissipated entirely.
The Limbic System and Leakage
Blushing is one example that indicates that the humanist myth of speech is flawed, and 
that it is necessary to question ‘the purity, the rigor, and the indivisibility’ of the 
opposition between human response and animal reaction.125 The hierarchical binary 
pairs which define this opposition are neatly set out by Joel Wallman in Aping 
Language:
Apes and monkeys do not have obvious nascent versions of the language 
regions of the human brain, although there are some hints o f  such 
developments here and there. Nor do other primates, with a few  exceptions, 
evince language-like principles in their natural system of communication.
Ours, dispensing with qualifications, is cortical, while theirs is limbic; our 
symbols are learned, their calls are inborn; our language is referential, their 
communication affective, (p. 152, emphasis added)
Wallman here attempts to put ‘us’ and ‘them ’ very firmly in separate camps, and
repeatedly uses ‘our’ and ‘their’ to reinforce the difference. However, this aim is
seriously undermined by the insertion of sub-clauses in every sentence which dilute or
even directly contradict the main point. These contradictions indicate that the
distinction is not really as clear-cut as he tries to argue. On what basis can he simply
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‘dispense with qualifications’ in order to preserve the ‘purity, rigor and indivisibility’
of the human/animal opposition? The three oppositions that Wallman names here -
learned vs. inborn, cortical vs. limbic, referential vs. affective -  are all versions of the
same basic opposition between free and not-free. ‘Their calls are inborn’ and therefore
unchangeable, while ‘our symbols are learned’, and therefore mutable. The other two
oppositions emphasise the emotional aspect of animal communication; it is ‘affective’
and ‘limbic’. John M cCrone draws a similar distinction:
Calls and cries are effective but they are not what we would describe as tme 
forms of communication, where an animal deliberately sends a message to 
another member o f its group rather than just gives voice to an emotion -  where 
signalling comes under the control o f the conscious cortex rather than the sub- 
conscious emotional system.
There is insufficient space here to explore the full implications of the cortical/limbic
distinction, but it is used by writers such as W allman and M cCrone to set up a binary
opposition whereby the evolutionarily more recent cortex is associated with ‘higher’
brain processes, language and conscious thought, while the phylogenetically older
limbic system is associated with ‘lower’ brain processes, emotion and automatic
reactions.
The scientific humanists quoted here do not claim that humans do not have a limbic 
system, but they do argue that human language is ‘cortical’ whereas animal 
communication is ‘limbic’. This structure excludes emotion from ‘true’ human 
language and ‘higher’ systems. For example, Lieberman writes: ‘the ability to produce 
vocalizations that are not linked to emotion and instinct seems to create the gulf
127between human language and the vocal communications of apes’. Is it really 
possible to produce vocalizations that have no link to emotion? As the neurologist 
Vilyanur Ramachandran argues, ‘your emotions -  mediated by the limbic system and
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amygdala -  are an essential aspect of self, not just a “bonus”’.128 It is impossible to
exclude the limbic system, and consequently emotion, from playing a part in even the
so-called ‘higher’ processes in humans. However, this does not prevent humanist
writers from claiming that human language is voluntary and intentional, whereas
animal communication is automatically determined. In The Ape that Spoke, McCrone
explicitly sets out a hierarchy of ‘different levels of communication’:
The simplest is the alarm call -  the instinctive or wired-in reaction to danger 
which automatically alerts the whole group. [...] Although often appearing to 
be impressive examples of communication, alarm calls are both automatically 
triggered and automatically understood [...]. While the Vervet monkey may 
appear to be intelligent with its variety o f calls, this simply shows it has a 
strong evolutionary need for different sorts of reactions to different threats. [...] 
As well as alarm calls, birds have mating cries, territorial singing, threat 
displays and food-begging chirrups. These noises are all genetically 
programmed and require little thought, so they do not qualify as deliberate 
attempts to communicate in the human sense. A higher level of communication 
than wired-in instinctive calls is the expressive or emotional cry, where an 
animal gives vent to its inner feelings. [...] Such a noise could be said to be 
genetically programmed. [...] The difference is that an emotional cry does not 
trigger a guaranteed response in the listener.
(pp. 112-13, emphasis added)
Unsurprisingly, human speech occupies the highest level in this communication
hierarchy, since it is ‘under conscious muscular control’.129 In M cCrone’s view, the
communication of vervet monkeys is not really ‘intelligent’ or ‘impressive’; it only
appears to be. There are many ways in which this could be challenged. For example,
recent research into bird songs has shown that they are not simply ‘genetically
programmed’ but are at least partly learned and subject to cultural and regional
1 T Ovariations, known as ‘dialects’. Once again, though, I follow Derrida in 
‘wonder[ing] whether one could not claim as much relevance for this type of analysis 
in the case of the human, with respect, for example, to the “wiring” of its sexual and 
reproductive behaviour’.131
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With this question in mind, a very suggestive essay is ‘The Smell O f Love’ by the
psychologist F. Bryant Furlow.132 Furlow argues that pheromones ( ‘biochemical
bouquets’) play an important part in human ‘mate-selection’, and argues that ‘reports
of our olfactory devolution have been greatly exaggerated’ (pp. 118-19). Humanist
discourse has tended to de-emphasise the importance of smell to humans, because it is
culturally associated with the animal. Psychoanalytic accounts, most famously Freud’s
Civilization and its D iscontents, suggest that as the child develops, there is a ‘shift of
privilege in the sensorium from smell to sign, the nose to the eye’.133 Cary W olfe takes
issue with this, and argues that
one way to recast the figure of vision (and therefore the figure of the human 
with which it is ineluctably associated) is to resituate it as only one sense 
among many in a more general -  and not necessarily human -  bodily 
sensorium.1 4
This is the effect of Furlow’s essay, although he him self tries to resist any anti­
humanist implications. He repeatedly reassures those who believe that ‘the notion that 
animal senses play a role in personal attraction diminishes our hum anity’ (p. 121). He 
concludes his article in this way:
Those who find offensive the notion that animal senses play a role in their 
attention to a partner need not worry. As the role of smell in human affairs 
yields to understanding, we see not that we are less human but that our tastes 
and emotions are far more complex and sophisticated than anyone ever 
imagined, (p. 125)
While Furlow valiantly tries to defend humanism by reinscribing smell as a ‘complex 
and sophisticated’ process, I would argue that it is not so much the fact that smell per  
se plays a role in human sexual attraction which strikes a blow at humanism, but the 
fact that this effect is not perceived consciously. As Furlow writes: ‘Curiously, 
remembering a smell is usually difficult -  yet when exposed to certain scents, many 
people suddenly recall a distant childhood memory in emotionally rich detail’ (p. 119). 
This evocation of memories and emotions is neither conscious nor under voluntary
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control. As Freud argues, this realisation that ‘the ego [...] is not even master in its 
own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on 
unconsciously in its m ind’ is a ‘major blow’ to ‘the naive self-love of men’.135
The human subject is never in full control of its own communication. It often
communicates in ways that are not only unconscious but actively sabotage conscious
intentions, such as the ‘slips o f the tongue’ most famously described by Freud: ‘It is a
frequent occurrence for the idea one wants to withhold to be precisely the one which
forces its way through in the form of a slip of the tongue’.136 Even if the speaker does
not betray herself verbally, people who are being deceptive ‘almost always give the
game away by producing an unnatural smile, a slightly flawed expression or a false
tone of voice’, as Ramachandran writes in Phantoms in the Brain (p. 278, note). He
offers a neurological explanation:
The reason is that the limbic system (involuntary, prone to truth telling) 
controls spontaneous expressions, whereas the cortex (responsible for voluntary 
control, also the location where the lies are concocted) controls the facial 
expressions displayed when we are fibbing. Consequently, when we lie with a 
smile, it’s a fake smile, and even if  we try to keep a straight face, the limbic 
system invariably leaks traces of deceit, (p. 278, note)
Although this might seem to preserve the binary opposition between limbic system and
cortex, the crucial point is that Ram achandran does not align this opposition with
human/animal. Both of these systems are part o f the human; having ‘higher’ brain
functions does not mean the ‘older’ limbic system is no longer functional or that it is
has been superseded. This not a narrative of mastery, but one which suggests a loss of
control: ‘the limbic system invariably leaks traces of deceit’.
The terms used here, specifically ‘leaks’ and ‘traces’, are suggestive of the 
transgression of boundaries and the disruption of categories. The psychologists Paul
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Ekman and W allace V. Friesen have argued that there is a ‘leakage hierarchy’, 
according to which
some nonverbal behaviors are harder to control than others during the deception 
process. These hard-to-control cues leak negative affect and provide clues that 
a person is deceiving. The leakage hierarchy specifies that the leakiest (and 
therefore hardest to control) channels are the voice and the lower body. The 
face and upper body are easier to control.137
In this leakage hierarchy, the voice occupies a paradoxical position with regard to the
traditional metaphysical concept of the voice. On the one hand, the voice is still
identified with access to truth; it is the leakiest channel, that is, the one that is most
likely to provide a truthful account to the listener. On the other hand, far from being
the instrument of power and mastery, it betrays the speaker. Above, I discussed
W allm an’s series o f oppositions between human language and animal communication,
which includes referential vs. affective. Yet here, it is clear that the voice ‘leak[s]
negative affect’ beyond the conscious or voluntary control of the speaker, who is here
not represented as an all-powerful locus of truth and agency, but as a mass of
conflicting systems which are not all under the control of a unified self.
Body Language and Proper Speech
Humanism, whether expressed in the ‘cognitivist problematic of the animal’ or in the
138metaphysical ‘truism s’ which it ‘repeats [...] even as it appears to resist them ’, 
presents speech as a transparent access to thought, as something pure which has 
transcended the physical and the animal. This passage from M cCrone’s The Ape that 
Spoke exemplifies the humanist dismissal o f the nonverbal aspects o f human 
communication:
M an’s ancestors would likely have tried to get round the handicap as much as 
possible by resorting to the three-dimensional world of gestures -  pointing and 
face-pulling to give extra clues to what they were trying to say. But eventually
f
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the two-dimensional limitations of speech turned out to be in fact an advantage. 
Man was forced to put his words into some sort of sensible order and the 
beginnings of grammar would have been bom. This meant that he no longer 
needed gestures to expand the meaning of what he was saying. It is noticeable 
that we still use a lot o f gestures or body language when we speak, although we 
tend to disregard them and concentrate on what is actually being said. It is as if 
evolution wired up Homo erectus to make gestures but modem speakers no 
longer need them now that we have proper speech, (p. 131)
McCrone here draws a distinction between ‘proper speech’, which is exclusively
verbal, and the comical picture of a prehistoric hominid clumsily ‘pointing and face-
pulling to give extra clues to what they were trying to say’, as if Homo erectus were
just making do until ‘proper speech’ evolved. Proper, from Latin proprius, one’s own,
originally from pro privo, for the individual, suggests that language is something that
1 30is possessed  by the individual speaker. In this view, gestures and body language are 
‘extra’ in every sense; they are external to the true meaning of ‘what is actually being 
said’. Like the limbic system and the sense of smell, these nonverbal aspects of 
communication are represented as archaic relics of a now superseded animal past. 
McCrone cannot ignore the ‘noticeable’ fact that ‘we still use a lot of gestures’ but 
apparently ‘we tend to disregard them ’.
This is not the case. Simply put, nonverbal behaviours matter; they cannot be 
excluded from ‘what is actually being said’. Their importance is demonstrated by the 
growing field of nonverbal communication studies, which examines body posture and 
facial expressions, physical appearance and dress, scent, ‘proxemics’ (the way that 
people use space), and ‘chronemics’ (the use of time to communicate, for example 
being late for an appointment).140 Even within this field, some researchers are keen to 
mark out language as a separate category, but their own analyses tend to blur the 
boundaries, despite their best efforts. For example, in his article ‘Nonverbal 
Vocalizations’, Michael Argyle writes: ‘It is useful to distinguish between the sounds
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which are part of language and those which are independent of it’.141 He then divides 
vocal sounds into four categories: ‘emotional cries’; ‘language’; ‘vocalizations linked 
to speech’ (including prosodic signals, synchronizing signals, and filled pauses); and 
‘paralinguistic aspects of vocalization’. Argyle’s aim is to distinguish between 
linguistic and nonlinguistic vocal sounds. He begins confidently, stating that 
emotional cries ‘are of interest since they are the most similar to animal vocalizations. 
They have nothing to do with language’, and then describes language as ‘a later system 
which has been incorporated in the vocal channel, superimposed on more primitive 
vocal m essages’. The first is clearly nonlinguistic, and the second linguistic. But the 
next two categories -  ‘vocalizations linked to speech’ and ‘paralinguistic aspects of 
vocalization’ -  are far less straightforward. Argyle states that ‘prosodic signals [such 
as rising pitch and loudnessl are really part o f  language', but a moment later he claims 
that ‘although prosodic signals appear to be part o f  language, they also convey 
emotional information’ (emphasis added). He then discusses ‘filled pauses, ers and 
ahs’ along with other ‘speech disturbances’ including ‘repetitions, stutters, incoherent 
sounds, omissions’, and claims that these ‘are not emotional sounds’: a claim that 
would be problematised by psychoanalysis. Finally even the name of the fourth 
category, ‘paralinguistic aspects of vocalization’, indicates the impossibility of clearly 
separating language from nonlanguage.142 These paralinguistic aspects ‘express 
emotions and attitudes to other people by the way in which words are spoken; the non­
verbal message is given simultaneously with the verbal one’. Argyle then states that 
‘other aspects of paralinguistics overlap with prosodic signals. “Pitch contour” can be 
a prosodic signal indicating end of utterance; it can also be a paralinguistic cue for 
emotion’. Despite Argyle’s intention to separate linguistic from nonlinguistic vocal 
sounds, these categories end up hopelessly muddled. It is not at all clear, for example,
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whether prosodic signals are ultimately included in language, or not. Argyle’s failure 
indicates the impossibility of his task, because there is no absolute dividing line 
between spoken language and nonverbal vocalizations.
Thus even la vive voix, far from being ‘a transparent substance of expression’,143 has a
material, bodily aspect which exceeds the control of the speaker. One of the few
critical theorists to consider this is Roland Barthes, for whom ‘the grain of the voice’
was a topic o f fascination:
Something is there, manifest and stubborn (one hears only that), beyond (or 
before) the meaning of the words, their form (the litany), the melisma, and even 
the style of execution: something which is directly the cantor’s body, brought 
to your ears in one and the same movement from deep down in the cavities, the 
muscles, the membranes, the cartilages, and from deep down in the Slavonic 
language, as though a single skin lined the inner flesh of the performer and the
• i • 144music he sings.
Here, rather than revealing conflicting emotions, the grain of the voice is a reminder
that the body is always present in speech: ‘The “grain” is that: the materiality of the
body speaking its mother tongue; perhaps the letter, almost certainly signifiance\U5
The body and the emotions cannot be excluded from speech to produce a pure category
of language. Shoshana Felman argues that there is an ‘incongruous but indissoluble
relation between language and the body’:146 that the act of speaking destroys the
opposition between the mind and the body. She writes:
If the problem of the human act thus consists in the relation between language 
and body, it is because the act is conceived -  by performative analysis as well 
as by psychoanalysis -  as that which problematizes at one and the same time 
the separation and the opposition between the two. The act, an enigmatic and 
problematic production of the speaking body, destroys from its inception the 
metaphysical dichotomy between the domain of the ‘mental’ and the domain of 
the ‘physical’, breaks down the opposition between body and spirit, between 
matter and language.147
‘Between animal and human’ could be very effectively added to this list. ‘The animal’
is associated with the body and matter, whereas ‘the human’ is identified with the
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mental and spirit. Thus, the materiality of the body which speaks ‘breaks down the 
opposition’ between the human and the animal.
Aphasia and the Symphony of Smells: Communication and 
Otherness
Humanism denies the significance of nonverbal communication in human interaction. 
However, when the verbal component is entirely absent, as in the case of people with 
aphasia, the extent to which humans communicate nonverbally cannot be denied. In its 
broadest sense aphasia refers to ‘loss of power to understand written or spoken 
language, as a result o f disorder of the cerebral speech centres’148 but it is generally 
and more accurately used to refer specifically to a lack of speech. This is confirmed by 
its etymology: from Greek a , no, phasis , utterance, from phanai, to speak, and related 
to pheme, which means both voice and rumour. If, as humanists claim, talking is what 
makes ‘us’ human, what happens to people when they become aphasic? Aphasia 
differs from the cases of feral children and autism examined in Chapter 2, and the issue 
of deafness, discussed above, in that it tends to affect people in later life as a result o f a 
neurological illness or injury. This suggests that rather than failing to become human, 
people with aphasia are at risk o f being ejected from the category o f the human.
The extent to which human communication exceeds words is described by Oliver
Sacks, in a discussion of patients with receptive (W ernicke’s) aphasia, who cannot
understand words spoken to them:
Their friends, their relatives, the nurses who knew them well, could hardly 
believe, sometimes, that they were aphasic. This was because, when addressed 
naturally, they grasped some or most of the meaning. And one does speak 
‘naturally’, naturally. Thus to demonstrate their aphasia, one had to go to 
extraordinary lengths, as a neurologist, to speak and behave un-naturally, to
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remove all the extraverbal cues -  tone of voice, intonation, suggestive emphasis 
or inflection, as well as all visual cues (one’s expressions, one’s gestures, one’s 
entire, largely unconscious, personal repertoire and posture): one had to remove 
all of this (which might involve total concealment of one’s person, and total 
depersonalisation o f one’s voice, even to using a computerised voice 
synthesiser) in order to reduce speech to pure words.1 9
This narrative contradicts the humanist concept of language as primarily verbal, with
gestures, tone of voice, and so on as mere accessories, which are somehow ‘exterior’ or
‘unnecessary’ to the ‘real’ meaning conveyed by words. W hat becomes clear here is
that these ‘extraverbal cues’ are in fact central to human language: so central that
people who are entirely unable to understand words ‘none the less understood most of
what was said to them ’.150 In order to demonstrate their lack, Sacks is forced to stop
being a person. Indeed, the ‘hum an’ elements of language must be removed, to the
extent of having to use a nonhuman computerised voice synthesiser.151 There is no
purely verbal human language.
But does becoming aphasic mean becoming inhuman? Sacks hints at something like
this when he writes:
The meaning may be fully grasped even when every word is missed. This, in 
our species Homo loquens, seems almost an inversion of the usual order of 
things: an inversion, and perhaps a reversion too, to something more primitive 
and elemental, (p. 77)
By identifying ‘our species’ as Homo loquens, and describing aphasia as ‘a reversion’,
Sacks does seem to exclude people with aphasia from the category o f the human.
However, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis with regard to autism, this does not
necessarily mean that he considers aphasia an impairment; it can also be viewed as
enhancing other aspects of perception. Sacks writes:
[A person with aphasia] cannot grasp your words, and so cannot be deceived by 
them; but what he grasps he grasps with infallible precision, namely the 
expression that goes with the words, that total, spontaneous, involuntary 
expressiveness which can never be simulated or faked, as words alone can, all
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too easily ... W e recognise this with dogs, and often use them for this purpose -  
to pick up falsehood, or malice, or equivocal intentions, to tell us who can be 
trusted, who is integral, who makes sense, when we -  so susceptible to words -  
cannot trust our own instincts. And what dogs can do here, aphasiacs do too, 
and at a human and immeasurably superior level, (p. 78)
Although he preserves the idea that the human level is ‘immeasurably superior’, Sacks
also indicates that normal human perception is in some respects inferior to that of dogs
and people with aphasia. This challenges the traditional humanist argument that
language produces infinite mastery, freedom and superior understanding. In fact,
Sacks suggests that by being ‘so susceptible to words’, the normal world-view is in
some ways impoverished in comparison to that o f a person with aphasia, or a dog.
Like Temple Grandin’s argument that ‘autistic people and animals are seeing a whole
register of the visual world normal people can’t, or don’t’,152 this re-evaluates the
relationship between the human and its others, and ultimately challenges rather than
reinscribes humanism.
This view contradicts the humanist assumption that only humans can perceive the
world in any meaningful way. This assumption is exemplified by the comments of
Terrence Deacon, a professor o f biological anthropology and linguistics:
I’m sure that dozens o f dogs have walked down this street in the past years and 
perhaps not one has glanced up in awe or wonder [at this mural] and thought to 
himself what does this mean? For a dog this is colour on a wall, perhaps even 
less than that.153
Deacon’s confident declaration that a dog cannot appreciate beauty rests on the 
assumption that the human experience of the world is superior to all other anim als’. 
Other animals’ experiences are impoverished versions of the human, ‘perhaps even 
less than that’. Vision (which, as Wolfe argues, is ‘ineluctably associated’ with ‘the 
figure of the hum an’)154 is privileged above all other senses. However, while dogs 
may not experience ‘awe’ and ‘wonder’ when looking at ‘colour on a w all’, their sense
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of smell is considerably more sensitive than hum ans’: a dog walking past a wall may
ignore the colourful mural but pay attention to the complex smells left by dogs which
have previously walked past. As Jean Craighead George writes, dogs can
communicate in ‘the language o f scents’.155 She writes:
W e have such poor noses that we are ignorant of almost all of the information 
[that] dogs read as easily as we read a newspaper. [...] Unfortunately, that 
avenue of communication is a one-way street to us, for although we apparently 
communicate information about ourselves to dogs, scent is the medium we 
understand the least, (pp. 58-59)
Unlike humanist accounts, which stress the importance of vision above all other
senses, this view recognises that there are ‘avenue[s] of communication’ which
humans cannot travel, but which nonhuman animals can. Indeed, ‘w e’ are not even
aware that ‘w e’ are communicating information about ‘ourselves’ in this way: as
Wolfe argues, ‘the traditional humanist subject finds this prospect of the animal other’s
knowing us in ways we cannot know and master simply unnerving\ 156
To return to the example of the mural, if, as Deacon claims, ‘for a dog this is colour on
a wall, perhaps even less than that’, it could equally be said that ‘for a human, this is a
faint smell of urine, perhaps even less than that’.
If there is a language of scents, could there be an equivalent art? This idea is explored
in a playful way by Paul Auster in his novel Timbuktu, which is written from the
perspective o f a dog called Mr Bones.157 Willy Christmas, his human companion, tries
to understand what the dog is experiencing when he smells: ‘Was there something
more to these frantic sniff-fests than simple military tactics? Could pleasure be
involved as well?’ (p. 40). Since Mr Bones resists being wrenched away from certain
smells, W illy decides that there must be pleasure involved. He ponders:
Did it not stand to reason that a dog of such spiritual inclinations would aspire 
to loftier things -  things not necessarily related to the needs and urgencies of
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his body, but spiritual things, artistic things, the immaterial hungers of the soul? 
[...] If dogs were beyond the pull o f oil paintings and string quartets, who was 
to say they w ouldn’t respond to an art based on the sense of smell? Why not an 
olfactory art? W hy not an art for dogs that dealt with the world as dogs knew 
it? (pp. 40-41)
This passage shows an awareness that however ‘lofty’ the practice of art or music, it
still ‘relies on the senses to reach [the] soul’ (p. 40); humans are physical beings too.
Whereas Terrence Deacon dismisses the possibility of dogs responding to art because
they do not appreciate ‘colour on a wall’, W illy Christmas tries to work out what it
would mean to move beyond this humanist perspective. He attempts to construct a
‘symphony o f sm ells’ for dogs by investigating M r Bones’ response to various smells,
while pondering questions such as whether including female scents in the symphony
would make it ‘pornographic, a kind of smut for dogs’ (p. 43). M r Bones enjoys the
process o f discovery, but cannot explain to W illy that
for a dog, dear master, the fact is that the whole world is a symphony of smells. 
Every hour, every minute, every second of his waking life is at once a physical 
and a spiritual experience. There is no difference between the inner and the 
outer, nothing to separate the high from the low. (p. 44)
Willy cannot compose the symphony of smells because he cannot ‘hear’ it;
furthermore, his attempts to transform Mr Bones’ experience of the world into human
terms cannot succeed. In ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am ’, Derrida writes:
It would not be a matter o f ‘giving speech back’ to animals but perhaps of 
acceding to a thinking, however fabulous and chimerical it might be, that thinks 
the absence of the name and of the word otherwise, as something other than a 
privation, (p. 416)
Timbuktu seems to suggest one way in which it might be possible to begin to ‘acced[e] 
to’ this ‘fabulous and chim erical’ thinking. Unlike those texts which suggest that 
nonhuman animals merely experience a diminished version of being human, if indeed 
they are allowed to ‘experience’ anything at all, Auster suggests that while dogs and 
humans may be companion species (to use Donna Haraway’s term), part of that
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companionship is recognising that they experience the world in radically different 
ways.
The argument that anim als’ communication is an impoverished version of human 
language is exemplified by Perspectives in Zoosemiotics, in which Thomas Sebeok 
examines the diverse ways that animals communicate, for example by using sonar, 
changing colours, chemical signals, and electricity. Zoosemiotics, a term invented by 
Sebeok and Rulon W ells, is ‘the discipline, within which the science of signs intersects 
with ethology, devoted to the scientific study o f signalling behavior in and across
1 SSanimal species’. Sebeok discusses the complex communication systems of animals, 
such as bees and ants, in great detail. This seems like a strong position from which to 
critique the primacy accorded to human language, but Sebeok devotes several pages to 
arguing that, instead of using the same criteria to judge humans and other animals, ‘we 
must guard against interpreting m an’s inventions too simplistically’ (p. 85). Other 
animals’ communication systems are primarily of interest because of their relationship 
to the human:
The task for the immediate future will be [...] using each species, so to say, as a 
miniature paradigm which throws light upon language observed as a peculiar 
combination of distinctive features, of which all or almost all components, 
considered alone, have their separate evolutionary roots, to consolidate and 
build upon what has been established about the protocultural foundations of 
human adaptation, (p. 61)
For Sebeok, then, other species are essentially inferior reflections o f humans:
‘miniature paradigms’ whose ultimate value lies in ‘consolidating’ research about
human development.
By contrast, the zoologist Charlotte Uhlenbroek emphasises the radical otherness of 
nonhuman communication systems:
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Although we share the same physical world with other creatures, we often 
inhabit totally different perceptual worlds. A spider tap-dances on the delicate 
threads of a web, an elephant listens with its feet to vibrations coming from 
miles away, a fish sparks up an electrical conversation with a neighbour. All 
around us are parallel universes rich in smells we cannot smell, sounds we 
cannot hear, vibrations we cannot feel and electricity we cannot sense.159
Whereas Sebeok conceives of other species as ‘miniature paradigms’ of the human,
Uhlenbroek notes the limitations of the human, emphasising what we cannot perceive.
The human subject here is not an all-powerful figure surveying the world from an
Archimedean vantage point, but an animal who is located in the world and whose
experience is ju st as limited and specific as any other. For example, she notes that
‘human ears are receptive to frequencies from about 20 Hz to about 20,000 Hz but
many animals can detect sounds far beyond that range’ (p. 31). Like Paul Auster’s
Timbuktu, what is important here is acknowledging the fundamentally different and
inaccessible quality of other animals’ experiences rather than conceiving of them as
limited or inferior versions of the human, while also acknowledging those experiences
which are shared across species. In this way we can ‘theorize the continuities between
human and animal subjectivities in relation to the emergence of linguistic domains,
while respecting the differences’, as Wolfe puts it.160
‘Electric Vocabulary’: Terminology and Power
Rather than attempting to teach human language to animals, Uhlenbroek uses 
technology, play-acting and other techniques to attempt to communicate with animals 
on their terms. For example, she employs ‘vibrometers using reflecting laser beam s’ 
(p. 185) to detect the very low frequency vibrations that stink bugs (Nezara viridula) 
use to communicate with each other: ‘I found myself eavesdropping on a remarkable 
conversation’ (p. 182). The use of the word ‘eavesdropping’ indicates an awareness
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that the stink bugs’ communication is not intended for humans to hear. This contrasts
with an unspoken assumption in much zoological writing that other species exist in
order for humans to observe them. It is also of note that Uhlenbroek describes the
stink bugs’ communication as a conversation, without using quotation marks. While
her book is entitled Talking with Animals, this ‘talking’ takes many forms besides
speech. Not only does she specifically criticise the ‘sharp distinction [...] made
between animals calls and human language’ (p. 68), but she also refers to the ‘intimate
dialogue’ of flashing lights between fireflies (p. 107) and the ‘electric vocabulary’ of
the ghost knifefish (p. 179), to name just two examples. For Uhlenbroek, ‘words’,
‘vocabulary’, and ‘dialogue’ can all be non-verbal. Similarly, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh
refers to the bonobo Kanzi’s use of the lexigram keyboard as ‘talking’: a term which
some see as deliberate obfuscation of the true nature of his abilities, but which could
also be interpreted as a recognition that language can take different forms. As Jean
Craighead George writes: “T a lk ” and “listen” are impoverished words to use to mean
communication; perhaps our reliance on speech explains why we spent so long
noticing so little animal palaver’ (p. 4). In The Story o f  Doctor Dolittle, Polynesia the
parrot admonishes the Doctor for failing to understand this:
At tea-time, when the dog, Jip, came in, the parrot said to the Doctor, ‘See, h e ’s 
talking to you.’
‘Looks to me as though he were scratching his ear,’ said the Doctor.
‘Animals don’t always speak with their mouths,’ said the parrot in a high voice, 
raising her eyebrows. ‘They talk with their ears, with their feet, with their tails 
-  with everything. Sometimes they don’t want to make a noise’.161
Although Polynesia’s main message is conveyed in words, the description of her ‘high
voice’ and ‘raising her eyebrows’ is a reminder that humans routinely communicate
using nonverbal language. It is not a question of arguing over whether bared teeth or
pointing at lexigrams conform to some definition o f language, but of questioning the
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‘purity, rigor, and indivisibility’162 of the distinction between human speech and 
nonhuman or nonverbal communication.
In O f Grammatology, Derrida quotes a passage from Levi-Strauss’ thesis on the
Nambikwara tribe, in which he argues that they are a ‘people without writing’:
Some time later, we saw them very busily drawing wavy lines. In that they 
imitated the only use that they had seen us make of our notebooks, namely 
writing, but without understanding its meaning or its end. They called the act of 
writing iekariukedjutu, namely: ‘drawing lines’, (p. 123)
Derrida takes issue with this final sentence:
It is as if one said that such a language has no word designating writing -  and 
that therefore those who practice it do not know how to write -  just because 
they use a word meaning ‘to scratch’, ‘to engrave’, ‘to scribble’, ‘to scrape’, ‘to 
incise’, ‘to trace’, ‘to imprint’, etc. As if ‘to write’ in its metaphoric kernel, 
meant something else. Is not ethnocentrism always betrayed by the haste with 
which it is satisfied by certain translations or certain domestic equivalents? To 
say that a people do not know how to write because one can translate the word 
which they use to designate the act of inscribing as ‘drawing lines’, is that not 
as if one should refuse them ‘speech’ by translating the equivalent word by ‘to 
cry’, ‘to sing’, ‘to sigh’? Indeed ‘to stammer’, (p. 123)
In fact, this is exactly what is done to keep human language separate from animal
communication. Animals do not speak; they ‘vocalise’ or ‘cry’ or ‘parrot’. For
example, a 2005 article in The Independent entitled ‘Talking Chimpanzee’ reported on
primatological research which showed that chimpanzees’ ‘vocalisations’ are ‘much
1 ^ 3more complicated and detailed than initially thought’. Although the article 
announced that ‘the communication barrier between mankind and our nearest animal 
relatives may be narrower than we thought’, it simultaneously protected that ‘barrier’ 
by putting quotation marks around key words, for example: ‘Previous research by 
scientists indicated that chimps have a “vocabulary” of about 30 “words” or sounds 
that allow them to communicate with other members of their group’. The quotation
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marks around ‘vocabulary’ and ‘words’ suggest that the chimps are not really using 
language; rather, it is ‘as i f  they have a vocabulary of words, ‘as if’ they are talking.
These questions o f terminology are not merely a ‘fruitless and boring debate’, as
Steven Pinker claims. He writes:
That debate is over what qualifies as True Language. One side lists some 
qualities that human language has but that no animal has yet demonstrated: 
reference, use of symbols displaced in time and space from their referents, 
creativity, categorical speech perception, consistent ordering, hierarchical 
structure, infinity, recursion, and so on. The other side finds some 
counterexample in the animal kingdom (perhaps budgies can discriminate 
speech sounds, or dolphins or parrots can attend to word order when carrying 
out commands, or some songbird can improvise indefinitely without repeating 
itself) and then gloats that the citadel of human uniqueness has been breached. 
The Human Uniqueness team relinquishes that criterion but emphasizes others 
or adds new ones to the list, provoking angry objections that they are moving 
the goalposts. To see how silly this all is, imagine a debate over whether 
flatworms have True Vision or houseflies have True Hands. Is an iris critical? 
Eyelashes? Fingernails? Who cares? This is a debate for dictionary-writers, not 
scientists. Plato and Diogenes were not doing biology when Plato defined man 
as a ‘featherless biped’ and Diogenes refuted him with a plucked chicken.164
I agree with Pinker’s initial assessment of the two sides of the debate, his description
of how the debate proceeds (namely, by ‘moving the goalposts’: I return to this point
below), and his point that the search for ‘True Language’ can never succeed. But I
disagree with his conclusion that it can be dismissed as ‘silly’. W hat he does not take
into account is, first, that the meanings of words are not produced by dictionary-
writers, but in all areas of discourse, some of which have more practical influence than
others. In the case of ‘language’, I have throughout this chapter identified many of the
discourses which play a role in producing its meaning, and some of the consequences
of this definition. Second, his examples which are supposed to prove ‘how silly this all
is’, namely ‘whether flatworms have True Vision or houseflies have True Hands’, are
hardly random or trivial choices. Like True Language, True Vision and True Hands
are strongly associated with the idea of human uniqueness.
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Similarly, his example of Plato and Diogenes’ debate draws attention to the
impossibility, even in simple biological terms, of producing an absolute definition of
the human which includes all human beings and excludes all nonhumans. In their
introduction to Posthuman Bodies, Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston describe the
same incident, and write:
To assert, in the spirit o f this vaudeville philosophy, that humanity (and the 
human body) is a catachresis -  a term unable either to ground itself adequately 
in a referent or to assert a common logic to unite its various referents -  is a 
good first step.165
As they argue, D iogenes’ refutation of the attempt to find an unambiguous way of 
defining the human, even if  it has a ‘vaudeville’ element, nevertheless points to a 
fundamental problem of humanism: ‘that humanity [...] is a catachresis’. Humanism is 
premised on the existence of an entity that can never be adequately defined or closed. 
Finally, the process of defining a word, particularly a word such as ‘language’ or 
‘human’ which plays a central role in culture and philosophy, is not separate from 
science and the power associated with it. Despite his focus on language, Pinker 
assumes that the definitions of words have nothing to do with the real work of 
scientists. However, as I have argued, the meaning of ‘the human’ depends on the 
meaning of ‘language’,166 and defining who is and is not human makes all the 
difference in terms of how they are treated, in real terms. As Halberstam and 
Livingston put it, ‘the imaginary closure of the category of the human, even or
| f i n
especially if perpetually deferred, has very real functions’. I would agree that there 
is no such thing as ‘True Language’. But Pinker’s rhetorical question ‘Who cares?’ is 
a flippant one, and comes from the comfortable position of a subject whose own 
inclusion within the privileged category has never been threatened.
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Conclusion: Endless Deferral
Humanism clings to the signifier ‘language’ as a marker of absolute difference
between human and animal, but as I have argued, there are many different ways in
which one can ‘rigorously theorize the disarticulation between the category of
language and the category of species’.168 In ‘Eating W ell’, Derrida writes:
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being [...] seems to me at 
once undisplaceable and highly problematic. Of course, if  one defines language 
in such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to say? But 
if one reinscribes language in a network of possibilities that do not merely 
encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes. I am 
thinking in particular o f the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of 
differance. These possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no 
language, are themselves not only human.169
In this chapter, I have explored this ‘network o f possibilities’, following some of the
traces which challenge the idea of ‘a single linear, indivisible, oppositional limit [...]
between the human and the infra-human’ based on spoken language.170 These
possibilities ‘mark [the human] irreducibly from the inside’; there is no such thing as a
pure human language which excludes all of the traces of animal communication. The
opposition between human language -  self-conscious, expressive, deliberate,
controlled, responsive, free -  and animal communication -  reactive, automatic,
passive, determined -  is not the clear division that is necessary to preserve humanism.
It is troubled by bonobos who can comprehend spoken language but cannot speak, by
parrots who can speak and perhaps think as well, and by a multitude of animal species
that communicate in ways that we cannot comprehend or even perceive. It is also
troubled by the fact that, in both verbal and nonverbal communication, the human body
always signifies in ways that exceed any conscious intention. The apparent power and
mastery that the human has through language is belied by the lack of control shown in
blushing, slips of the tongue and pen, and the voice which leaks information
uncontrollably. Finally, language itself is not something possessed by a unified human
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subject, a tool which s/he can use to manipulate the world, but is a structure that pre­
exists ‘us’ and which shapes ‘our’ subjectivities. ‘W e’ are never fully in control of 
what ‘w e’ say.
At the end of Chapter 1 ,1 argued that while paleoanthropologists disagree about which 
are the essential features of the human, they do not recognise that the human as a 
category is constituted  by these arguments; instead, it is represented as existing prior to 
any discussion o f it. I suggested that their disagreements in fact indicate a fundamental 
uncertainty about the boundaries of the human. These boundaries do not pre-exist the 
discourse, but are produced within it. A  similar process is at work in arguments about 
the essential features o f language. Language is defined differently in different texts; 
indeed, it seems to be de rigeur to include a disclaimer to this effect in every text that 
approaches the issue of ‘animal language’. For example, Wallman writes in Aping 
Language:
Hockett’s [...] famous list of so-called design features of language [...] has 
provided a useful orientation for those trying to capture the differences between 
human and nonhuman natural systems of communication. What is wanting, 
nonetheless, is consensus on what the necessary and sufficient, as distinguished 
from inessential, property or properties of language are and hence on how we 
might unequivocally identify language in another species, (p. 6)
Although W allman claims this ‘consensus’ is necessary in order to ‘unequivocally
identify language in another species’, it is clear from his use of the phrase ‘capture the
differences’ that in fact the aim is to unequivocally deny language in another species.
As Pinker notes above, those who wish to argue that there is only a quantitative and not
qualitative difference between human and nonhuman linguistic capabilities define
‘language’ in terms that at least allow for the possibility of nonhumans demonstrating
them. Conversely, those opposed to the concept of animal language define ‘language’
in such a way that it excludes nonhumans, and then change the definition if new
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research makes it necessary. The boundaries are always shifting, but humanism must
work to preserve language as exclusively human. In Through our Eyes Only?, Marian
Stamp Dawkins summarises the results o f the ape language research of the 1970s,
which demonstrated that apes could use symbols to refer to objects, produce novel and
spontaneous combinations o f symbols, and understand basic grammar. She writes:
W asn’t this enough? W hat more defined a human language? (It has to be said 
that this whole debate was made much more obscure by the lack of a clear 
definition of ‘language’. The definitions kept shifting as people frantically tried 
to draw distinctions where up to now none had really been needed. Human 
language had been so vastly and obviously different from anything else that 
detailed criteria o f what these differences might be were relatively new.) (p. 
74)
It seems amazing that this comment could be made parenthetically, and the statement 
that this debate was made ‘much more obscure’ seems somewhat o f an understatement. 
How can you set out to prove that something has or does not have a particular attribute, 
if you do not know what that attribute is?
Language, in summary, is central to our self-definition as a species, even 
though we have yet to derive an adequate definition of language itself, one that 
includes the essential but excludes the merely contingent.1 1
This quote from W allm an’s Aping Language makes it very clear (presumably without
meaning to) that language and the human are only constituted by each other. What is
the essence of being human? Having language. What is language? What makes us
human. The meaning is endlessly deferred, doubly deferred, as it is not only displaced
and referred on to another signifier, but delayed until a future time: ‘we have yet to
derive an adequate definition of language’. In this play of differance, ‘the difference’
between human and animal, which is needed to produce the human, never becomes
manifest. Language is ‘central to our self-definition’ so ‘we’ must cling to it, but in
this play of language and the human, ‘we’ never reach ‘the transcendental signified,
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1 79which [...] would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign’. The 
human never becomes present; it is never ‘allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of
17^its presence’.
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Conclusion: Dismantling the Myth of the Human
In this thesis, I have traced some o f the many fractures and limits that divide ‘those
who name themselves m en’ from ‘what so-called men, those who name themselves
men, call the anim al’.1 In the examples discussed, I hope that I have made some
progress in ‘determining the number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistency
of this abyssal limit, these edges, this plural and repeatedly folded frontier’.2 The
cultural, scientific, and philosophical debates which take place in the course of
defining the structure o f this ‘frontier’ are o f central importance in constructing the
category o f the human, since, as I have argued, the human can only be defined by
differing it from the animal. To reiterate Jacques Derrida’s argument in ‘Differance’,
the task o f deconstructive reading can be understood as
tak[ing] up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed, and 
from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition vanish but to see 
the emergence o f a necessity such that one o f the terms appears as the 
differance of the other, the other as ‘differed’ within the systematic ordering of 
the same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the sensible, as sensible 
differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life as differing-differed 
matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed-differing nature; and 
all the terms designating what is other than physis -  techne, nomos, society, 
freedom, history, spirit, etc. -  as physis differing: physis in differance).3
By examining different discourses which focus on the ‘coupled oppositio[n]’ between
the human and the animal, it is possible to see the way in which the human necessarily
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appears as ‘differed-differing’ animal, as the animal ‘in differance’. What it means to 
be human, according to contemporary humanist discourse, is not to be animal, and 
what is animal is what is not human.
As outlined in the Introduction, this project has approached the human as a myth: a 
fiction with real consequences, a story with ‘explanatory power’.4 The myth of the 
human is one o f the most potent ideas in contemporary Western culture, and to 
examine its workings is to take an important step towards dismantling its power.
There is an ongoing need for critical thinkers to assess this powerful discourse and to 
pay attention to how it defines who ‘w e’ are, and who or what is excluded in order to 
construct this ‘w e’. Therefore, in this thesis I have examined how and by whom the 
various boundaries between the human and the animal are constructed, and what 
effects this has on those who are marginalised or excluded from the privileged 
category.
Each of the three chapters in this thesis has taken issue with a particular humanist 
myth. The creation myths discussed in the first chapter provide humanism with a 
scientific grounding. In the wake of D arw in’s account of evolution and its 
undermining of the concept of immutable, separate species, paleoanthropologists and 
other scientists concerned with human evolution have attempted to identify a moment 
of absolute breakage between prehuman and human. Scientific accounts of human 
evolution echo the Biblical tale o f divine Creation; they are, as Catherine Belsey writes 
of myths in general, ‘stories o f the origins of things’,5 and they have explanatory power 
because they claim to tell us who ‘w e’ are and where ‘we’ originate. Through these 
stories, the human is constructed as the animal in differance; it is defined as what is
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new, as what differs from  its prehum an ancestors, and conversely they are represented 
as what is not yet hum an: as hum anity deferred. W ithin this particular discourse, the 
crucial difference betw een the hum an and the animal is thus differance in time: a 
chronological distinction and deferral.
The second chapter o f this thesis exam ined another operation of differance. The 
intangibility of human essence, the impossibility o f identifying a visible core of the 
human, means that hum anist discourse must try to delineate how humans act. The 
myth of the human thus relies upon differentiating human from nonhuman behaviour. 
However, this attempt to secure the boundary between the human and the animal in 
terms of behaviour m eans that those who do not act in the ‘correct’ way, such as 
people with autism, are excluded from  the category of the human and consequently do 
not benefit from supposedly universal human rights. This chapter demonstrates the 
crucial ethical im perative which m otivates the project as a whole and the broader 
project of posthumanism in general: the need to move beyond humanism as a social, 
institutional and conceptual fram ew ork.
In the final chapter, I analysed the w ay that human language is defined as animal 
communication in differance. The m yth of spoken language as mastery of the internal 
self and the external world is central to the way that the human is defined within 
contemporary hum anist discourse, and once again this process of definition relies upon 
exclusion. Characteristics which are com m on to both humans and nonhumans, such as 
nonverbal communication, are excluded from definitions of ‘true’ language, while 
language-like aspects o f animal com m unication are denied or presented as fictional, 
only superficially resem bling language. In this way the human is defined again as
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what differs from the animal. Posthumanism must take issue with this particular myth 
because it is foundational to contemporary conceptions of the human.
While these three myths are particularly significant in defining the human as the 
animal in differance, there are further aspects that could be explored. There is great 
potential for projects looking at the formations o f categories such as gender, race, and 
class, and how these intersect with the process o f defining the human. The material 
itself could also have been arranged in a num ber o f different ways, tracing some of the 
many lines which run throughout: for example, the Neanderthal speech debate is a 
single cultural phenom enon which encapsulates questions about evolution, behaviour, 
and spoken language, and the contested borders o f the human. Other directions for 
future research include further work in the new field o f Disability Studies, specifically 
examining the way that people who are autistic, deaf, mute, aphasic, or mentally ill are 
discursively excluded from the human, and how these exclusions are founded on ideas 
about speech and subjectivity. Another possibility would be a closer examination of 
fictional texts, such as the plethora o f books and television programmes for children 
which feature Neanderthals and other prehistoric people. Taking a more historical 
view, it would be fascinating to investigate representations o f parrots in the late 
nineteenth century and to explore how these relate to the new voice-related 
technologies of the time, such as the telephone and phonograph, and to the popularity 
of seances and spirituality. O ther historically specific projects might include a 
comparison of the overtly fictional perform ing apes of the mid-twentieth century, such 
as the Pathe films and PG Tips advertisements discussed in Chapter 2 o f this thesis, 
with the natural history documentaries which have replaced them since the 1970s, in 
order to examine ideas of nature and performance.
285
In addition to alternative types of research, such as those suggested above, it is 
important to recognise that this is not a closed project because the specific 
configurations o f m eanings which define the hum an are constantly shifting. The 
foliations o f the ‘abyssal lim it’ between the human and the animal are not static, but 
are subject to an ongoing process of reinscription within cultural discourse. Virtually 
every day, the m edia reports on new scientific research related to the themes of this 
project, such as the recent discovery that putty-nosed monkeys employ a 
communication system (known as ‘pyow-hack’) which uses syntax,6 the controversy 
over the new hom inid species H omo floresiensis, unearthed in Indonesia in 2004,7 and 
research which suggests that dogs bark specifically to ‘speak’ to humans,8 to name just 
three examples. Every discovery o f this kind provokes the production of many more 
texts, such as new spaper articles, television documentaries, popular science books, and 
novels, all o f which play a part in constructing the boundaries of the human by 
differing it from the animal.
One of the most significant arguments that I have sought to emphasise here is simply 
that the human has a history: that the definition of what it means to be human, and who 
is and who is not included within this category, is culturally and historically variable. 
The human is one o f the most resonant concepts in contemporary culture. It is an 
extremely powerful signifier, but what it signifies is mutable: the behaviours and 
characteristics that mark out the human from the inhuman are redefined depending 
upon what is at stake, and who is doing the defining. This mutability is visible within 
culture and media: for example, the burgeoning autistic liberation movement is an 
important site of explicit debates about what it means to be human.9 It is vital for
posthumanist theorists to track the way that the boundaries of the human are being 
contested on a daily basis.
Finally, I would like to reaffirm  the ethical implications of this project. As discussed 
in the Introduction to this thesis, some researchers within the field of Animal Studies 
have created an opposition between ‘animal advocates’ who are motivated by a 
concern to improve the way animals are treated, and ‘postmodern literary theorists’ 
who are ‘merely’ concerned with representations and signifying practices. W hat I 
hope to have demonstrated in this project is that this is an untenable opposition. 
Textual representations can and do make all the difference to real living conditions. 
From the extreme and overt legal dehumanisation o f slaves, to the more subtle and 
insidious exclusions o f autistic and deaf people from the category o f the human, the 
effects of being represented as nonhuman are immense. These exclusions are made 
possible -  indeed, are made essential -  because o f a structure o f thought that seeks to 
divide the world into human and nonhuman, ‘us’ and ‘them ’, same and different.10 
Thus, questioning the ‘purity, rigor, and indivisibility’11 of the borders that separate 
human from animal has the potential to improve the circumstances of many living 
beings. One way to approach this is to recognise the play o f traces that always trouble 
the limits between human and animal and which differ the human from itself. The 
human is never, simply, itself; it is the animal in differance.
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